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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

KOMBI Calls For President Alia's Resignation 1
Lawlessness, Anarchy in Shkoder Deplored *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 13 Jul]* 2
Program of Socialist Party Published *[ZERI I POPULLIT 3 Jul]* 3

BULGARIA

Ministry Defends Purchase of SS-23 Missiles *[BTA]* 11
Prime Minister Popov Meets Radio Personnel *[Sofia Radio]* 11
Vulkov Israel Visit Ends With Transport Talks *[BTA]* 11
Liberal Congress Party Presses Zhelev on 'Chaos' *[BTA]* 11
Finance Minister Investigates BSP Bank Accounts *[DUMA 19 Jul]* 12
Agrarian Leader Calls For Opposition Unity *[BTA]* 12
Nikola Petkov BZNS Rejects Unification *[Sofia Radio]* 12
Dertliev Speaks at BSDP News Conference *[Sofia Radio]* 13
Democracy Club Federation Holds News Conference *[Sofia Radio]* 14
Radioactive Pollution Reported at Kozloduy Plant *[Sofia Radio]* 14
Kozloduy No. 6 Generating Unit To Be Started Up *[BTA]* 14
Environmental Commission Chairman on Kozloduy *[TRUD 18 Jul]* 14
Industry Ministry News Conference on Restructuring *[Sofia Radio]* 15
Long-Term Cooperation With Siemens Anticipated *[BTA]* 15

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reaction to Dubcek Departure From VPN Reported *[CTK]* 17
ODS Leader Calls For Dubcek Resignation *[CTK]* 17
Parties React to Call For Dubcek's Resignation *[CTK]* 17
Calfa Rejects ODS Call For Dubcek's Ouster *[CTK]* 18
Slovak Party Chief Discusses Dubcek, Independence *[CTK]* 18
Krycer Discusses Situation in Moravian Movement *[LIDOVE NOVINY 23 Jul]* 18
Club Formed To Unite Social Democratic Factions *[Bratislava PRAVDA 22 Jul]* 20
Czech Reaction to Carnogursky Interview Reported *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 23 Jul]* 20
Carnogursky on Future Slovak Constitutional Setup *[SLOVENSKY DENNIK 23 Jul]* 21
Defense Minister Opposes Slovak Home Guard *[CTK]* 21
Remaining Legal Obstacles to Referendum Explained
[Havligerova in HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 23 Jul] 22
Klaus Outlines Problems in Agricultural Reform *[OBCANSKY DENIK 19 Jul]* 22
Dlouhy: USSR Lacks Funds for Export Purchases *[Prague TV]* 23
Slovak Statistics Reveal Economic Decline *[NARODNA OBRODA 23 Jul]* 24
Federal, Republic Officials Agree on Pipeline *[CTK]* 24
Semtex Enterprise Creates Detectable Explosive *[CTK]* 24

HUNGARY

Environment Minister: Danube Project Unacceptable *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 24 Jul]* 25
MDF Opposes CSFR Decision on Gabcikovo *[Budapest Radio]* 25
Party Chairman, Gorbachev Discuss Grain Sales *[Budapest Radio]* 25
Entz, Chebeleu Assess Geneva Minority Conference *[NEPSZABADSAG 22 Jul]* 25
Army Commander Denies Troop Mobilization *[MTI]* 27

POLAND

'Improved Atmosphere' at Troop Withdrawal Talks *[PAP]* 28
Party 'Reluctantly' Supports U.S. Treaty *[PAP]* 28
Official Describes Future Hungarian Treaty *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 22 Jul]* 28
Democratic Party Calls on Other Parties To Meet *[PAP]* 29
Trade Union Candidates Must Be Non-Party *[Warsaw TV]* 29
Center Accord's Kaczynski on Election Coalitions *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 19 Jul]* 29

ROMANIA

Nastase Leaves for Visit to Yugoslavia, Albania *[ROMPRES]* 32
Meets SFRY's Markovic, Milosevic *[ROMPRES]* 32
Friendship Treaty With Italy Outlined *[ROMPRES]* 32
EBRD Help Depends on Implementation of Reform *[ROMPRES]* 32
Defense Minister Spiroiu Interviewed *[LUMEA AZI 18 Jul]* 33
FSN Approach to Privatization Law Criticized *[TINERETUL LIBER 20-21 Jul]* 34
Brucan Examines Political Spectrum *[ROMPRES]* 35
PACR President Manolescu Interviewed *[LIBERTATEA 18-19 Jul]* 35

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Draft Accord on Moratorium Released *[TANJUG]* 38
Foreign Affairs Secretary on EC Peace Moves *[TANJUG]* 40
Roundup of Press Comments on Ohrid Declaration *[TANJUG]* 41
Federal Chamber's Appeal for Peace Detailed *[TANJUG]* 41
Army Issues Statement on Erdut Incident *[TANJUG]* 42
Statement on Vinkovci Incident *[TANJUG]* 42
Federal Chamber Refrains From Discussing Crisis *[TANJUG]* 42
EC Drops Proposal To Invite Presidents to Talks *[TANJUG]* 42

International

Kucan, Rupel Meet Netherlands Envoy on EC Role *[TANJUG]* 43
Loncar, Romania's Nastase View Regional Issues *[TANJUG]* 43
Markovic Meets Nastase *[TANJUG]* 43
Milosevic Holds Talks *[TANJUG]* 44

Slovenia

Defense Secretariat Promises To Reopen Airports *[TANJUG]* 44
Views Airport, Border Issues *[Ljubljana Radio]* 44
Drnovsek, Kadijevic Discuss Release of Soldiers *[Ljubljana Radio]* 44
Slovene Leaders in Talks With EC Envoy *[TANJUG]* 45
Hopes for Increased Trade With West *[AFP]* 45
Fifth Military District Statement on Talks *[TANJUG]* 46
Slovene Soldiers To Leave Army Soon *[TANJUG]* 46

Croatia

Tudjman Blamed for Isolating Croatia *[TANJUG]* 46
VJESNIK Urges 'Historic Accord' *[TANJUG]* 47
Belgrade Papers View Options for Tudjman *[TANJUG]* 47
Weekly Assesses Army Moves on Slovenia *[TANJUG]* 47
Tudjman Condemns Army Support for Serbia *[Zagreb Radio]* 48
Assembly Delegates Protest 'Illegitimate' Acts *[Zagreb Radio]* 48
Zagreb Daily Says Croatia Has Lost Allies *[TANJUG]* 48
Cease-Fire Agreement in Plaski Municipality *[Zagreb Radio]* 49
Hungarian Weapons Reach Croatia Via Bulgaria *[TANJUG]* 49

Councils Expect 'Decisive Attack' by Serbs *[Belgrade Radio]* 49
Sibenik Situation 'Far from Stable' *[TANJUG]* 50
Attacks in Knin Area Described *[Belgrade Radio]* 50
Six Guardsmen Killed East of Osijek *[Zagreb Radio]* 50
Two National Guardsmen Killed in Vinkovci *[Zagreb Radio]* 51
Shoot-Out in Vinkovci Leaves Three Dead *[AFP]* 51

Serbia

Government Statement Condemns Mesic *[TANJUG]* 51
Serb-Romanian Relations Discussed *[TANJUG]* 52
Official Claims Serbians 'Preparing for War' *[Zagreb Radio]* 52
Vojvodina's Bozovic on Hungarian Minority *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 22 Jul]* 53
Vojvodina Paper Assesses Hungarian Press Analyses *[NEPSZAVA 22 Jul]* 55
Magyar Villages Threatened by Serbs *[Budapest Radio]* 55
40,000 Apply To Join Serbian Guard *[Belgrade Radio]* 55
Serbia Turns Back Albanian Recruits for Croatia *[TANJUG]* 55
Kosovo Officials Present Demands to Mesic *[TANJUG]* 56
BORBA Views Ethnic Albanian Moves in Serbia *[TANJUG]* 56

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Democratic Action Demands Army Units Demobilize *[TANJUG]* 56

Macedonia

Gligorov Meets Dumas, Urges Compromise *[TANJUG]* 57
VMRO Urges Macedonian Independence *[Skopje Radio]* 57

Montenegro

Bulatovic Fears Slovenia Will Hinder Withdrawal *[TANJUG]* 57

KOMBI Calls For President Alia's Resignation

AU2407173591 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian
18 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Pal Delia, chairman of KOMBI's Publishing Board: "The Nation Faced With Tragedy—The President Watches From His 'Box'"]

[Text] The Albanian nation is living through its most serious drama since the first decade of this century. We see with our own eyes at every moment the fatal day drawing near, and still feel powerless to cure our disease. Perhaps we are not used to upheavals or are waiting for everything to come to us from on high (from God: May he help us) or from far away (the United States and the West). It is not at all difficult to notice that people are not working, from the administration's central apparatus to the smallest state production unit. Those who hurry to and fro day and night are the traders and small itinerant craftsmen who seem to set the tone of life. There is no safety or peace in our streets or at our hearth sides, and if this goes on the end will not be pleasant. The exodus continues and the state remains silent. As the days pass, these and many other wounds are draining the veins of the country and the nation, which we can candidly say is standing at a crossroads if not worse. Our tables and stomachs are empty, and we are incapable of getting through today, let alone thinking about the evil tomorrow. Kosovo is at war, and they want to bury Cameria, while their kin-state issues statements about the first, and, as for the second, says that the time is not ripe. Wherever you go, people ask the same question. What is happening to us, and where will this plight lead us? In short, the nation faces a tragedy. Everyone is scared of it. Some merely keep their heads down, others hold on to their property, and others hold on to their 50-year-old sinecures, not to mention those who gamble at our expense.

In all this time of stagnation, the role of the president should be more decisive, as it is elsewhere in the world. However, in our case, the president is in the background, and seem to exist only as a name. It is not an easy thing to say such a thing even in a conversation among friends, still less in the press. On the contrary, it is a heavy responsibility to describe to a broad circle of readers and the entire Albanian public a situation which constitutes the opening chapter of the country's total crisis. With the mission it has undertaken, the newspaper KOMBI cannot remain silent when a national figure, who must of necessity represent the national unity of the entire people, loses his reputation and gradually becomes a point of reference for an accumulation of serious, extremely serious responsibilities.

Nobody finds it hard to comprehend both sides of the coin, the two faces of our president, Mr. Ramiz Alia. One is that of the former first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh] Central Committee and the chairman of the Presidium. What does this side of the coin look like? A lot of activity. He sets off from Tirana for Korce, Kolonje, Skrapar, and comes back. Dozens of speeches and village meetings knee to knee with the people, dozens of deceptions about our "happy, prosperous, and above all secure future." Albanian life itself showed how much this river of the leader's rhetoric was worth. Not a single newspaper or radio or television broadcast failed to repeat over and over again that the PPSh and Ramiz Alia are the standard-bearers of democracy in our country. It is well known who hastened to raise him to this place of honor, usurping the voice of the people, who had aspired to democracy for more than five decades. When the ruling party proposed him as president, its defense of him was of the most servile kind possible. The Assembly session raised him above Zeus, but the days and events that followed justified the opposition's objections as being closer to the truth, emotions apart, even in the eyes of the PPSh's deputies.

It is regrettable that for the past three months the people have seen Mr. President almost exclusively on the screen, welcoming and seeing off various delegations and businessmen. This is part of his protocol schedule. However, the people cannot eat protocol, clothe themselves in protocol, or travel by protocol. We do not understand why the president shuts himself up in his office, and forgets that "splendid" feature of his past, his ties with the masses. Why should he retreat and be so inactive in the country's political life? Now or never, we need dynamism and initiative on the part of the state's leading figure in order to solve our complex problems. As journalists, and spokesmen for the public that reads and respects us, we must voice the view that is now freely expressed (thanks to democracy, for otherwise the "hell" of Burrel would open for everybody alongside myself), that our present president, Mr. Ramiz Alia, does not represent national unity, and that the most sincere and correct thing would be for him to submit his resignation to the People's Assembly and the people.

How can there be any claim on the people's confidence when, during the general strike that paralyzed the country, Mr. Nano's government did not budge from its bunker, the People's Assembly discussed endlessly, and the only voice that was not heard with its former strength was that of the president? Even when he did speak in the legislature, it would have been better if he had not done so. It was neither fish nor fowl, with neither the resignation of the government nor a new political settlement—pure dissonance!

It was not long before the president appeared on the mountain top of Kukes with a speech reminiscent of the communist era. He began his speech more or less like this: "Dear brothers and sisters of Kukes... I have looked forward to meeting you... In my heart and mind, I have been with you... but my many duties prevented me from coming here." The people cannot swallow such slogans any more, and such slogans should not be served up to them, still less when in the middle of the speech the president swore "sincerely" that he personally had no direct or indirect link with the events in Shkoder. With what kind of courage does he make such a statement, and

why in Kukes? We think that such tragic events must be explained where the people's outrage is strongest, at the scene in Shkoder, or in other districts that are asking for the identification of the culprits for this unprecedented massacre, such as Tirana, Durres, etc. Moreover, personal and civil responsibility obliges him to provide the explanation in his birthplace, in what he calls darling Shkoder, at the foot of Tarabosh, which does not shake in the wind. [In a PPSh Central Committee plenum speech in January 1990, Alia denied reports of demonstrations in Shkoder, saying, "Tarabosh does not shake in the wind."]

After the efforts to cover up the truth, the president's long silence, and the innumerable oral orders by telephone, the massacre of Shkoder must be clearly exposed, just as all the other massacres that the Albanian people have suffered and borne on their backs for decades on end are being exposed. In any case, the handiwork of the president is evident in all this tangle and this now several-months-old riddle.

The attitude of the president, who simply watches from his box, is also evident in other areas of political and economic life. The People's Assembly becomes jammed for days on end over a single law, article, or paragraph. The debates, discussions, and opinions of the political parties are of the most varied kinds. The only opinion not officially and publicly expressed is that of our president. He prefers to discuss and decide with what he calls the main political parties, ignoring, discounting, and wiping from the roundtable various others. We are thinking of the Albanian Party of National Unity. Let us just cite one example. At his first meeting with our party's leaders, the president persisted in his monist ways of organizing the country's political forces, saying, "You are like the Democratic Front." We gave him a reply at the time, but will repeat it again. "No, Mr. President, we are neither the Front nor any other instrument of the PPSh or of yourself. We are an independent political force that has arisen out of the needs of the times, without consulting the still-surviving leaders of the dictatorship who unfortunately still operate in the same old way."

Under these circumstances, when Albanian political and economic life has joined the European mainstream, the monist methods of direction that are so evident in the personality of the president, instead of encouraging democratic developments, are becoming a hindrance to these processes that are so vital for our nation.

It is a highly serious matter when you see the people threatened by tragedy, with hunger for bread and food and shortages of clothing, with moral, spiritual, and even physical extinction, with loss of national pride and independence, and the danger of further loss of national characteristics, while you, Mr. President, sit in the main "box" in front of this tragedy, as a mere onlooker. In the end, there will be nothing left for you to do but to hand out prizes and diplomas to those political forces or leading actors whom you prefer, who are playing "musical chairs" at the Albanian people's expense. But do not forget one thing: The people, too, Mr. President, will not leave you without a prize for what you did for decades, and there will in particular be a special prize for the current Albanian drama.

History does not forget, and the nation does not forgive.

Lawlessness, Anarchy in Shkoder Deplored

AU2507075591 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 13 Jul 91 p 2

[Fadil Kraja article: "A City Without a Government..."]

[Text] Shkoder, this ancient cradle of national art and culture; Shkoder, the early pioneer of democracy and freedom, now seems a bewildered city, without peace or security... without a government. Your heart weeps to see it. People's Shkoder humor, that characteristic humor that kept them alive even in the most difficult days, has deserted them. Now people walk the gloomy streets at a brisk pace, and nightfall sends them home. Gunshots, explosions of dynamite, thefts, raids on houses, assaults, and bloodshed disturb your sleep and the calm of night. People talk about "dark forces," but in fact everybody knows that the forces of order stand with folded arms, and take so little action that one has the impression that they themselves wish for such a state of affairs. They even encourage it. There is no other way of explaining the fact that not a single murderer, thief, or vandal has been arrested. Rather, it is the activists of the opposition parties and the Independent Trade Unions who voluntarily settle quarrels and scraps and who have undertaken to maintain order at least insofar as to prevent the outbreak of general chaos and anarchy. Everybody notices the tense situation. There is no sign of the Socialist Party (the Albanian Workers Party). Its apparatchiks, who swaggered until yesterday and caused you trouble for a single word out of place, now lie low like mice. They cannot be seen anywhere.

There is no government in Shkoder. It is a city without a government—worried Shkoder. The Executive Committee, the District People's Council, and the councillors that the people elected to lead them are the government. However, the Council has not met for six months. Who can summon it? The Council's Presidium, which had and still has as its chairman a secretary of the Party Committee, has been reduced to the level of a miserable appendage to a party plenum. The first secretary used to lay down the law. He used to mount the rostrum, issue directions, insult people, and hire and fire, while the councillors had only one job—to raise their hands. To approve. To keep silent. To applaud. The two front rows of the hall were occupied by the "bosses," the internal affairs department, the courts, the procurator's and investigator's offices, and the veterans, who even came to meetings with revolvers in their belts. Heads of sections were chosen and dismissed by the first secretary, and even by his wife. Two years ago, the first secretary's

wife boasted openly among her friends that she had appointed the education chief. Everybody knew, and everybody remained silent. They remain silent still.

Young people gather on street corners, in front of the post office, the theater, and in the now devastated flower gardens. They gamble and place bets, discharging their batteries of boredom in shouts and insults. Meanwhile, the line in front of the post office grows longer, as people try to contact the "lucky ones" who have fled and settled in Europe. Many letters are lost, do not arrive, or are not sent, and are still censored in some fanatical backwater that the times have left behind. Does this only happen to letters arriving in Shkoder, or elsewhere too? Shkoder is worried. People complain, even to the central post office in Tirana, but letters continue to be lost and censored.

The border is not guarded at all now. Crowds of young people cross it under the border guards' very eyes. They are seized on the other side, where they are beaten, insulted, and humiliated. Serb and Montenegrin officers and soldiers insult their nation, their roots, their language, and even the mothers who gave them birth. Then they send them back. The next day, others go, always others. Nobody thinks it too late for this humiliating flight devoid of all hope. Those who are sent back, the insulted and the humiliated, then give vent to their rage against shop windows and in the basest kinds of theft and assault, down to the murder of innocent people.

Meanwhile, as if in irony, Illyria Holdings has bought one of the city's newest buildings in order to turn it into a discotheque and games hall. Entire rooms full of loudspeakers, bars, billiards, and other mechanical games with the most sophisticated technology. However, Illyria Holdings is putting off the opening day, because young people's eyes view the building with loathing and distrust. Twenty new leks to enter, when thousands of young people are without work or hope. The atmosphere in Shkoder, the city without a government, is electric. If there is any delay... This article is dedicated to the opposition parties and the independent trade unions that are in practice maintaining order of a kind.

Program of Socialist Party Published

AU2307081891 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 3 Jul 91 pp 1-3

["Program of the Socialist Party of Albania"]

[Text]

Introduction

The Socialist Party of Albania (PSSh) was created by a decision of the Tenth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party (PPSh), which was held 10-13 June 1991. In this party are included all former members of the PPSh who, with free will and full conviction:

—Call upon it to carry on the historic role and activity of the Workers Party which led the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War, obtained national liberation, and put the country on the road to comprehensive transformation.

—Accept the new program and statute of the PSSh, the ideological and theoretical and organizational bases and the other requirements and duties which evolve from these documents and who work for its complete and conclusive orientation as a political force like the leftist European socialist alternative.

The PSSh is emerging as a new party on the basis of deep democratic changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country and as a response to aspirations of broad strata of the population for freedom, justice, and democracy.

As a new alternative on the Albanian political scene, it is the work of honorable people, who have been proven to be devoted to the interests of the people. The PSSh is a party of the masses, a party of social progress and social justice and of the protection of national interests.

1. Theoretical Principles of Its Policy

The theoretical bases of the PSSh are the most important ideological and cultural achievements of humanity and of our nation.

—The historic heritage of progressive Albanian sociopolitical thought, the democratic and national traditions of our people, its aspirations and its struggle for freedom, equality, social justice, and progress.

—The theoretical culture inherited from humanity and, in particular, humanistic philosophy and the ideas of Marx, above all, in a critical manner and in accordance with current developments.

—The best achievements of the theoretical and political thought of our times, trends with socialist orientation and from the workers' movement, which are the foundation of the aspirations of the people for democracy and for a better life, and for a more just socioeconomic system.

1.1. Socialist ideals take concrete form in our progress along the road to democratic socialism, by means of socioeconomic qualitative changes through the policy of democratization and reforms.

The values on which the socialist ideals are based are freedom, equality, social justice, and solidarity. They are criteria for orientation as the best possible social system, for evaluating political reality and for guiding the activity of the party and of every party member.

Freedom has social and national significance. It is achieved when society creates the opportunity for each person to be of assistance in political, economic, and cultural life and to develop his personality without any obstacles. We are in favor of a free society of free individuals. In order to be free, there must be equal opportunities in life, social assistance, the development

of individual abilities and responsible and understanding cooperation in society and in political life, liberated from oppressive and compulsive dependencies.

Equality is achieved by means of social justice, which is based on the dignity of each individual. Social justice requires equal freedoms, justice before the law, equality of men and women, and monitoring by society of the distribution of income, property, and power in order to eliminate extreme polarizations and discrimination. It requires the fairest possible distribution of income, property, and power and of opportunities for receiving training, as well as education and culture.

Under conditions of a pluralistic society, the issue of unity is resolved in a new way by means of solidarity. Political, economic, and cultural diversity necessitate the joint struggle of individuals in a free and democratic society for their rights and for their interests, which affect the entire society and nation. Solidarity has inspired and stimulated the movements of the popular masses in the struggle for freedom, democracy, and justice. It is the readiness to unite around each other's aims and ideas, to find each other and it provides a guarantee that democratization and reforms will be implemented. Without solidarity, there is no human society and it is joint activity which ensures the freedom and self-determination of the individual.

1.2. The dignity and rights of the individual form the basis of our concept of humanization and a worthwhile life.

The PSSh is working for a society and a legal system which will ensure the achievements of human rights in accordance with international norms, in accordance with the United Nations' Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the documents of the CSCE. It is committed to putting into practice freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of expression and of the press, the right to move freely within and outside the country, to join a party, organization, or association, as well as the rights of social and professional groups and minorities.

The coordination of individual rights with the rights of society ensures that they will not conflict with each other; on the contrary, the respect of individual rights to freedom of opinion, to work, food, lodging, education, and culture will make it possible to have a human life with moral values and dignity, while the achievement of collective rights will make it possible for all to enjoy their individual rights,

Human rights and dignity require that each person and all people work for social justice, with responsibility for the creation of conditions of a worthwhile life.

The PSSh is working to ensure human rights and freedoms in accordance with contemporary standards while protecting the values of the spirit, the values of our nation and people, our best traditions and customs, respect for the differences among social and ethnic groups, in the interest of the advancement of culture on national, popular, and democratic bases.

1.3. The activity of the PSSh for the achievement of its aims takes concrete form in its policy and organization, which responds to the democratic concept of relations among the party, society, and the state.

The PSSh plays an active role in the formation of the political will of the masses in all fields of life, exerting influence by means of its program, its political education and culture, and its activity, to form progressive public opinion and to enlist the active participation of the people in political life, by taking responsibility for the interests of the country and of society.

For its aims it uses only democratic means and methods. The principles and structure of its organization are stated in the Statute of the Socialist Party of Albania.

The Socialist Party represents the basic interests of the broad strata of workers in the cities and the villages, of the intelligentsia, the young people, and the strata without privileges. Its members and supporters have the same convictions with regard to socialist ideals and national progress, as well as the same political aims. The party respects various personal opinions and religious beliefs and does not subject them to party decisions.

Our policy is open; it receives its stimuli from the needs of a democratic society, from changes in awareness and in living conditions; it is nurtured by the broad interests and goals of the people, by the opinions created through the free flow of socioeconomic information. It is a policy of solidarity in thought and action in a free and equal society, which constantly places before itself new tasks and which aims to be convincing, faithful, and mobilizing, without being imposing.

Political activity is carried out in a conscientious manner, by means of free dialogue and public discussion, which ensure the freedom of expression of opinions, the explanation of measures, and the adoption of decisions which can be put into practice.

Under the conditions of political pluralism, the PSSh is in favor of loyal dialogue, correct and democratic relations with every other party and political force, as long as they are guided in their aims and activities by the interests of the country, democracy, and progress. It respects the political ethic of participation in the direction of society and of the state, on the basis of democratic practice and the current requirements of social life.

1.4. Albanian society has embarked upon the road of the construction of a pluralistic democratic state and a market economy, while becoming integrated into the present-day processes of European unity. It is convinced that there is an opportunity for a society with a pluralistic democracy and a market economy to permit the affirmation of socialist ideals, the European democratic socialist alternative.

The PSSh supports the strengthening of the law-governed state, so that the law will apply to all, so that state activity will be carried out only by authorized state organs and always in accordance with the Constitution and the legislation in force. The party works consistently for the continuing improvement of legislation, so that relations of individuals, collectives, organizations, and institutions with the state will be regulated by unitary legal norms which are publicly known. It aims at the further improvement of the political system and the effective execution of the role assigned to the organs elected by the people, and the reform of the political system, by firmly espousing principles of democracy. The comprehensive reforms create conditions for eradicating bureaucracy and bureaucratic methods, for maintaining a state apparatus which is not burdensome, but dynamic and effective, which is constructed on modern bases and which ensures the progress of the country.

1.5. The theoretical and political thought of the PSSh is based on the real situation in the country and on its prospects for the future. It works for a society in which democracy will be implemented, not only in political and social life, but also in the economy, in the fields of culture, education, and science, in which equality and social justice and an appropriate level of well-being will be ensured for all, along with an opportunity for work and for the fulfillment of spiritual needs.

The transition to a market economy, as an essential choice for the development of the country and for its integration into the world processes, will give new impetus to economic and technological progress. However, it is also exposed to some negative consequences with which the civilized world is confronted today. In these circumstances, we are not offering a social utopia but a policy to surmount these phenomena with the fewest difficulties and the least pain for the broad strata, providing economic, social, and political measures to deal with the harmful trends and challenges of the future.

The PSSh militates against subjugation, inequality, and the aggravation of conflicts between social classes and strata for economic reasons, ensuring the support of the trade unions in this area. In regard to social measures and reforms, it is aiming for a society in which the individual will not be unprotected, but, instead, will have his interests guaranteed, a society in which each person will be free, with justice and dignity, on the basis of his work and his property. The conditions of a dignified life also include the protection of the family, of the social rights and health of individuals, and of the environment.

1.6. The PSSh supports the policy of peace and collective security and is opposed to the use of war to resolve conflicts between various countries. It is in favor of the protection of the freedom and rights of peoples, international cooperation and good neighborliness, as well as integration processes and the support of international bodies.

The PSSh will always give special attention to the nationality issue. It supports, without reservation, the legitimate and undeniable demands of Kosovo and of the Albanians who live in their own regions in Yugoslavia, for freedom and national rights in a form which they judge to be acceptable and proper for the times, including the right to self-government.

Our party considers the issue of the Cams to be an inseparable part of our nationality issue. It supports and stands by the Albanian diaspora everywhere in the world, so that it will protect and maintain its national language, culture, traditions, and customs, and strengthen its comprehensive ties with its first homeland, by participating in the ensuring of its progress and prosperity.

1.7. The PSSh pursues a policy of strengthening and ensuring the defense and security of the country. It supports measures for the modernization of the armed forces and for raising their level of readiness for defending the homeland in accordance with current conditions, serving only the general national interests.

1.8. The PSSh is breaking away, once and for all, from all the distortions of the past: from the model of the so-called "socialist society", which was not able to ensure rapid economic and social development, the contemporary development of production forces, culture, and science, or the improvement of the standard of living of the masses; from the practice of the party-state and of the dictatorship, which nurtured a total centralism, administrative methods, bureaucracy, privileges, the workers' loss of interest in their work, state ownership over everything, the isolation of the country. It is breaking away from dogmatism, subjectivism, and cults, which resulted in violations against democracy in socioeconomic and party life, violations of human rights, of freedom, and of social justice, and violations of the interests of the individual in the name of the "class struggle".

1.9. Basing its program on socialist ideals, the PSSh ranks itself among the political forces of the European left, represented in the Socialist International.

2. Democracy and the Law-Governed State

2.1. The Socialist Party is in favor of civilized and democratic coexistence with every party and political force which is guided in its activities by national interests and democracy. The requirements for consolidating this coexistence form a basis for consensus for all political forces during the discussion and the political competition for power.

The Socialist Party is making an effort to ensure that this democratic coexistence becomes a general way of life for social classes, strata, and groups and individuals in society.

We will work to ensure that no individual or social group will be excluded from democratic participation in the activity of directing the state and society.

We will make an effort to defend democracy from any possible dangers resulting from the operation of the market economy, such as the excessive concentration of economic power, of the information media, or of other means of imposing the political will in the private and public sector.

We think that there is no democratic coexistence without transparency of political and social life, and of the life of the state and its administrative bodies. By means of this, conditions are created for the democratic control of the masses over the state. For this, it is necessary that all have the right to receive information on matters dealing with society as a whole and with them as individuals. Deciding for oneself regarding the control by society over one's own information is the expression of a basic right, just as an individual's right to inviolability.

2.2. The Socialist Party is in favor of the strengthening of the law-governed state, so that the Constitution and the laws will stand above all. A democratic state is based on respect for the equal rights and duties of the citizens.

The state is the only executor of power and of the protection of the law. Obedience to the law is a vital democratic rule. While respecting this rule we do not deny ourselves the right to oppose a specific law. Changes in legislation must always be made by legitimate public procedures, by majority vote. Anyone who makes a conscious decision to violate the law must be prepared to suffer the legal consequences.

2.3. We believe that the law-governed state is a necessary condition for social justice and for democratic participation in the adoption of decisions. However, the state should not take it upon itself to resolve all the problems of society and the individual. This would revive the spirit of bureaucracy, ineffective work, paternalistic psychology, and parasitic tendencies.

The state must assume responsibility for those activities and services which are essential for the development of society and which cannot be handled by individuals and social groups. In other directions, it stimulates private and collective initiative.

2.4. The Socialist Party considers parliamentary democracy to be the highest expression of political democracy and free elections to be the only mechanism which ensures the established political power under constitutional social control.

We are in favor of the democratic monitoring of the domination of the majority, the submission of the minority to the will of the majority, and the respecting of the rights of the minority in parliament.

The decisions of the majority can be overruled in all cases when they are harmful to the bases of democratic coexistence and endanger the well-being of future generations.

We believe that the parliamentary system does not limit and does not replace the initiative and responsibility of citizens for their own fate and that of society. Parliamentary democracy permits openings for the continuing expansion of the participation of citizens in political life, to join social organizations and movements, to draft petitions, to organize referendums, and plebiscites in accordance with the Constitution.

2.5. The Socialist Party values the trade unions as natural allies in the everyday activity of constructing a society of general well-being and a democratic state. We support the demands of the trade unions for active participation in making economic decisions and we support their right to collective bargaining in the area of wages, working conditions, social security, etc. The Socialist Party supports the trade unions' freedom to organize and their right to strike.

2.6. The Socialist Party recognizes and values the place and the role in the life of the country of various religious communities and their respective institutions. We respect their status, specified by law. We respect freedom of conscience and of belief, the freedom to engage in religious rituals and to preach religious faith, considering that these rights are just as legitimate as the rights of those who do not believe to have freedom of opinion and freedom to preach atheism.

2.7. One of the main objectives of the activity of the Socialist Party of Albania is the eradication of bureaucracy. It is committed to having an effective administration, easily maneuverable and without many expenses, which will always be concerned with the interests and anxieties of the people. We will work to preserve the state apparatus from corrupt, bureaucratic individuals who do not enjoy the respect and support of the people, to liberate the state administration from the traditions of a paternalistic state, and to make it open at all levels and capable of being monitored by the people.

2.8. The Socialist Party will make an effort to stipulate and fully regulate, by law, the status of the civil servant. He must also have a right to strike. The state must be responsible for the behavior of its civil servants and the latter must be responsible before the law for illegal administrative actions.

2.9. The Socialist Party will work for the creation of a legal system which will guarantee the protection of the basic rights of the individual and of the citizen, which are recognized and stated in the Constitution and in important international documents.

3. Economic Platform

The basic purpose of the Socialist Party is concern for the individual, for his comprehensive well-being and

development. The party aims to achieve this objective by means of the profound democratization of production relations; the wise and effective utilization of all natural resources and human potential for the development of the country; the creation of a modern economy, with broad possibilities for reproduction, consumption, and innovation.

3.1. The Socialist Party will support and will stimulate the implementation of a radical economic reform, by means of the transition to the market economy in which all forms of ownership will coexist, coordinated by the regulating role of the state.

It will make an effort to ensure that:

—all forms of initiatives, work, and ownership in the city and the village have equal status under the law and compete freely.

—state ownership is maintained in the branches which are of decisive importance for the development of the economy and over natural resources, giving the enterprises complete freedom and independence, with all the powers which the demands and criteria of the market economy require.

Group ownership should have broad support, especially in the village and in the services sector.

—Private work and ownership should have favorable economic and social conditions for development in the services sector and in the production sector.

Ownership by shareholders should be widely developed and conditions should be created to facilitate the participation of workers.

The profound restructuring of the economic system should aim at the achievement of complete self-management of economic subjects, turning workers into co-owners with the state and sharers in the profits of the enterprise, in the majority of the goods and services included in the state monopoly over prices, wages, and foreign trade and their gradual liberalization, and the dismantling of the administrative-command structures of the state. The state exercises control in economic activity on the basis of fiscal, customs, and other policies and means.

In agriculture and in the village, the Socialist Party defends the thesis that the land remains the property of the state, but this does not prevent the market economy from being present there. Economic relations are built on the basis of the renting and the evaluation of land according to the purpose for which it will be used, for agriculture, for the placement of housing, etc. We believe that a progressive agrarian system, based on collective structures and on the conditions in our country, in which there is little agricultural land, is in the interest of the peasantry and of all the people. The consolidation of the private farm, with important market functions, is supported in all areas of the country. The party will support the free will and initiative of the peasantry to choose the most appropriate alternative for themselves for the development of agricultural production, while observing the laws of the law-governed state. It will work hard to ensure that the state takes care of subsidies for agricultural production under unfavorable climate and soil conditions, especially in the mountainous zones. The development and urbanization of the village is based on the use of all its land, not only for agriculture but also for tourism, services, etc.

3.2. The development of production forces will be stimulated by reorienting the traditional priorities into policies for the use of investments, labor resources, and financial resources. The investment cycle in agriculture will be supplemented in all zones and the structure of production will correspond to the natural conditions and the needs of the market. The party will aim to give priority to the food industry and light industry so that, in general, production in the country and the import of consumer goods will be in accord with the purchasing power of the people, the cultural level of the workers and their modern lifestyle. The supplementing and modernization of the infrastructure, the rapid and complete development of the service sector and tourism will be some of the main components of our contemporary progress. Heavy industry will be based upon its potential and mature progress will be made toward more complete cycles and in more effective directions. Technical and technological innovation will be a broad work front for investments in all branches of production and services.

Through its policy, the Socialist Party will, in a relatively short time, be able to overcome the economic backwardness it has inherited; advanced levels will be achieved in society's labor productivity, in the standard of living and the level of culture and consumption, in the creation of the necessary material conditions and conditions of the spirit for elevating the personality of the individual; reserves will be made available and the functioning resources of the country will be increased; it will be possible to have a free exchange of the country's currency for foreign currency, etc.

The party will concern itself with ensuring that the intensification of the use of natural resources and the natural acceleration of the development of production forces are based on sound socioeconomic criteria, with long-term prospects and with strict ecological requirements.

3.3. With the creation of a new economic climate and with the preparation of the necessary legal framework, the Socialist Party will work to intensify cooperation with foreign capital and participation in the international division of labor. Its goal is a naturally integrated economy, one which is open and ready for competition and cooperation with the world. The advantages of climate, geographic position, natural resources, and labor resources will be extensively used for the priority development of tourism, vital services, and consumer industries and infrastructure.

For the achievement of its economic program, the party supports the concept that cooperation with the world is effective when it is based on the rational and most profitable use of all the domestic resources, on the work of our people, on the revitalization of economic incentives for work and mutually profitable activities which would result in the free exchange of the lek for other currency.

3.4. The Socialist Party will work to ensure that the immediate and long-term transformations in economic relations are carried out gradually with the support of the state. It will see to it that the reform of the economic system for the transition to the market economy revitalizes the motivating forces of society and protects the standard of living of the workers from the social consequences of the liberalization of production and of distribution.

The fiscal system, the policy of taxes and fees will stimulate investments and will guarantee a rational system of natural utilization. They will restrict the social polarizations and the social injustices which result from the conflicting and unlimited activity of the laws of the market. At the center of this policy will be the protection of the strata of the population with low incomes. The economic program of the Socialist Party, in essence, is in favor of the market economy, the free initiative of individuals and other economic subjects, and the intervention of the state in the economy, by means of the monetary and financial system, and budget and credit policy, which give the market the necessary social dimensions.

3.5. The most immediate tasks of our party are to overcome the decline in the economy, to return it to a normal work and production system, to satisfy the market's need for essential goods, to utilize existing capacities, to restore economic balance and stability, and to instill a spirit of optimism and confidence in the future.

The Socialist Party believes that, without radical economic reforms, it would be difficult to stabilize the economy, while without its stabilization, the reforms will not achieve the desired results.

4. For a Free Human Society with Social Justice

4.1. The PSSh considers the specification of the place and the role of the individual in society to be the essence of its program. It does not consider him only as a production factor. Its theoretical and political concept is that the social dimension should supplement and embody the dimensions of political, economic, and individual freedom.

4.2. A free society, with social justice, is the result of uninterrupted and multifaceted reforms which must be carried out simultaneously by the state and by society itself. On this road, there are conflicts of interest among the individual and specific social groups, which the PSSh is committed to resolving through dialogue and mutual tolerance.

4.3. The PSSh believes that a democratic socialist society should be the complete opposite of a pseudosocialistic totalitarian society. Sectarianism and intransigence will be replaced by tolerance, and uniformity and homogeneity of views will be replaced by pluralism. Private personal interests will be joined to mutual cooperation and fraternal solidarity.

4.4. The right to work is one of the basic human rights without which there can be no democratic society. We socialists believe that the employment of all people in the cities and the villages is a primary duty. Every person should be free, in the framework of many types of ownership, to choose the work and profession which he desires. The state cannot allow economic discrimination against the individual and, at the same time, by means of its specified institutions, take responsibility for the employment of every citizen within or outside the country. In the cases of temporary unemployment, social assistance should be provided which will ensure the normal satisfaction of needs. By means of the fiscal system, the fairest possible distribution of income should be ensured, protecting and favoring low-income workers and families with a number of children, etc.

4.5. The passage of time and progressive work conditions, in accordance with the development of the forces of production in our country, should bring us up to European standards. We socialists favor the establishment of the seven-hour workday within a short period of time and, in time, the transition to the five-day work week.

4.6. At the present time, housing is a basic problem for all Albanian families, especially in urban areas. The alleviation and solution of this problem can be achieved by combining private initiative with state and cooperative initiative.

4.7. We consider the family to be the basic unit of society. It must be protected and developed in accordance with the best moral traditions and values of the Albanian family.

4.8. Experience and reality up to now show that despite the achievements in the emancipation of Albanian women, there are noticeable differences in the actual political, economic, and social positions of men and women. The legislation which has been drafted and implemented has not given the required results with regard to real equality between men and women. This gap is especially wide in the villages where women generally do the most difficult work.

We socialists believe that, under our present conditions, special legislation should be approved which will specify basic criteria for the employment of women, excluding physical work in sectors which could be harmful to their

health, eliminating night shifts, increasing paid maternity leave to one year, etc. The state should give priority to having housework done on a cooperative basis, which would make it possible for women to increase their political and cultural work, and their work in society.

4.9. The PSSh is in favor of a real evaluation of generational conflicts. It asks that the younger generation understand and respect the effort and contribution of the older generation in developing Albanian society and it believes that the older generation must understand and provide channels for the interests and needs of the younger generation in the future.

4.10. Society has a duty to show special interest and to take measures stipulated by the state for the psychological and social equilibrium of the people in the "third age." The social group of pensioners should never feel estranged from the mainstream and attention of society.

4.11. The gaps existing between the village and the city will be bridged as much as possible by satisfying, on a priority basis, the social and economic needs of the village and by creating a new and complex infrastructure which will adequately respond to its present and long-term development.

4.12. The Socialist Party favors broad-scale lay education, without which it would be impossible to achieve the emancipation of Albanian society. It calls for obligatory middle-school education as well as higher education in accordance with the interests of individuals and society. The aim is that, within a short time, the Albanian schools will be up to the standards of European schools in regard to form and content.

4.13. We are for contemporary development in the field of culture and science, with the goal that the broadest horizon for the life of the spirit of the people will be opened and enriched.

We will support those measures which stimulate high quality creativity and talents in science, culture, literature, and the arts. Our party is in favor of the expansion of contacts with the culture and science of the progressive countries. In this entire process of mutual communication, the party maintains its well-known position of protecting the national identity of our culture, literature, and arts, and of always serving the interests of the people.

4.14. The PSSh will work to enhance the role of the intelligentsia in our life, so that a new concept of its place in society will be instilled and will be put into practice. On this road, we will fight against any concept that underestimates the role of the intelligentsia, which has resulted in the levelling off of its values and its assistance in various fields of life and in the limitation of its participatioon in political and social life. Our party will be committed to enhancing the social and economic evaluation of intellectual work in accordance with its real value and effectiveness, recognizing author's rights not only for writers and artists but also for engineers, agronomists, economists, physicians, etc.

4.15. The PSSh is in favor of giving maximum attention to the evaluation, protection, and wise utilization of our rich biological resources. The protection of nature and of the ecological balance should be part of the culture of every Albanian. We support serious studies in this area, which should deal with all ecological aspects related not only to environmental protection and pollution but also to the regeneration of damaged resources.

4.16. We socialists will work hard to achieve a modern health service in all zones of the country and to ensure the coexistence of the state and private sector in this activity and state subsidies for medical care.

5. Foreign Policy Objectives

5.1. The Socialist Party is in favor of an active foreign policy in the service of the interests of the Albanian nation, the comprehensive advancement of the country, and its natural and dignified integration into a united Europe. It desires friendly relations with all the states of the world, large and small, rich and poor, which want to have ties with our country and which offer us their friendship. In international relations, the PSSh has been liberated from every ideological, national, geostrategic, and racial prejudice.

5.2. As a party that expresses and defends the interests of the masses of the people in a society with a market economy, the Socialist Party is committed to solidarity and mutual assistance for all peoples who are struggling against social injustice and inequality, for national liberation, for peace and progress in their countries and in the world.

5.3. Albanian socialists will work to ensure that Albania will be an active participant in the CSCE and will put into practice all the agreements reached within the framework of the CSCE. They will support every initiative for disarmament and arms control, for strengthening security measures throughout Europe, and for guaranteeing peace.

5.4. The Socialist Party has high regard for and bases its activity on the initiatives of the United Nations and its mechanisms for the protection of the peace and the peaceful solution of political conflicts everywhere in the world, for the eradication of the gaps between the rich and the poor countries, for the cultural, educational, technical, and scientific development of the backward countries, and for the assertion of the national identity of various peoples. It will support the efforts to create conditions to assist the activity of the various United Nations structures in Albania and in other countries.

5.5. As the representative of broad strata of one of the oldest peoples on the continent, the Socialist Party aspires to and will be committed to comprehensive friendship and cooperation with all European states. It carefully follows the progress of the process of the

creation of a united Europe and it will make an effort to create all the essential conditions for the inclusion, as soon as possible, of the Republioc of Albania in the common European home.

5.6. The policy of strengthening friendly relations with the neighboring states is a key guideline of our party. The party will work to ensure that the process of Balkan cooperation, in which Albania is an active participant, will be increased and expanded so that it will include all sectors. It will continue to espouse the opinion and the sound logic that conflicts and disagreements between the Balkan countries, especially ethnic conflicts, cannot be resolved by old mentalities or old formulas, but should be dealt with by a new political will that must be in accord with the new concepts and the spirit of the CSCE documents.

5.7. The Socialist Party is committed to respect for the rights of minorities in accordance with the requirements of the UN Charter regarding human rights. It will be concerned about the creation of all the necessary conditions for the protection and development of the ethnic identity, language, and culture of the minorities. It will ask for the same treatment for Albanians who live in their territories outside the state borders of the Republic of Albania. The socialists are convinced that respect for the legitimate rights of minorities will serve as a bridge of communication, peace, and fruitful cooperation among the Balkan countries.

5.8. The Socialist Party will devote special attention to the nationality issue. It is in this framework that it regards the issue of Kosovo, that of the Albanians who are living in their own lands in Yugoslavia. It supports, without reservation, their legitimate and undeniable demands for national rights and freedoms in the form which they consider to be accceptable and timely. Our party will be concerned about and will protect the interests of Cameria, which is an inseparable part of our nationality issue. The Socialist Party will support and assist the Albanian diaspora everywhere in the world, in protecting and cultivating its national language, culture, traditions, and customs and it will expand contacts and cooperation with it.

5.9. Economic cooperation with Europe, the integration of our country in the many types of European economic processes being established constitutes a long-term strategy for the Socialist Party. The changes in legislation regarding the forms of ownership in Albania, involving guaranteeing foreign investments, have created an essential basis for profitable and fruitful cooperation of our country with the outside world.

Our party is determined to go further on this road, convinced that it will lead to rapid progress and improvement in the economy and to the improvement of the lives of the people. It will work to ensure that our legal framework, which regulates foreign economic relations, is constantly expanded and improved in accordance with the needs that our activity and international practice, which is continually in a state of flux, will present, and also to defend important national interests.

5.10. The PSSh, keeping in mind the ancient European traditions of our people, will always be open to progressive cultural trends from our continent and the entire world, to assimilate and apply the results of technical and scientific progress. It will make an effort to ensure that our people involved in the fields of culture, the arts, and science will be integrated into these trends. It supports the development of intensive exchanges with others, for the intellectual enrichment and consolidation of old and new common values. In these exchanges, the party will work to continually protect and strengthen our national identity and our cultural and intellectual originality, as an independent subject in the community and in international relations.

5.11. The Socialist Party supports and will support the democratization of international relations so that the voice of small and medium-size countries will be heard and will be taken into consideration. It has maintained and will maintain the attitude that the norms for regulating relations among states should be the results of the opinions, experiences, and contributions of all the people of the world. It is in favor of friendly and equal relations with all countries, unconditional and based on mutual respect, on noninterference in internal affairs and on profitable cooperation, in the mutual interest of each party. In all its foreign relations, it will aim to ensure that independence of judgement and action are preserved, by not involving the country in any agreement or contract which will be harmful to its national sovereignty and the right of the people to make their own decision about their present and future.

5.12. The Socialist Party of Albania is in favor of a pluralistic democracy in all fields, as well as public dialog and debate among different political forces. It supports the establishment of contacts and cooperation with leftist and progressive parties, members of the socialist international which are struggling for social progress, freedom, and peace in the world. However, it will oppose and it will not permit the interference of foreigners and their arbitration to determine the truth. The Albanian people should be the masters in their own country, and political problems should be resolved only on the basis of their opinion and will.

Ministry Defends Purchase of SS-23 Missiles

AU2507084691 Sofia BTA in English 0814 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 25 (BTA)—Some U.S. sources reported yesterday that the USSR had sold Bulgaria seven SS-23 missiles in violation of the 1987 Moscow-Washington INF Treaty. In this connection, Lieutenant General Ivan Stefanov, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, made the following statement on national television last night:

"The missiles were delivered under an intergovernmental agreement signed in 1986. The seven missiles and two launchers arrived in February 1987. Bulgaria has not bought any more missiles since December 8, 1987," General Stefanov said. Under the INF Treaty, only missiles owned by the two contracting parties or delivered after the signing of the treaty are subject to dismantling and control.

The SS-23 missiles in Bulgaria, armed with conventional warheads, are within the 400 km range and are manned by Bulgarian experts only. Still, they enhance Bulgaria's defence capability, General Stefanov said.

Prime Minister Popov Meets Radio Personnel

AU2407174391 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] This afternoon Prime Minister Dimitur Popov is holding a meeting with our colleagues from the Bulgarian Radio; it is still in progress.

The prime minister dwelled in detail on the heavy responsibility assumed by his government, referring to the effort to rescue the country from a disastrous situation. The reform is gathering momentum despite the economic difficulties, he pointed out.

Dimitur Popov thinks that during the period prior to the elections the Bulgarian radio programs should objectively reflect events in the country, which does not mean that they should be subject to censorship and that journalists should be deprived of the their right to state their own opinions. Nevertheless, factual reports should be separated from commentaries.

The government and all state institutions have acted to overcome this difficult period in our country and this task cannot be accomplished without the cooperation of the journalists, Dimitur Popov said. You are required to adopt an active stance and not to be indifferent observers of the current processes, he added.

Vulkov Israel Visit Ends With Transport Talks

AU2507101991 Sofia BTA in English 0801 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Tel Aviv, July 25 (BTA)—The official Bulgarian delegation to Israel led by Mr. Viktor Vulkov, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, ends its visit today. Yesterday the Bulgarian guests visited some historic landmarks and places held sacred by Christians and Jews. Today the two countries' ministers of transport: Mr. Veselin Pavlov of Bulgaria and Mr. Moshe Qatzav of Israel, will continue their talks. In March they signed an agreement on an air service between Bulgaria and Israel and are now discussing opportunities to expand cooperation in other types of transport and transport construction. Work is in progress on a bilateral agreement on commercial shipping.

Mr. Veselin Pavlov and Mr. Moshe Qatzav have discussed with experts possibilities for cooperation in combined transport which will turn Bulgaria into a transit terminal for all kinds of cargoes freighted from Europe to Israel and in the opposite direction. This initiative will probably be advanced by agreements which may be reached today at talks between Deputy Minister of Agriculture Georgi Tanev and Israeli's Minister of Agriculture Refa'el Eytan, and at the meeting of the Bulgarian delegation with Mr. Tan Guilermann [spelling as received], president of the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce.

Liberal Congress Party Presses Zhelev on 'Chaos'

AU2407201391 Sofia BTA in English 1858 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Sofia, 24 July (BTA)—[passage omitted] The Liberal Congress Party demanded an explanation from President Zhelyu Zhelev, calling on him to identify openly the people who deliberately want to plunge Bulgaria into chaos.

The party's Chairman Yanko Yankov asked if Prime Minister Dimitur Popov, Minister of the Interior Khristo Danov and Socialist Party Chairman Aleksandur Lilov were among them.

The people has the right to hold a referendum on the Constitution and any attempt to link the date and the objective of the referendum to other events is an attempt to deny the people its right, the New Social Democratic Party says. At a news conference its leaders stated that the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) is verging on a catastrophe and its leaders' conduct does not match their promises. Next Monday the party will decide whether it should demand the resignation of SDS leader Filip Dimitrov. His arrogant attitude to parties in the SDS is pointed as one of the reasons. [passage omitted]

The Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights calls on the political parties, public organizations and voters across the country for calm and tolerance. The association appeals for fair elections as well as a fair election campaign. It opposes voter intimidation in any form whatsoever and insists on the observance of ethical principles of political struggle.

Finance Minister Investigates BSP Bank Accounts

AU2307155991 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 19 Jul 91 pp 1,2

[DUMA PRESS report]

[Text] On Wednesday 17 July, Finance Minister Ivan Kostov began an investigation into the sums held in the bank accounts of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The audit is connected with the minister's property action brought against the BSP and is being conducted with the permission of the Chief Prosecutor's Office, Mr. Kostov stated to a DUMA reporter on 18 July. He explained that an application to freeze the BSP bank accounts may be submitted to the court when the analysis is completed.

As is well known, Minister Kostov deposited his claim against the BSP for a sum of 1,855 million leva at the Sofia City Court on 10 May, and the case was registered under No. 2,045 on 15 May. At the same time, Minister Kostov made application for the accounts to be frozen, but this application was disputed.

Minister Kostov submitted his memorandum on the debts of the BSP, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, Bulgarian Democratic Youth, and the Fatherland Union to the Council of Ministers on 25 April. At that time, the claims against the BSP amounted to 1,772,300,000 leva that had been received as state subsidies during the period from 1949 to 1990. With the addition of accrued interest, the amount was increased to 2,700,400,000 leva.

On the same day, the legislative Union of Democratic Forces demanded that the Grand National Assembly should include in the revenues of the updated budget the amounts that the BSP and the Dimitrov Komsomol have received from the budget during the 1949-90 period. Both the finance minister and the Blue members of the National Assembly offered the supporting argument that this money (about 3 billion leva) could fill the gaps in the updated budget and be used to assist the socially disadvantaged.

At a news conference on 23 May, Andrey Lukanov stated that the BSP bank accounts held 10-12 million leva. In his view, this amount would not help the budget deficit, and the obvious purpose was not to block the accounts, but to block the BSP.

Aleksandur Tomov stated on 27 May that the amounts mentioned by Minister Kostov were inflated. According to BSP financial experts, the amounts involved do not exceed 1.3 billion. In the meantime, the BSP has returned property, but this is not recognized, Tomov explained. Part of the money granted to the BSP was spent on state needs, and this money did not enter the accounts.

The finance minister's claim is in fact a claim to nationalize the BSP's property, Aleksandur Tomov stated at the time. He added that the aim was to put the BSP's back against the wall before the elections, so that it is left without clubs, without newspapers, and without a base for its election campaign.

Agrarian Leader Calls For Opposition Unity

AU2507101091 Sofia BTA in English 0903 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 25 (BTA)—The differences among the opposition forces in Bulgaria are paving the way for the electoral victory of the Communists, Mr. Tsenko Barev, leader of the Agrarian emigres, tells "TRUD."

The political forces did not play the part which belonged to them by right and duty since November 10, 1989, (when the communist regime was ousted), according to Mr. Barev. The trade unions have already assumed their role but are so strongly politicized that they do not give the political forces time for reflection.

The BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] (United) can serve as a natural rallying factor of the democratic opposition, being an original reform-oriented political organization intrinsic to Bulgarian mentality, Mr. Barev says. For him, the unification is already a fact, while the leaders have been trying in vain to achieve a mechanical merger over the last year and a half, the local agrarian branches across the country actually paved the way for genuine unity. "I respect Milan Drenchev (the leader of the Nikola Petkov BZNS), but the Agrarians will unite even without him," Mr. Tsenko Barev says. He is not afraid that the former BZNS nomenklatura will make its way into the new party. After the unification conference, scheduled for July 27, arrangements will be made for a regular congress, and the local branches will elect their own leaders as well as the top-level leaders. An interim leadership will be elected by the congress delegates. Mr. Tsenko Barev does not intend to assume the union's leadership because he believes he is rather advanced in age for a political career and can only help young people learn.

The united BZNS will draft its programme and after consultations with the other political forces will decide whether it will run in the elections on its own ballot-paper. In any case, the future government will be a coalition one, none of the forces is in a condition to take Bulgaria out of the crisis, Mr. Barev believes.

To him, the Bulgarian Socialist Party is still a communist party and has nothing in common with Western-type socialist parties.

"SVOBODEN NAROD" runs an interview with Mr. Tsenko Barev on the same subject.

Nikola Petkov BZNS Rejects Unification

AU2407205491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Svoboda Nedeva report on news conference of the Nikola Petkov National Agrarian Union, in Sofia—live]

[Text] [Words indistinct] The Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] at today's news conference discussed the question of the reunification of the opposition BZNS with the orange BZNS which was announced for next Saturday, 27 July.

The Nikola Petkov BZNS's Chief Secretary Andreychev was adamant about his own negative attitude, which also reflected the view of the union's leadership, about the forthcoming unification conference. He described it as a manipulation and as a destructive element for the unity of the Agrarian movement, totally opposed to the ideology and struggles of this movement as a whole.

The goal of the conference is to obliterate the long struggles of the real Agrarian Movement and to eliminate the existence of this movement altogether by trying to hide the guilt and responsibility of the orange BZNS for the crimes it committed under the Stalinist regime.

The idea of the conference, however, has also more subtle motivations, namely to undermine the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] prior to the elections and to divide it.

There is no doubt that the place of the Nikola Petkov group is in the SDS-Center and the electoral law will show in what kind of coalition the group will run for the elections.

The speakers at the briefing were also categorical in their statement that the conference scheduled for the weekend will not be unifying, but divisive.

Mr. Milan Drenchev declared as follows: With the exception of individual members, not one of the Nikola Petkov local unions will ever join the BZNS-United, while the planned reunification will just be an old u..ion with new members.

Mr. Drenchev assured the journalists that the question is a global and historical one, namely the question whether to preserve or to destroy the Agrarian Union, whose only legitimate representative is the Nikola Petkov group. The Nikola Petkov members are the real champions of the Agrarian Movement. Anyone who recognizes the Agrarians and rejects the so-called official BZNS is welcome in our group; any other action would be immoral, Mr. Milan Drenchev added.

The climax of the news briefing was reached when Secretary Andreychev angrily displayed one of the latest issues of the daily ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME [organ of the orange faction] with a portrait of Nikola Petkov on the front page. The secretary declared: This very newspaper reprinted the verdict of the former National Assembly deputies who sanctioned his assassination and now this very newspaper has the impudence to announce the establishment of a foundation named after him.

Later during the news briefing, Mr. Milan Drenchev announced that he is not willing to return to parliament since his conscience does not allow him arbitrarily to prolong his mandate after the Grand National Assembly has been dissolved, and considering that never in Bulgarian history has a Grand National Assembly continued to act as an ordinary one.

Dertliev Speaks at BSDP News Conference

AU2407204691 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] At todays's news conference of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP], Dr. Petur Dertliev declared that the Social Democrats are ready with their electoral platform and expressed the hope that the experts of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] have not succeeded in stealing some of their ideas.

Let us hear some more from reporter Elena Shtereva, who attended the news conference.

[Begin Shtereva recording] We must find a tolerant method for the joint struggle, and if the struggle should no longer be common, let it be a parallel struggle at least because the recent events in the Union of Democratic Forces were a great source of happiness for the BSP.

This is what Dr. Dertliev said. Petur Kornazhev added: If there should be a divorce, we would not like it to be similar to the Balkan-style divorces which end up with forks and knives. It should be a civilized and tolerant form of separation.

According to Dr. Dertliev, Filip Dimitrov is the unifying element within the SDS. His report submitted on 22 July was described as objective and reflecting the real situation of the democratic processes underway in our country.

Citing the report, Dr. Dertliev remarked that 25 percent of the leaders of local SDS coordinating councils are BSDP members. He added that large areas exist in the country where the SDS leadership did not consider it necessary to form civic committees.

Dertliev also cited other passages of Dimitrov's report, stating: We are impressed by the high level of approval for Dr. Dertliev, which can be explained by the fact that numerous people consider him a victim of unjustified accusations.

The leader of the Social Democrats evaluates the word "unjustified" as too weak, but he is convinced that a negative response has emerged against the slanderous campaign conducted against his party and against himself.

Dr. Dertliev repeated today that (?two individuals and a leader who slandered him should apologize to him), but he did not mention any names.

As far as the unifying process of the two Agrarian unions is concerned, the chairman of the Social Democrats declared that he wishes them success in spite of everything. He thinks that a total reunification is hardly likely

to take place, and that according to the traditional Bulgarian mentality, one group will remain isolated. [end recording]

Democracy Club Federation Holds News Conference

AU2407204491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Kalina Stanchev telephone report on news conference of Federation of Democracy Clubs—live]

[Excerpts] The Federation of Democracy Clubs seems to be in better political shape, compared with the situation at the last news conference. Answering the first question at today's briefing, the members of the executive leadership seemed to confirm this impression.

According to recent telephone calls, telegrams, faxes, and other messages, the leadership thinks that the mass support of the clubs from all over the country is inclined toward the liberal platform. Namely, there is a reorientation from rather radical and orthodox opinions toward more pragmatic views, which is in conformity with the current platform of the federation.

In the hope that the topical issues will find prompt solutions, the clubs are awaiting a conference, or to put it more precisely, even two conferences.

Petko Simeonov stated that one conference is planned to take place at the initiative of the Federative Council in Shumen on 3 August, while he is convinced that 50 or 100 (?members) persist in their stubbornness to split the federation. They are planning to hold their own conference earlier, namely on 29 July.

This was announced as being in contradiction to the statute and code of regulations of the organization and in total contradiction to decent political behavior, Petko Simeonov stated.

According to Petko Simeonov, the recent report read by Filip Dimitrov, leader of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], reflects the real situation, but how things should develop in the future is rather uncertain, according to Simeonov. [passage omitted]

A meeting of the Club for Liberal Democracy is announced for tomorrow. Further issues are expected to be clarified at the meeting. According to Petko Simeonov, who claims that the information is unofficial, Dr. Zhelev is expected to become a member of this club. [passage omitted]

Radioactive Pollution Reported at Kozloduy Plant

AU2407132491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] We have received an announcement from BTA that two days ago the group in charge of radioactive control discovered radioactive pollution on the site of Nuclear Power Plant No. 1. It is a hot spot [petno] of an area of about 1 square meter with radioactivity of approximately 2.5 milliroentgens per hour.

The hot spot is situated near the smoke stack of one of the special buildings. Efforts are currently under way to identify the cause of the radiation, and measures are expected to be taken to limit the polluted hot spot.

Kozloduy No. 6 Generating Unit To Be Started Up

AU2507084391 Sofia BTA in English 0759 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Kozloduy, July 25 (BTA)—"If all remaining tests pass normally and as expected, generating unit six will be plugged into the country's power grid in a week's time," Mr. Ivan Ivanov, director of generating units five and six of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, said last night.

He said that the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy allowed the start-up of the second 1,000-megawatt reactor. All its operating characteristics will be tested, including a trial turning of the turbine and tests of the generator, as well as many mandatory experiments related to the safety of the generating unit.

The generating unit has been staffed with senior operatives and shift workers. Under the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Act, their qualifications will be checked by a state commission.

Environmental Commission Chairman on Kozloduy

AU2407114491 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 18 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with Krasen Stanchev, chairman of the National Assembly Environmental Commission, by TRUD commentator Nikolay Buzin; place and date not given: "The Situation at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is Extremely Alarming"—first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] After returning from Vienna where Krasen Stanchev, chairman of the National Assembly Environmental Commission, together with Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandur Tomov, took part in talks on the fate of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant, Mr. Stanchev spoke with TRUD commentator Nikolay Buzin.

[Buzin] Mr. Stanchev, were you surprised by Europe's decision on the fate of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant?

[Stanchev] Until the middle of last year the EEC had not envisaged providing funds for assisting Eastern European power supplies. After complex lobbying, the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program now envisages such aid. The best variant, however, is an alternative to nuclear energy in Bulgaria, but the EEC does not envisage such a variant.

[Buzin] If we accept that the fate of our second nuclear plant in Belene was decided to a large extent by pressure from "the Greens," what part did they play in discussions on Kozloduy?

[Stanchev] Their part was, is, and will remain small. In the case of Kozloduy the situation depends on the country's current possibilities. Ecoglasnost carries a certain amount of blame, but most of all, I am responsible as the one who headed the group of experts. We did not pay enough attention to Kozloduy.

[Buzin] Do you think that Europe and the world in the near future will totally reject nuclear energy? What are the alternatives to this type of energy?

[Stanchev] If Kozloduy "blows up," I believe that the development of nuclear energy will be "put on ice" for a relatively long time. There is a question here of one small detail: The situation at Kozloduy is extremely alarming. This is obvious! A long time ago the alarm ought to have been raised, but the secretiveness surrounding our nuclear energy program, also guarded partially by the International Atomic Energy Agency, stopped this from happening.

Europe and the world will not assist Bulgaria with the alternatives to nuclear energy. In the main there are two: gas fired power stations and energy saving measures, but in both cases time is needed.

[Buzin] There are ideas for the Bulgarian energy industry to be owned and managed by foreign companies, consortiums and so on. What is your attitude to this?

[Stanchev] From a purely economic, even political, point of view, the idea of a consortium is impossible. The best solution would be a bidding "mechanism" organized by mixed consultative teams.

Yes, in a similar way our problems in other areas of production can be resolved. At the moment the requirements have not been clarified for importing technologies, nor the requirements for foreign investments in general. The new environmental protection law lays down the regulations for the energy industry's participation in this. It is not difficult to imagine that without these regulations a particular type of "eco-madness" is possible.

Industry Ministry News Conference on Restructuring

AU2407120491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1100 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Bilyana Mikhaylova report on news conference at the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services in Sofia on 24 Jul—recorded]

[Text] At today's news conference, journalists heard an explanation of the logic of the strategy for restructuring industry, before this strategy was submitted to the Council of Ministers. The restructuring will encompass all the aspects that shape industry's structure.

Mrs. Violeta Kasurova, chief of the Industrial Development Strategy Department, explained that until recently the preliminary scenario will rely on the so-called long-wave procedure [metodika na dulgite vulni], which until recently was not only unknown, but even forbidden in Bulgaria. It has been established from an analysis that the first warning signs of a crisis in industry were noted as long ago as in 1975. Beginning in 1984, industry entered a depression, and in 1990 it went into recession.

The strategy defines the most general directions in which work will be done: the problem of privatization, the problem of industry's competitiveness, the leading role of the market, and the regional distribution of industry. The restructuring will cost billions of dollars and will only be possible if foreign investments play a role. Foreign interest has been shown, for example, in Radomir Metals, Kremikovtsi, Neftekhim, the whole of the textile industry, and the heavy engineering works in Ruse. In the view of the ministry's experts, considerable interest does exist, the only problem being that possible foreign investors still cannot assess the extent to which the Foreign Investments Act is favorable for them.

Other subjects covered at the news conference included the problem of whether or not municipal property exists that the municipalities can dispose of as they see fit, by selling or leasing various properties and facilities. Valeri Tsekov, deputy minister of industry, trade, and services, explained that the municipalities obtained the right to dispose of and manage municipal property, but this does not mean that the property belongs to them. The attention of the municipal people's councils is drawn to this fact. They should be aware that quite enough legal formulas exist for selling or auctioning municipal facilities.

Minister Ivan Pushkarov made a brief appearance at the news conference. He stressed that in carrying out economic policy he rejects all the insinuations connected with political aims. So far, not a single plant director had been found who had to be dismissed and who was a member of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. Minister Pushkarov stated that he would like the National Assembly to form a special commission to deal with this issue, and invited this commission to try to find an SDS director who merited dismissal. It was stressed in principle that in all cases of changes of directors—and 85 new directors have been appointed—the trade unions had always been asked for their views.

Long-Term Cooperation With Siemens Anticipated

AU2307193491 Sofia BTA in English 1844 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 23 (BTA)—Today Mr. Aleksandur Tomov, Bulgaria's deputy prime minister, received Mr.

Heinrich Pierer von Esch, deputy chairman of the board of directors of the Siemens Company.

It was pointed out at the meeting that the contacts between Bulgaria and Siemens date back to the beginning of the century and that now, when Bulgaria is opening up to the world and is returning to the market economy, there are even greater opportunities for cooperation.

Mr. Pierer pointed out that Siemens is interested in and ready to offer a long-term cooperation to Bulgarian companies in the field of telecommunications and electricity generation, including repair and construction of new conventional power generating plants and cooperation in nuclear energy generation. There are opportunities for cooperation in medical equipment, mining, automation of plant equipment and machinery. The guest stressed that his company intends to use Bulgaria's potential, i.e. to set up joint stock companies, subsidiaries of Siemens in Bulgaria, and to use Bulgarian equipment and technology.

Mr. Tomov said that the Bulgarian Government is inclined to favour a long-term cooperation with Siemens and that the company's presence in Bulgaria would mean not only business but would also be a proof of the confidence between Bulgaria and Germany.

Reaction to Dubcek Departure From VPN Reported

AU2407112391 Prague CTK in English 0658 GMT 23 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Prague July 23 (CTK)—Today's independent MLADA FRONTA DNES comments on the recent announcement by Federal Assembly (parliament) Chairman Alexander Dubcek that he quit the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement, stressing that "if Dubcek were a real politician he would have resigned from his post of parliament chairman too".

Dealing with Dubcek's statement according to which the "VPN abandoned the centrist policy and chose a split inside the movement instead", the daily says when Dubcek was elected parliament chairman he enjoyed general support as he preferred no political party. But he abandoned this stand. "A parliament chairman elected on the VPN list of candidates, which has never been left-oriented, who supports Meciar's opposition party (the Movement for Democratic Slovakia—HZDS), does naturally not dissociate himself from political confrontations", the daily stressed.

The Czechoslovak independent daily LIDOVE NOVINY comments on Dubcek's statement according to which "the VPN policy aimed at a split", recalling in this connection Meciar's effort at gaining his supporters' superiority in the VPN and his withdrawal from the movement. The daily voiced the belief that Dubcek parted with the VPN because it supports the radical economic reform and the federation, refuses to abandon the centrist policy and become left- oriented, and to head for populism and short-term social demogogy. [passage omitted]

Bratislava—The independent Slovak daily NARODNA OBRODA today refers to Czechoslovak parliament Chairman Alexander Dubcek's quitting once the strongest movement in Slovakia, the Public Against Violence (VPN), as "the VPN diverted from its originally proclaimed political centrist line". The paper says that the 1968 "Prague Spring" initiator sticks to his social consciousness and the principles of humanistic tolerance. He has remained a consistent supporter of just power-sharing between the Czechoslovak federation and the Czech and Slovak Republics. [passage omitted]

ODS Leader Calls For Dubcek Resignation

LD2407193491 Prague CTK in English 1517 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 24 (CTK)—It is unacceptable for the union of the Czech and Slovak republics to be merely temporary, the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) deputies club in the Czechoslovak parliament, Frantisek Houska, said at a press conference of the ODS here today.

He commented on Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky's statement that Slovakia would enter integrated Europe as an independent and sovereign state around the year 2000. Carnogursky made the statement in an interview for the French daily LIBERATION of July 22.

"If he does not go back on his vision and pushes it through than the only thing we can recommend is a quick separation (of the Czech and Slovak republics which make up the Czechoslovak Federation)", Houska said.

The ODS called on Dubcek to resign as chairman of the Federal Assembly (parliament) since he left the government coalition when he withdrew from the Slovak Council of the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement last weekend. Dubcek then declared the VPN abandoned its centre policy and split the movement.

"Dubcek's departure would be a message to the Czech and foreign public that what is going on in this country is not a Gorbachev-style perestroika", ODS Deputy Chairman Miroslav Macek said. Dubcek was a leading figure of the 1968 communist-led reform movement in Czechoslovakia.

ODS representatives also criticised bills submitted by the Czechoslovak government to the Federal Assembly. They responded to the accusations from the Civic Movement deputies who were dissatisfied with the fact that parties of the government coalition vote against bills of their government.

Parties React to Call For Dubcek's Resignation

LD2507043891 Prague CTK in English 1939 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 24 (CTK)—CTK today asked political parties with representation in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly for their opinions on yesterday's call by the right-wing Civic Democratic Party (ODS) for the resignation of parliament chairman Alexander Dubcek.

The ODS made its demand in response to Dubcek's Sunday announcement that he was withdrawing from the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement on whose platform he was elected to the Federal Assembly in June 1990. Led by Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, the ODS occupies 43 seats in the 300-member parliament.

Jan Sokol, a member of the centre-left Civic Movement (OH - 41 deputies), said the OH does not see anyone who could replace Dubcek th t both houses of parliament would agree on, presenting the danger of a parliament without a chairman. As long as Dubcek supports government policy, said Sokol, the OH feels he can remain in the post.

A spokesman from the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM - 47 deputies) said it was irrelevant whether or not Dubcek belonged to a party that was part of the governing coalition. In a mature democracy, personal character matters more than party affiliation, the spokesman said.

The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA - 11 deputies), a rightist group closely associated with the ODS, agreed with the call for Dubcek's resignation, saying it was understandable since deputies elected him chairman as a VPN representative.

The Christian-oriented Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL, together with the Christian Democratic Party (KDS) - 15 deputies) says it too does not support Dubcek. CSL Chairman Josef Lux told CTK the party's position was taken in spite of Dubcek's great popularity abroad and his integrating role between Slovaks and Czechs. It would be very difficult to find someone to replace Dubcek if he were to resign, Lux added.

The Christian Democratic Party (KDS - see above) said it was unfortunate that it was the ODS who called for Dubcek's resignation. A KDS spokesman said the party supported Dubcek's removal a long time ago, but it had seemed more appropriate for a Slovak party to make the proposal.

The Club of Social Democratic-Oriented deputies (SDO—nine deputies) said the right's argument that Dubcek had lost his mandate by withdrawing from the VPN was "nonsense". An SDO spokesman said Dubcek's break from the VPN took place long after the split within the movement and only after the VPN deviated from its original ideals.

The Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS - 16 deputies), a party supporting autonomy for the Czech provinces of Moravia and Silesia, responded to the ODS's call for Dubcek's resignation with the question: Are the deputies who were elected by the no longer existing Civic Forum still members of the government coalition? "(We) consider this at the very least just as debatable as Dubcek's case", says the HSD-SMS statement.

Calfa Rejects ODS Call For Dubcek's Ouster

LD2507042991 Prague CTK in English 1953 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 24 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa today told CTK the Civic Democratic Party's (ODS) demand for Alexander Dubcek to step down from the chairmanship of the Federal Assembly (parliament) was "rash and ill-considered".

Calfa said Dubcek was too well-known a politician, both at home and abroad, to call for his resignation merely on the basis of his withdrawal from the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement on Sunday.

Dubcek plays an important role on the federal scene, said Calfa, as he is trusted in Slovakia and declares himself in favour of a federal state. "There are not many Slovak politicians today who so lucidly define our constitutional future".

Calfa said he wondered what was motivating the ODS deputies, predicting a negative reaction to their statement in the Slovak Republic. "At a time when we are trying to find some sort of balance, every step and every sentence must be weighed three times".

Calfa said he would discuss the issue with Dubcek tomorrow after the Federal cabinet meeting.

Slovak Party Chief Discusses Dubcek, Independence

LD2407184291 Prague CTK in English 1304 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Bratislava July 24 (CTK)—The fact that Alexander Dubcek, Czechoslovak parliament chairman, has several times confirmed he wants to be neutral is correct, chairman of the Council of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) Rudolf Filkus told a press conference here today. Commenting on the demand by the parliamentary group of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) that Dubcek should resign, Filkus said the HZDS refuses to question his position as parliament chairman. HZDS Deputy Chairman Michal Kovac denied the claims by the Czech trade union daily "PRACE" that Dubcek is manipulated by the HZDS. "The parliament chairman is politically really independent", he said but acknowledged that in the forthcoming elections (June 1992) the HZDS would welcome Dubcek's candidature for the movement. Dealing with the interview of Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky with the French daily LIBERATION (Carnogursky said that Slovakia should be independent around the year 2000), Kovac said the HZDS agrees with this aim but if it is to be realised the two republics must become the subjects of international law already now.

Krycer Discusses Situation in Moravian Movement

AU2407154591 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 23 Jul 91 p 5

[Interview with Jan Krycer, LL.D., chairman of the Movement for Autonomous Democracy/Society for Moravia and Silesia, by Frantisek Schildberger; place and date not given: "We Are a State-Forming Movement"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Schildberger] The currents of thought within every party or movement form a living organism: Opinions are formed therein, personalities are expressed. What currents can one speak of at this time?

[Krycer] Our voters and supporters are mostly manual workers. These people want to hear a clear and convincing concept; they do not like to be presented with unfinished programs. If any differences of opinion exist in the movement, it is that some members would like to move more firmly and more radically. The goals, however, are clear and common to us all.

[Schildberger] The situation in the legislatures is more complex: You have one club in the Czech National Council, but you have two in the Federal Assembly....

[Krycer] The congress decision is unequivocal: Only one club is recognized; it is the one with five deputies. Nobody supports the other club—not a single delegate at the congress voted for it. However, we do not know of any legal means authorizing us to withdraw the right to represent the Movement for Autonomous Democracy/ Society for Moravia and Silesia from anyone. Nevertheless, at this time, the members of the other club are for us just independent deputies.

[Schildberger] So, there will be two Movements for Autonomous Democracy/Society for Moravia and Silesia in the next elections?

[Krycer] As far as we know, these deputies are negotiating with the Civic Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party....

[Schildberger] It seems to me that the key issue in your movement is the attitude to what is often termed as the extra-legislative methods of political struggle.

[Krycer] I do not consider extra-legislative means to be appropriate in the present situation, but I would not exclude the possibility that a situation that would call for their use could arise very soon.

[Schildberger] What situation would that be?

[Krycer] If deputies not elected in Moravia and Silesia were to decide on issues affecting Moravia and Silesia. [passage omitted]

[Schildberger] So, you do not consider the deputies elected in the Czech Republic to be a single entity?

[Krycer] One could say that. Nevertheless, we consider ourselves to be a part of the Czech Republic. We do not want to split it. We emphasize that we are a state-forming movement. Our goal, a union of republics, is not only our goal; we share it with other political forces. Therefore, together with the Czechoslovak People's Party and some Civic Movement deputies, we have submitted a proposal for separate voting in the Czech National Council on budgetary matters and constitutional laws. The proposal will be discussed after the legislative recess.

[Schildberger] The Moravian National Party was constituted in Brno. A small, but not negligible, number of Moravians stated their nationality in the census to be Moravian. Nationalist calls are heard even from among the supporters of your movement. At the same time, your movement has always emphasized that it does not build on the national principle. Has your attitude changed?

[Krycer] The national principle is still not dominant in the movement. If some Moravians stated their nationality to be Moravian, we view this as a demonstration of their disagreement with the fact that nothing has been done for Moravian autonomy, and as an opportunity to publicly express their affiliation with Moravia.

[Schildberger] Do you intend to press for cooperation between the Movement for Autonomous Democracy/ Society for Moravia and Silesia and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia?

[Krycer] There is absolutely no cooperation with communists. Of course, since the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia has more than 30 deputies in the Czech National Council, we must seek the opinion of this political force when fundamental issues are discussed, and if their opinion on a specific problem coincides with ours, we can agree on a common way to proceed. We do the same with all the legislative forces, particularly with the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Civic Movement, and the Civic Democratic Party. [passage omitted]

[Schildberger] If a union arrangement materializes, your movement would have to seek a new identity.

[Krycer] If it did not find a new focal point, it might even dissolve.

[Schildberger] What about the screening problem?

[Krycer] The congress adopted an unequivocal resolution. All district organization chairmen and all officials from the movement's coordinating center in Brno will be screened.

[Schildberger] As opposed to, for instance, the Christian Democratic Movement, you have not disowned your deputies who received positive results in the screenings....

[Krycer] The movement will await the decision of the judicial proceedings initiated by Deputy Tomis. The court decision will be binding for us. [passage omitted]

[Schildberger] Your former press spokesman, Dr. Vyhlidal, made an accusation that some representatives of the movement use the movement's money for private business. Could you comment on that?

[Krycer] I can proclaim with absolute certainty that the Land Council and the Land Congress of the movement approved the investment in two companies in which nobody in the Movement for Autonomous Democracy/ Society for Moravia and Silesia leadership—including Mr. Tuzinsky—is involved. This concerns the 1.5 million [currency not specified] invested in the LISKA (business, export, import) firm, and 10 million invested in another company, in which we are a silent partner, and as such, we respect its wishes and do not mention its name. I should add, however, that it is neither WARIMPEX nor INTERCOM. I repeat that nobody in the movement is in any way connected with either of the two companies. [passage omitted]

Club Formed To Unite Social Democratic Factions

AU2307122891 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Jul 91 p 2

[CTK report]

[Text] The newly-established Club for a United Social Democracy [Klub za jednotnu socialnu demokraciu] (KZJSD) is intended mainly for members of the Czechoslovak Social Democracy [CSSD] who are dissatisfied with the policy of the present party leadership but have not yet decided to join tne Association of Social Democrats [ASD] for one reason or another. According to a statement issued by the Club's founders, its members object, above all, to the CSSD leadership's growing intolerance and the fact that an increasingly growing number of former "Communist, National Front, and similar functionaries whose moral credibility is questionable" are joining the party. The Club's members "are terrified at the prospect of the party's members base being changed and the old red brotherhood presenting itself under the name CSSD."

The Club's main aims are to establish cooperation with the ASD, to influence the CSSD members' base with the goal of calling an extraordinary CSSD congress before the legislative elections that would prevent the CSSD's transformation into a neo-communist party, and to achieve the CSSD's merger with the ASD.

Czech Reaction to Carnogursky Interview Reported

AU2407123991 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 23 Jul 91 p 1

[CTK report: "J. Carnogursky in LIBERATION: Independent Slovakia Around the Year 2000"]

[Text] Paris—Slovakia's aim is to gain independence around the year 2000, when negotiations on the admission of today's CSFR into the EC will be held, and to enter the integrated community as a completely sovereign state. This was declared by Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky in an interview he granted the French daily LIBERATION. The interview was published in the 22 July issue of the newspaper. The Slovak prime minister described the creation of an independent Slovak state as inevitable in the long term, stressing, however, that this objective must be achieved by nonviolent means and in a constitutional way, within the framework of the European integration process. He acknowledged that, essentially, he pursues the same objectives as Slovak nationalist parties. "It is possible to put it that way. But my attitude is more progressive and more European. I am not an ally of Slovak nationalists. I would like to be an ally of nations struggling for their national identity within the framework of future Europe," he replied to a question concerning his position.

Responding to the objection that, according to public opinion polls, only 16 percent of the Slovak population are in favor of an independent Slovakia, the prime minister said: "This is true, but more than 50 percent of Slovaks demand a greater degree of sovereignty and broader powers. Demanding independence means venturing into unexplored, risky terrain. The Slovaks do not have the courage to take this step, fearing the violence they see in Yugoslavia today. I believe, however, that a peaceful evolution toward independence will gain the support of the great majority [of Slovaks]."

Jan Carnogursky expressed the conviction that Slovakia's path toward a market economy would probably be quicker if it were able to realize its own economic reform, without pressure from central power.

[Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech on 23 July on page 2 carries a 700-word interview with Jan Kalvoda, deputy chairman of the Czech National Council. Asked to comment on Carnogursky's interview for the French newspaper, Kalvoda says that his feelings are "very mixed." On the one hand, he welcomes the "honesty" with which Carnogursky advocates an independent Slovak state. On the other hand, he wonders why Carnogursky does not come up with the demand now, while new constitutions are being drafted. Kalvoda continues: "What I do not understand at all is the Slovak prime minister's idea regarding some sort of a Leninist modification of the theory of a 'gradual extinction' of the federation. I would expect such proposals—yes to a common state, but not too common, and only for a few seasons—from a primitive hillbilly. When presented by a politician, however, they are unacceptable." Kalvoda also objects to Carnogursky's statement that the Slovaks lack the courage to demand independence today for "fear of the violence they see in Yugoslavia." He says: "When I think this analogy through to the end, I cannot but conclude that the Slovaks fear the deployment of the Czechoslovak Army. This is a totally outrageous [nehorazny] argument. If Mr. Carnogursky fears the occupation of Slovakia by Czechs and the 'federation,' let me assure him that what I observe more often is the opposite attitude, one that is equally ominous for the common state, the attitude of 'let them go'." In conclusion, Kalvoda says: "The politicians elected in the two republics in the last elections must, by the end of this calender year, come to an agreement either on a common state or on the extinction of the federation—by constitutional and cultured means, if possible. Considerations such as those expressed in the above-mentioned interview cannot be the negotiating position of the Slovak Republic because they are a mixture of pious wishes and a naive perception of the European reality. The representatives of the Slovak Republic must formulate their idea and concept of a common state (if they have any), and they must formulate just as comprehensibly their philosophy on the breakup of the common state. There is no time for intellectual games such as those entertained by J. Carnogursky in the above-mentioned interview."]

Carnogursky on Future Slovak Constitutional Setup

AU2507130291 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 23 Jul 91 p 2

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky by Rudolf Prochazka; place and date not given: "Let Us Be Realistic and Demand the Impossible"—first paragraph is SLOVENSKY DENIK introduction]

[Excerpts] The European Community is on the threshold of new and intensive economic and political cooperation. This is why it is not unusual that political circles in Germany are trying to adapt to new trends that appeared after the disintegration of the totalitarian systems in Central and Eastern Europe. Last weekend, too, was marked by the spirit of the Christian Social Union conference in Munich on the future integration of Europe. In addition to Lithuanian President Kazimiera Prunskiene, the Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky—who granted us an interview—also took part in it:

[Prochazka] According to organizers, this conference was intended to provoke an extensive discussion on the future of Europe. To what degree did they succeed, and what role have you played there?

[Carnogursky] I believe that their intentions were completely fulfilled. The Christian Social Union has established permanent commissions dealing with some principal issues of its policy: for instance, a commission for economic policy, a commission for the position of Bavaria in Germany and in Europe, a commission for the channeling of the Christian belief into social activity, and similar commissions. In order to express an outsider's view on the problems of European unification, Mrs. Prunskiene and I participated in the discussion held by the Commission for Bavaria's Position in Germany. I, personally, presented a paper on Slovakia's current position and on Slovakia's plans for the future. I stressed the fact that the law on federation—dating back to 1968—could start fulfilling its mission—that is, to provide a framework for the real equality of both republics, to achieve a certain degree of decentralization of decisionmaking, and to grant the republics their original jurisdiction—only after the fall of communism in November 1989. This is the only way to implement the democratic idea of the free competition of political forces—that is, competition between individual parties in the republics—and to introduce the important principle of autonomy and the original jurisdiction of the republics in relation to the federal center.

[Prochazka] To choose Slovakia's optimal position within the framework of the federation means to be constantly choosing, each and every day, between a loud, popular, and nationalistic policy and a quiet—but more consistent—policy of patiently pushing for Slovakia's jurisdiction over specific areas. Is it not erroneous to think that the nationalistic idea can be suppressed?

[Carnogursky] The nationalistic idea is very strong. For the nations of Central, as well as Eastern Europe, this idea represents the strongest bond of solidarity and permanent inspiration for people of all ages. At the same time, this idea also reflects Europe's heterogeneity. The attractiveness of the idea promoting European integration is based on the fact that it allows all nations to develop their autonomy and cultural uniqueness. In the process of Europe's unification, the current developments in Yugoslavia can be very instructive. At the beginning, the foreign ministers of the European Community and also the United States, were of the opinion that the current constitutional setup of Yugoslavia could not be questioned. They apparently believed that they could ignore the centuries old aversion of Croatians and Serbs to living in a common state. Only under the influence of the tragedy and unconstitutional steps taken by one of the parties are they willing to agree to a looser internal setup. However, Slovakia does not want to go the Yugoslav way, nor the way of some republics in the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

[Prochazka] In conclusion, I must quote the final words of Jan Carnogursky's speech. He says that the November revolution in Czechoslovakia, that came unexpectedly early, has shown to many people that the boundary between the possible and the impossible does not have clear contours in today's world and that there is a wide range of alternatives and possibilities in the development of individual societies and in the European communities. Let me follow up on the idea of a Prague philosopher, Franz Kafka: Let us be realistic and demand the impossible. I still have a realistic view of Slovakia's position in the future constitutional setup and in the European communities, Jan Carnogursky said.

Defense Minister Opposes Slovak Home Guard

LD2407145491 Prague CTK in English 1136 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 24 (CTK)—There is no reason for the creation of a Slovak home guard which was proposed by deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council (parliament) Jan Klepac and later supported by Slovak Minister of the Interior Ladislav Pittner, Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky today told a press conference.

Dobrovsky said he had a telephone conversation with Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky this morning who told him that in view of the current security situtation in Slovakia this step might be effective. Dobrovsky described Carnogursky's attitude as "very alarming" and mentioned in this connection Slovak premier's recent interview with the French daily LIBERATION in which he called for the creation of an independent Slovak state.

Dobrovsky said a home guard is a military institution whose task is to protect the country against external enemy. In accord with the law this task is fulfilled by the Czechoslovak Army. Together with civilian defence the army is qualified to help remove the consequences of

natural and technological catastrophes. Police and security corps should be reinforced to fight crime but new army units must not be created, Dobrovsky said.

Due to the fact that the Slovak premier is not against the creation of a Slovak home guard and that armed forces are being redeployed in Czechoslovakia (39 per cent are to be deployed in Slovakia), the problem should be dealt with by the State Defence Council, led by President Vaclav Havel, Dobrovsky said.

Remaining Legal Obstacles to Referendum Explained

AU2407135691 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 23 Jul 91 p 3

[Jana Havligerova commentary: "The Limits of What Is Possible"]

[Text] "Thy words be yes yes, no no." [quotation as published] Finally, we have the opportunity to voice our opinion. Do we really?

After a protracted tug-of-war, the Assembly approved the referendum law last week. It was approved after a second vote, after a resolution of the disputed matter of settlement of property issues [between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic] in the event of a breakup of the federation. But, when examined more closely, the happy unraveling promises nothing but new complications. The respective article reads: "The transfer of property from the ownership of the CSFR to the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic will be subject to a constitutional law of the Federal Assembly. This law will also provide for the transfer of the CSFR's financial assets and liabilities, the currency reserves, the federal material reserves, and the property of the CSFR situated outside its territory."

This is an elegant formulation that is acceptable to everyone. However, it does not solve anything whatsoever. Above all, one can analogously deduce from the bickering over powers what the process of drafting such a law will be like. Most important, the Slovak side is more than likely to make the calling of a referendum conditional on the [previous] adoption of the above-mentioned legal norm. As a matter of fact, such was the Slovak side's original proposal and because it was not accepted, deputies for the Christian Democratic Movement at first rejected the submitted referendum bill. The fact that no deadline was fixed for this this key piece of legislature to be ready only increases Slovakia's room for maneuvering.

It is thus apparent that it will take some time before we will be able to utter our yes yes, no no.

Klaus Outlines Problems in Agricultural Reform

AU2407121291 Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech 19 Jul 91 pp 1, 3

[CSFR Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus article: "The Market Must Function Everywhere"]

[Excerpts] It is no secret that reform in agriculture has not progressed very far. Despite the fact that the land bill has been passed, no new ownership relations have been established, privatization has not been carried out, and the agricultural cooperatives have not been transformed. On the contrary, in the existing agricultural enterprises, uncertainty has increased and it is a well-known fact that uncertainty is fertile soil for inactivity, and for passivity, and it encourages waiting for a solution (with a capital S) to come from outside, that is, a solution made by someone else—a solution that would solve all our problems.

However, the solution is not in sight. State agricultural policy is not clear and is being rejected because of the disputes about the jurisdiction [of the federal and national governments], as—by the way—are many other things in this country. In the meantime, supply (agricultural production) continues to operate according to the previous style of thinking; that is, the primary thing is to ensure self-sufficiency and the growth of production at any price, even if demand drops. After the price increases, consumers cannot, or do not want, to consume the same amounts of agricultural products as they did in the past. The state—under the strong influence of the agricultural lobby—also played a role, since it was incapable of restructuring its policy of subsidies and of promoting changes instead of supporting existing ways of production. With this, the state contributed toward the creation and the culmination of the current problems in agriculture today. The responsibility of the republican governments—not of the Federal Government—is quite evident in this sense.

Let us summarize what has happened. We all assumed—some of us did so more than others; economists did so less, and agricultural experts more—that consumers in Czechoslovakia simply wanted to consume the existing amounts of food "at any price." In economics terminology, we say that the elasticity of demand for food is very low. The assumption was made that there would be low sensitivity of demand to price changes. This has not been confirmed. We were not surprised by the short-term reaction, yet it has become apparent today that the decline in demand will not be a short-term decline. [passage omitted]

The adjustment of demand was very slow, because:

- due to the length of the agricultural production cycle, there are limited possibilities for making adjustments in agriculture;

- agricultural enterprises are not subjectively prepared to react to new conditions;

- uncertainty, nervousness, and the loss of prospects grow;

- people call for the state to take a responsible role and are nostalgic for the old methods of administration;

- with its policy of subsidies, the state issued incorrect signals, and this made it possible to retain production that has no future;

- no steps were taken against the monopolistic behavior by state enterprises in the food industry and in the retail system.

The result is a significant agricultural surplus in:

- beef (approaching one half of assumed yearly domestic consumption);

- butter and dairy products (approximately 20 percent of the expected production);

- wheat (an approximately 15 percent surplus);

- rape (a 30 percent surplus above the expected harvest).

Eliminating this surplus will require quite extraordinary and very expensive measures. These measures will be a combination of putting surplus agricultural products into state storage facilities, of exporting surpluses—despite the fact that we cannot have any illusions about advantageous prices—of selling surplus goods cheaply in Czechoslovakia to achieve humanitarian objectives, and of a partial destruction of overproduction. The basis for a long-term solution is:

- the establishment of a federal fund for market regulation that will subsidize the domestic market; however, this will only alleviate farmers' financial losses from the export and storage of overproduction;

- to continue the regulation of prices (and of the markup) in the food industry and in the food retail system, as long as these areas are not definitely privatized, and to increase the efficiency of price control;

- to finish the work on the system of compensatory payments for the import of agricultural and food products.

However, the long-term solution requires much action from agricultural producers. We do not see more commercials, we do not see surplus meat being offered in the farmers' own stores; neither can we see a significant improvement in the quality of deliveries to retail stores or in the speed with which they are supplied. The farmers themselves should do more. To increase their activity means to rearrange relations among themselves and to carry out the internal transformation of agricultural cooperatives. We will speak about this subject next time.

Dlouhy: USSR Lacks Funds for Export Purchases

LD2507012591 Prague Federal I Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy returned from Moscow today after he unexpectedly departed yesterday morning.

[Begin Dlouhy recording] It was a short, one-day visit. The aim was to discuss all controversial problems in mutual economic relations: in commercial exchange, conditions of payment, indicative lists and so on, and at the same time, to get the first information about what kind of cooperation and what volume of supplies we can expect in 1992.

Four meetings took place. During those 24 hours, I met the author of one alternative economic reform plan, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, for about a three-hour discussion. It was very interesting. We have also had talks with the finance minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Lazarev, with the acting minster, the chairman of the state commission of the Russian Federation for the economy. The main meeting was with Economics Minister Shcherbakov.

The last meeting took place in relatively unusual conditions. We started the talks at 1 o'clock at night. They lasted about two hours. Views were exchanged in three areas. First, views on economic reform in both countries. It must be said that in the last few months, and after the London summit, views on economic reform in the Soviet Union have changed quite a bit. It seems the Soviet leadership is getting ready to take steps similar to those taken in Czechoslovakia and elswhere in east Europe.

We also spoke about problems in our economic relations. I had to reject clearly the view of the Soviet side that it is necessary to reassess the indicative lists according to which trade exchange between our countries should be reduced even further. I was forced to insist that this is a case of interstate treaties that have been signed already, and that signed interstate treaties cannot be treated as a piece of paper that can be rejected at any time. It is necessary to treat the Czechoslovak economy in the same way as the German economy is treated. This means that we insisted on the existing treaties and on the existing written material and on the trade exchange based on them.

On the other hand, it was said quite realistically that there are obviously hard times ahead for us, in particular with regard to further reduction of Soviet demand for our exports. The reality in the Soviet Union is that they have no funds to pay for our exports.

Still, all possible ways to expand our commercial contacts on other than the state level were confirmed.

The third area was the area of economic relations in 1992 and beyond. The Soviet side was able to state only one thing: that after 1 October, the first (?quantitative

draft) can be ready and that there is interest in again concluding a one-year agreement for 1992 like we had for 1991. [end recording]

Slovak Statistics Reveal Economic Decline

AU2407140491 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Jul 91 p 2

["(NO-rr)"-signed report: "Yet Another Decline in June"]

[Text] Bratislava—Production in industrial and construction enterprises fell in June in comparison with May.

Industrial production amounted to 25.7 billion korunas; it was 3.3 billion higher in May. The greatest decline was recorded in the chemical, rubber-asbestos, and mechanical engineering industries. In comparison with the first six months of last year, the decline in production in enterprises with more than 100 employees represents a full 20 percent of last year's level. The decline in the construction industry in June amounted to 290 million korunas in comparison to May. During the first six months of the year, production in monitored enterprises was 42.8 percent lower than during the first six months of 1990.

It seems that we are also eating less and less. In June, we purchased 5,300 tonnes less of meat, 1,800 tonnes less of poultry, 402,000 liters less of milk, and 11.6 million eggs fewer than in May. During the first six months of last year, 33.7 percent more meat, 11.3 percent more poultry, 22.3 percent more milk, and 47.2 percent more eggs were purchased than during the first six months of this year. However, despite this, retail turnover has increased. After adding on the unmonitored commercial enterprises and private enterprises, it rose by approximately 14 percent at current prices. At first glance, the paradoxical reports about a reduction in purchasing and an increase in retail turnover are explained by the figures on the more than 51 percent increase—compared to December 1990—in the prices for consumer goods and services. However, the more than 13 percent increase in prices for services in June alone, as compared to May, is worthy of mention. For this reason especially, the cost of living index also rose—as opposed to May—by 2.7 percent for workers and employees, by 1.7 percent for cooperative workers, and by 3.3 percent for pensioners. In comparison with December 1990, these figures represent an increase of 45.4 percent for pensioners and of 49.1 percent for cooperative workers.

The statistics for the first six months of the year do not omit the unemployment figures. In addition to the well-known fact that 161,400 people are unemployed and that the unemployment level is 6.32 percent, we find out that the unemployment level has exceeded 8 percent in 14 Slovak districts. In the Galanta, Rimavska Sobota, Bardejov, and Kosice environs and the Trebisov Districts, it has exceeded 9 percent and is 10.45 percent in the Cadca District (it is not without interest that the level in the Martin District [in East Slovakia, location of arms production plants] is under four percent).

A total of 2,899 production units were auctioned off in Slovakia before 7 July, and the number of licenses permitting citizens to conduct private enterprise reached 207,900.

Federal, Republic Officials Agree on Pipeline

LD2507042491 Prague CTK in English 2019 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Bratislava July 24 (CTK)—Federal, Czech and Slovak officials today reached an agreement on the creation of a shareholding company to manage the "Transgas" pipeline, which will transport natural gas from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia and the rest of Europe.

In an impromptu press conference after their meeting, Federal Economics Minister Vladimir Dlouhy, Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky and Czech Economic Policy and Development Minister Karel Dyba announced the formation of a team of experts to evaluate the legal and logistical aspects of transferring the necessary management rights from the Czech Republic to Slovakia.

The team, which will meet for the first time next week, will also analyse a plan to privatise Transgas, with 52 per cent of the shares going to Slovakia and 48 per cent to the Czech Republic. The Slovaks base their claim to the majority stake in the company on the fact that most of the pipeline runs across Slovak territory.

In the midst of a fierce debate on power-sharing in February of this year, Federal, Czech and Slovak leaders agreed not to split the pipeline into Slovak and Czech sections, but to leave it united with headquarters in the Slovak capital of Bratislava. On July 16 the Slovak Government ignored the earlier agreement, deciding to create a joint stock company to manage its share of the pipeline.

Under the Communists, the pipeline was managed solely by the government of the Czech Republic.

Semtex Enterprise Creates Detectable Explosive

LD2407103891 Prague CTK in English 0842 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Prague July 24 (CTK)—Synnhesia Semtin, the Czechoslovak enterprise that once produced Semtex, has produced a new plastic explosive more easily detectable.

An article in this week's issue of the Defence Ministry's "OBRANA LIDU" says the new explosive, having passed several tests, adheres to international detection standards. The article was written by the Foreign Trade Ministry's press secretary Frantisek Havril.

The Foreign Trade Ministry currently bans the export of plastic explosives. It has said resumption depends on the creation of an explosive monitorable, for example, by an airport's detection machines.

Before the 1989 revolution Czechoslovakia exported Semtex to other East bloc nations and to Libya. The latter is believed to have supplied it to various terrorist groups.

The article says the new explosive should be limited to industrial use.

Environment Minister: Danube Project Unacceptable

AU2507104491 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 24 Jul 91 p 1

["Ka.M."-signed report: "We Cannot Accept the Decision Under Any Circumstances"]

[Text] Sandor K. Keresztes, minister for the environment and land development, told our correspondent: I am not surprised by the Slovak Government's decision because they took an extremely inflexible attitude during our negotiations in Pozsony [Bratislava] last week. He went on to say that we could not accept the Slovak Government's decision under any circumstances. If the Slovak side takes practical steps, there will be an adequate response.

At the same time, Sandor K. Keresztes pointed out that this was only the Slovak Government's decision; therefore, we cannot consider it final. He explained that he was hopeful that the Czech and Slovak Federal Government would come to a different decision.

The Hungarian negotiating delegation's contacts are with the Federal Government. Keresztes hopes that the legal arguments already explained by the Hungarian negotiating delegation, the likely sanctions that will follow a unilateral step, and the international reaction to the diversion of the Danube will make our partners consider the matter more seriously.

MDF Opposes CSFR Decision on Gabcikovo

LD2407125491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] The appropriate committee of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] sees the remnants of communism behind yesterday's decision by the Czechoslovak Government to unilaterally switch on the Gabcikovo hydroelectric plant next October. The Environmental Affairs and Natural Protection Committee points out that the interest of Europe as a whole is also violated by changes that alter the natural treasures of the Danube and the Danube basin. For this reason, the MDF committee calls on European governments and environmental protection movements to prevent the implementation of the Czechoslovak decision.

Party Chairman, Gorbachev Discuss Grain Sales

LD2407180791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Interview with Gyula Thurmer, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party chairman, by Robert Kis in Budapest on 24 July—recorded]

[Text] [Kis] What did you discuss with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow?

[Thurmer] We dicussed a written request we made to the Soviet leadership. We asked them to understand that there will be a record harvest in Hungary this year and that Hungarian agriculture will be ruined if we cannot sell two or three million tonnes of grain abroad. The Soviet leadership—Mikhail Gorbachev, personally—accepted our request and directed the Council of Ministers to notify the relevant companies to contact the Hungarian counterparts. There is an opportunity for the purchase of one and a half tonnes to 2 million tonnes from Hungary.

[Kis] How can a party chairman sell grain?

[Thurmer] It would be very nice if the relevant ministers and the government did this, but they do not do it, so we feel it our duty toward the nation and the Hungarian peasants to help. It would be very nice if the government grabbed this political opportunity.

[Kis] How would the Soviet partner pay?

[Thurmer] I felt during our talks that there is a real demand here, backed with the ability to pay. The Soviets can pay for it. They would buy the grain elsewhere, in any case. The question is whether they should buy it in the United States or in Hungary.

[Kis] I understand that you met CPSU Deputy Chairman Gennadiy Yanayev [name and title as heard]?

[Thurmer] Yes, we talked for more than an hour today with the Soviet vice president. He said that the Central Committee meeting is of great importance, stating clearly that this Central Committee meeting will strengthen socialism in the Soviet Union, and nobody should expect personnel changes. Mikhail Gorbachev is party general secretary and will remain so the day after tomorrow as well.

[Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian at 1600 GMT on 24 July adds: "The Foreign Ministry issued a statement denying Gyula Thurmer met with Soviet Government representatives in Moscow."]

Entz, Chebeleu Assess Geneva Minority Conference

AU2507090891 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Jul 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Geza Entz, secretary of state at the Secretariat for Hungarians Living Beyond Our Borders, and Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, director at the Romanian Foreign Ministry, by Pal Bodor in Geneva; date not given: "Geneva: Two Opinions"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The Geneva International Conference on National Minorities ended last week. After the conclusion of the conference, our correspondent interviewed Geza Entz, leader of the Hungarian delegation, and Traian Chebeleu, leader of the Romanian delegation.

Entz: Positive Measures Cannot Wait Any Longer

[Bodor] What conclusions do you draw from this conference, and what were the most important results?

[Entz] Our delegation tried to actively participate in all working groups and activities of the conference. We knew that this was an exceptional occasion, where the experts of the European and Atlantic areas gathered to thoroughly discuss the national minority issue that is so important from the point of view of the new European and world order. I can say that the work was successful, and our statements and suggestions attracted a positive response from the majority of the participants.

The conference met in a mental and political climate that could not have been predicted. A critical situation evolved in the SFRY and seriously left its mark on the conference. Stability has the greatest value in international relations. At the moment, we are facing a period when new structures will have to be created to guarantee stability—both in interstate relations and within the states, because they have not been satisfactorily settled in Europe's 20th century history so far. However, now we have the basic principles—included in documents that are internationally acknowledged and signed by all participant states here—and with their help and in their spirit it is possible to manage this stability and the necessary changes, too. I am mainly referring to the Helsinki Final Act that defines and sets out a whole system and quality of modern interstate relations for a long time ahead.

We are living through the age of structural changes, but it seems to me that all affected sides ultimately agree that these changes will have to come about peacefully, through negotiations. I repeat that these talks will affect—and they already do today—both interstate relations and relations within states.

It is true though, that we do not yet have the necessary experience and means—or to use a term accepted here, mechanisms—necessary for such negotiations. Rearrangements have usually been carried out in peace treaties after wars. This time, the means and the methods of negotiation and contact needed to handle these problems are still waiting to be drawn up. This could be felt in the confusion and lack of clear strategy of the determinant factors in international life at the outbreak of the crisis in the SFRY. However, the situation appears to be changing in this respect, too.

When issues like these emerge, issues that directly and fundamentally affect the affairs of national minorities, it can be feared that no actual decisions are made—and this fear was justified almost to the last moment of this conference. It seemed that the decisions were to be postponed to the forthcoming stages of this process. However, it did not happen that way in the end. The delegates accepted a forward-looking decision at the last moment, that indicates that we are indeed part of an accelerating time, and politicians feel that positive decisions cannot be delayed.

[Bodor] Can the national minorities expect further steps from the autumn stage of this process?

[Entz] The view that we definitely have to make progress in national minority issues at the Moscow conference dedicated to "human dimensions" is accepted by the widest circles.

Chebeleu: Romania Does Not Acknowledge the Notion of Collective Rights

[Bodor] Mr. Ambassador, during discussions on similar subjects, disagreements start even with the interpretation of concepts. Do you think that the prior clarification of the political and legal terms at issue would assist the actual negotiations? Could we say that a "semantic dictionary" on the issues of human rights and national minorities should be set up?

[Chebeleu] We would indeed need something like this. In practice, though, it is a difficult task. Imagine, the term "national minority" is actually still waiting to be defined. The United Nations have been trying to do this for a decade already. Nevertheless, we are all aware of what a national minority is and what this term covers. However, there is no doubt that we are moving in an area of relativity in a certain sense. I am afraid that if we attempted to immerse ourselves in the definition of terms, we would waste even more time and our activity would be even less convincing for the general public and for our governments, too. Therefore, we continue to work with the terms at our disposal. Everybody interprets these the way they can. This is the way it is in politics, and I do not think we can take on big reforms now.

[Bodor] My impression is that the sides concerned have caricatures and stereotypes instead of the realistic picture they should form of each other.

[Chebeleu] I agree with you. Certain stereotypes are used in Romania and probably in Hungary, too, and we cannot disperse these false images through our work. The only solution is dialogue, nothing else, on every level and on every possible occasion. We should try to clarify the things we can, and the things we cannot clarify now we should leave for later and come back to because we do not have any other means anyway. If we come to a conference like this with ready-made decisions, then we cannot enforce them either with force or through the international community. We cannot force anything on Hungary, and Hungary cannot force anything on us through this conference. Naturally, it is important for us to find out how much international political support our views have, but if we really want to solve some problems of Romanian-Hungarian relations, we cannot do it through international conferences. We cannot force our views on others at international conferences, even with a smaller or greater majority. Therefore, we have no other means but dialogue.

[Bodor] Some people refuse with horror the notion of collective rights in the area of national minorities—although this phenomenon cannot even be approached without this notion.

[Chebeleu] As far as our government is concerned, we do not accept the concept of collective rights, either, especially because this is not even a legal term. It is a political term at the most, but I would not even call it that. Naturally, there are certain rights that can only be exercised in a community. For example, if someone has the right to use his mother-tongue in public administration, he obviously needs at least one other person to do this. There are rights that are exercised in a community, that is collectively, but these do not become collective rights because of that; it is the individual's right to use his mother-tongue for example. In order to have a right, one has to have the means to exercise this right. An individual can be taken to court; a government can also be summoned by the international community—but how could a whole national minority be taken to court? Especially in connection with a collective right that cannot even be defined or worded? This is the reason we distance ourselves from this legally undefinable notion—although I can see exactly how this can be made use of politically. However, in that case, we should enforce political intentions by the specific means of politics. On the other hand, if we use legal expressions, then we should be rigorous. How could we accept a notion that is undefined in international commitments, especially when we undertake to adhere to the agreement word by word, as is the case here. What does collective right mean? What are the collective rights? Let us define them then.... If we all agree that we know what we are talking about and what the term covers, then all our reservations will disappear. That is, we have problems with the ambiguity of this notion.

[Bodor] Do you think that you managed to clear up some of the more delicate and complicated questions at this conference?

[Chebeleu] I do not think that this was one of the aims of this conference. The conference was convened in order to improve the handling of national minority issues, and, if possible, to promote international cooperation in the interest of the practical application of the relevant commitments. Therefore, from the outset, this conference did not intend to discuss delicate, complicated, or concrete questions.

Army Commander Denies Troop Mobilization

LD2407150191 Budapest MTI in English 1321 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Budapest, July 24 (MTI)—Commander of the Hungarian Army Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz has been interviewed by the Hungarian daily NEPSZABADSAG. The interview is carried by the Wednesday issue of the paper.

Q: Reports have recently been released by the Yugoslav press to the effect that the Hungarian Army has been mobilized. Has the mobilization really been carried out?

A: There has been no mobilization, neither have any military regulations been introduced. Our attitude in this respect is determined by those principles presently guiding Hungarian foreign policy. One such principle is that in the future phenomena similar to the Yugoslav crisis will probably occur quite frequently in the region. Therefore, there is nothing to be gained by reacting to such situations hastily.

Another aspect is that the social or ethnic unrest along our borders that might lead to armed conflicts, can always bring about the possibility of taking irrational and radical steps. We must, however, forbear to take such steps and adopt the attitude that measures to be taken against any danger threatening the Republic of Hungary must be proportional to the danger itself.

Q: What does that mean in a situation like the current one?

A: It means that the internal armed conflicts of a neighbouring country are not primarily military challenges for us. In a country where developments point in the direction of an eventual civil war, military action is not directed against another country. Armed conflicts near the Hungarian border have so far not necessitated that comprehensive measures be taken in the Hungarian Army. The most useful attitude for us to adopt is that of keeping our distance and condemning the incidents.

With respect to the military, the guideline to follow is one that prevents the escalation of armed conflicts. At the same time, an important factor in defence is to reveal possible sources of danger in time, to determine their characteristics and take the proper military measures. These measures, however, should be limited and should serve only to strengthen the security of our borders and airspace.

Through our moderate attitude, we are complying with the foreign policy of the Hungarian Government, Lt. Gen. Lorincz said.

'Improved Atmosphere' at Troop Withdrawal Talks

LD2507041991 Warsaw PAP in English 2049 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Moscow, July 24—"The intensification and deepening of dialogue on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland allows us to talk about important progress in the discussions," Jerzy Sulek, director of the European department at the Polish Foreign Ministry and head of the Polish delegation in the bilateral talks, said in Moscow Wednesday [24 July].

Members of the Soviet delegation unofficially expressed satisfaction at the improved atmosphere for the discussions, which had earlier stalled over the projected date for the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from Polish territory, apportionment of costs relating to Soviet military installations, and environmental and material damage sustained during the 45-year Soviet presence in Poland.

The 11th round of negotiations between the two delegations will take place in Warsaw in August.

Party 'Reluctantly' Supports U.S. Treaty

LD2507044991 Warsaw PAP in English 2153 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Warsaw, July 24—The "Democratic Left" parliamentary floor group has declared it will reluctantly support the ratification of the economic and trade relations treaty between Poland and the United States.

"The work on the preparation of the treaty raised serious doubts within the Democratic Left group, mainly related to the possible losses in the domain of intelectual property" it was said at the group meeting on Wednesday [24 July].

Commenting also on the social security treaty between Poland and Germany Deputy Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz opined that Polish Government's stand had not been sufficiently firm on the issue of compensations for Poles forced to work in Germany during the Second World War.

Official Describes Future Hungarian Treaty

AU2407153391 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22 Jul 91 p 5

[Interview with Zbigniew Kruzynski, head of the Central Europe Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Lubczyk; place and date not given: "A True, Not Rose-Colored Picture"]

[Text] [Lubczyk] What stage has work on a Polish-Hungarian treaty reached?

[Kruzynski] Negotiations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expert level concerning the text have been practically completed. You can say that the final commas are being inserted. It is true that there has still been no final confirmation from both sides, but all differences regarding wording have been overcome. Currently, matters are being coordinated with the departments concerned, as they have the possibility, right, and duty to express their views on all questions in the treaty that affect them, but we do not expect any delays in work on the final form of the treaty.

[Lubczyk] How long has work been in progress on the treaty?

[Kruzynski] The decision on the need to draw up a new treaty on basic relations with Hungary was made last year. It is to replace the old 1968 treaty between the Polish People's Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic. From the legal and formal angle, it is still in force, but it is completely inappropriate to the present political situation, as it was an element of the socialist community's system of bilateral and multilateral ties, a community that no longer exists.

[Lubczyk] Did any significant difficulties arise in agreeing on the content of a new treaty?

[Kruzynski] There were no difficulties stemming from fundamentally different interests or divergent positions. However, it turned out that the task is one requiring a lot of time and work, and that stems from the fact that there was practically no pattern in existence on which the treaty could be based. Poland has only juts begun to conclude treaties of this kind, and the treaties that have already been signed with, for example, France and, most recently, Germany did not prove to be useful in every respect for the preparation of treaties with such close neighbors as Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

[Lubczyk] The old treaty was a "treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance." Does the new treaty refer to traditional friendship, which has a special, exceptional history in the case of Hungary?

[Kruzynski] Misgivings really did arise about whether the idea of friendship should be included in the treaty. This is because after 40 years of "state" friendship between socialist nations, central supervision of friendship, it often became an empty slogan that tended to elicit a reaction from society that was the opposite of what was intended. However, we ascertained that there was no such danger in Polish-Hungarian friendship.

Of course, it is true that the concept of Polish-Hungarian friendship had been worn out to a great extent, especially over the past two to three decades. Certain misunderstandings arose in our relations during that period. Despite obvious similarities in the fate of both nations, there were and are differences in the development of both societies, and mutual perceptions have gradually become distorted. It is not just a question of stereotypes of petty black market traders and, in general, we still have images that are based on past events and various fragmentary assessments. However, there was no way in

which these mutual misunderstandings could be compared with the problems that existed in Polish-German relations or Polish-Russian relations, but there is also no basis for painting a rose-colored picture of contacts between us. We want the treaty to create a framework for activities that will revive the best patterns of friendship and foster a modern form of partnership. This will, however, call for goodwill and consistent efforts on both sides.

[Lubczyk] So, the treaty is oriented toward the future.

[Kruzynski] Yes, it is to create conditions for the comprehensive development of contacts and cooperation appropriate to modern states that wish to make use of geographical proximity and—to use a political term that is being increasingly used—good neighborly relations.

The principle of mutual solidarity is an important element of the treaty. History shows that without mutual solidarity we are condemned to failure. In order to make up lost ground in terms of development, we should not compete against each other, but practice solidarity.

[Lubczyk] How does the treaty deal with the question of security?

[Kruzynski] That is a further important element of the treaty. Effectively, the first issue that we settled—that was still during the preliminary stage—was that the treaty is not to become an alliance. This may come as a surprise to readers, but cooperation in the security field must become an organic part of the common security system in Europe, a system that is just coming into being on the ruins of the "balance of terror." Today, security cannot be guaranteed through bilateral cooperation, and that is why it has to be placed within a broader European context. Irrespective of the security clause—that is the jargon that we use—we devoted a lot of attention to preparations and negotiations in the treaty. This is surely obvious, bearing in mind the importance and sensitivity of the subject. The treaty requires provisions that are appropriate to the interests of both sides and would place our cooperation in this area within the whole complex of European relations.

[Lubczyk] When will the treaty be signed and where?

[Kruzynski] It will definitely be signed in the second half of this year. A date and place have not been fixed yet. According to international custom, it will take place within a ceremonial setting at the highest level.

[Lubczyk] Will the future treaty also make reference to trilateral cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary?

[Kruzynski] Trilateral cooperation, regional cooperation in a broader sense, is a priority area in Polish foreign policy. The treaty mentions the need to develop regional cooperation, mutual support in striving to achieve European integration, and that was, as we know, one of the basic themes of the document signed in Visegrad. However, the treaty with Hungary has a bilateral character.

[Lubczyk] Thank you.

Democratic Party Calls on Other Parties To Meet

AU2507105991 Warsaw PAP in English 1816 GMT 22 Jul 91

[Text] Warsaw, July 22—The Democratic Party (SD) on Monday [22 July] called on leaders of other political parties to hold a meeting under the aegis of the president of the Republic.

Such a meeting held prior to the upcoming general elections would "help ease the present tense political situation," SD leader Aleksander Mackiewicz told a news conference here.

The Democratic Party will have its own candidates, but it does not rule out local coalitions, Mackiewicz said, and added that the SD will name a full list of its candidates to the Sejm (lower house) and only half of the number of candidates for the seats in the Senate.

Mackiewicz who is going to run for Sejm deputy himself, said that his party expects to gain at least as many seats in the lower house as it has in the SD caucus now, that is 20. The SD also counts on a considerable success in the senatorial elections in several constituencies.

Trade Union Candidates Must Be Non-Party

LD2407184591 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1730 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Candidates to the Sejm and Senate standing on trade union lists cannot be members of political organizations. The ban also applies throughout the entire parliamentary term of office. This decision was taken by the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity National Commission. Representatives of the Mazowsze region do not agree with it, and have announced that they will submit a complaint against the union's solution to the Helsinki committee.

Solidarity will not put up its own lists of candidates to Parliament in the Torun and Wloclawek voivodships, which form one electoral district. The board of the Kujawy and Dobrzyn land region has decided to place candidates on a joint list with the Center Accord, the Polish Peasant Party Solidarity, and local Citizens' Committees.

Center Accord's Kaczynski on Election Coalitions

AU2307164491 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 19 Jul 91 p 2

[Interview with Center Accord leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski by Kazimierz Groblewski; place and date not given: "A Long Way From the Extreme Right"]

[Text] [Groblewski] At the last Citizens' Committees conference, you said that the Center Accord does not want to go into the elections together with the extreme

right. What is the extreme right in Poland, and how does it differ from centrist and right-wing groups?

[Kaczynski] First of all, the extreme right consists of people and organizations that are the successors of prewar groups, primarily the National Democrats. Then, second, there are newly formed groups that do not refer directly to the National Democrat tradition, such as the Christian-National Union and several smaller groups. Their members are burdened with quite a number of prejudices, including ones that fall within the National Democrat tradition.

These groups propose rebuilding a traditional society in Poland, one with hierarchical traditions, a patriarchal family, an economy based on family businesses. It is a program that can be realized, but that, in my opinion, most of society considers anachronistic. We also have an extreme liberal right—the Union for Real Politics is a classic example.

We resolutely reject all of that. The whole idea behind the Center Accord was that Poland should have an alternative to the left other than the groups on the extreme right, such as the Christian-National Union, and I think that we have succeeded. The fact that the Center Accord is seen as an extreme grouping by a significant part of society is a propaganda success for the left. On several occasions I have said that we will not go anywhere with the Christian-National Union, that we are a party that differs very clearly and radically from the Christian-National Union.

[Groblewski] Who will the Center Accord form an alliance with before the elections?

[Kaczynski] We are seeking to establish a coalition with the Citizens' Committees, the overwhelming majority of which do not support the Christian-National Union, with that part of the peasant movement that has evolved out of "Solidarity," and with Christian democrat groups. There is no doubt that in many regions we will start out with the support of "Solidarity" on the basis of bloc lists.

[Groblewski] Have any concrete decisions been made about this, because "Solidarity" has, after all, already decided to enter the elections independently.

[Kaczynski] It has decided that it will go into the elections by itself with a limited list. We are not calling that into question. However, I know that in Warsaw, for example, there are plans to put forward a limited number of candidates, which gives rise to the possibility of holding talks about a bloc list. The situation in many regions is similar. We also received proposals that we could not accept, but which indicate that there are good intentions—that "Solidarity" would include our candidates on its list.

However, our bloc in a narrow sense would be made up of Citizens' Committees and part of the peasant movement. I think that our disassociation from the Christian-National Union was of great value for the peasant movement. I think that we will be able to form a centrist coalition or a coalition of the moderate center right. It would be the same as the way in which the Democratic Union—as we understand it and irrespective of the personal views of some of its representatives—is, nevertheless, a left-wing group, or at least a pro-left group.

[Groblewski] Which part of the peasant movement would belong to the coalition?

[Kaczynski] There is still some time left for talks, and I will not name any groups at this stage. We will not, of course, be holding talks with the Polish Peasant Party-United Peasant Party, at least not at the highest level. We consider the group to be left-wing, which is not a negative term in a moral sense—it is difficult not to respect such left-wing politicians as Jan Jozef Lipski or Zbigniew Bujak—but also a nomenklatura group.

[Groblewski] Do you think that a pre-election agreement between the Center Accord and the Democratic Union would be possible, at least in the form that the Liberal-Democratic Congress has proposed, that is, an agreement about the Senate elections? Recently, you placed the Union, the Liberals, and the post-communists in the same category, and described them as a grouping that wants to pursue goals based on a post-communist order.

[Kaczynski] That, unfortunately is the way things would appear to be, judging by their current programs, or one acknowledges—this is something that I would address to the Union, above all, that is, not to the Union as a party, because it was not a party at the time, but to the groups that supported Mazowiecki's government—that a mistake was made, a certain social stage was omitted, and that we must return to it. It cannot be possible for people who earned important social positions for themselves under communism to use these positions now to acquire even more powerful positions without any kind of verification, or one says that everything is proceeding correctly and that those who think differently are troublemakers, accelerators—a great number of names have been thought up.

So, there would have to be a verification of programs. The Liberals have a program of defending the status quo, perhaps even more so than the Union's program.

[Groblewski] So, there will be no agreement, not even on the Senate elections?

[Kaczynski] I do not see that as possible, unless, I repeat, programs are verified.

[Groblewski] What about the National Citizens' Committee?

[Kaczynski] The National Citizens' Committee is a body that contains representatives of many different parties, including some that have an extremist character.

[Groblewski] Would you like the president to support the coalition that you have talked about?

[Kaczynski] I would like the president to call for the introduction of a greater degree of order into our political life and to point out dangers. This does not mean he should become involved in the election campaign directly. A success for post-communist forces would, quite simply, be a danger for Poland and a danger for democracy. However, the decision rests with the president.

[Groblewski] Would a success for the Democratic Union or the Liberals also pose a danger for Poland?

[Kaczynski] In a different sense. A success for Tyminski or the Social Democratic Party would give rise to questions about the path that Poland is to take. On the other hand, a success for the forces that you asked about would simply mean the continuation of current policies. I fear that the opportunities provided by these policies are at the point of being exhausted. A series of events could occur that would call these policies into question and could result in a return to non-market structures. However, I am in no way saying that the Liberals or the Democratic Union are communists.

Nastase Leaves for Visit to Yugoslavia, Albania

AU2407174591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1621 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/7/1991—Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase left Bucharest today for Belgrade to pay visits to Yugoslavia and Albania.

Upon his departure he reasserted Romania's position in support of a democratic, constitutional settlement of the crisis in the neighbour country by the Yugoslav policy-makers.

Showing he will discuss that question with the Yugoslav authorities, he specified that the exchange of views would also focus on regional aspects and on cooperation in the general context of the CSCE process.

Meets SFRY's Markovic, Milosevic

AU2507090991 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0851 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, ROMPRES 25/7/1991—The situation in Yugoslavia as well as the stage of the bilateral relations were the main issues discussed during the talks the Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase had in Belgrade on a short working visit at the invitation of his Yugoslav counterpart Budimir Loncar.

The Romanian minister called on the President of the Federal Executive Council Ante Markovic and on Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic.

In a statement to the press at the end of the talks with the Romanian foreign minister, President Milosevic expressed hope at the expansion of the relations between Romania and Serbia based on joint interest and on the two countries' past collaboration. "We optimistically view further possibilities to expand collaboration between the two sides," said the Serbian president.

Friendship Treaty With Italy Outlined

AU2407174791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1615 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/7/1991—The treaty of friendship and collaboration between Romania and the Italian Republic signed Tuesday [23 July] by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Adrian Nastase and Gianni de Michelis was released in Bucharest on Wednesday.

The treaty recognizes the illegal character of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 23 August 1939, and expresses the two parties' conviction that interstate relations should be underlain by the universal values of freedom, democracy, pluralism and observance of human rights.

The parties reiterate the pledges they assumed under the Paris Charter and the other documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and stipulate that Romania and Italy shall develop relations in accordance with the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, equal rights, human dignity and respect for foremost human rights and liberties.

The parties shall intensify their efforts toward helping create a qualitatively new situation in Europe, the document also shows. If one of them considers that such a situation has occurred as to endanger its lofty interests of security, it will be entitled to ask the other party to proceed to bilateral consultations without delay.

They shall work for better cooperation in Europe by building new permanent and appropriate structures apt to consolidate peace on the continent.

Furthermore, Romania and Italy undertake to broaden and deepen economic, industrial, financial, technical, scientific and ecologic collaboration. They shall also encourage the expansion and deepening of Romania's relations with the European Communities.

The parties shall favour direct capital investment, the setting up of joint companies with the participation of partners in third countries as well as the harmonization of juridical norms in economic matters.

The document also notes that Italy observes in its accords with Romania the competences of European Communities, the provisions set forth by their institutions.

Equally stipulating the stimulation of growing development in culture, the document shows, inter alia, that the two countries agree to reciprocally restitute the works of art illegally taken to or exported from the territory of either of them and can be found in the other's territory.

Periodical consultations shall be held between the members of the two governments as well as regular consultations at the level of the two foreign ministries' functionaries, the document also notes.

The provisions of the treaty affect in no way the obligations deriving from the treaties and accords previously concluded and are in no way directed against any third state.

The treaty comes into force when the instruments of ratification are exchanged and is valid for 20 years which extends tacitly every five years if no one of the parties notifies the other its disavowal at least one year before hand.

EBRD Help Depends on Implementation of Reform

AU2507091191 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0748 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 25/7/1991—If the whole law-making process is completed—and I mean not just the privatisation bill, but all basic reform laws—the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] will effectively assist Romania in its projects,

Minister Adrian Severin, assistant to the prime minister for reform and relation with Parliament, said after his talk, Wednesday afternoon [24 July] with a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development delegation led by Klaus Hoffert, EBRD adviser and representative for Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

The stage of the reform is at in Romania and the main points of the privatisation bill which is being discussed in Parliament were presented to that first EBRD delegation, said the minister. [sentence as received] The guests appreciated the Romanian Government's programme and stressed that the EBRD's main aim under its charter was to assist privatisation efforts in Central and East European countries. However EBRD, like other similar bodies, will assist Romania only if its message to the world is clear and coherent, the Romanian minister said in conclusion to his brief statement.

Defense Minister Spiroiu Interviewed

AU2307112691 Bucharest LUMEA AZI in Romanian No. 29 18 Jul 91 p 17

[Interview with Defense Minister Lieutenant General Constantin Nicolae Spiroiu by Ovidiu Dranga; place and date not given: "Romania Does Not Propose To Participate in Military Alliances"]

[Text] [Dranga] What changes have occurred in the Romanian defense doctrine following the new political and military situation in Europe and in the Balkans, and what changes do you expect in the coming years? In this context, do you believe that the emergence of new military alliances in Eastern Europe is possible?

[Spiroiu] The structural changes that were unleashed in Romania in December 1989, as well as those that occurred in the political and military situation in Eastern Europe, have naturally generated an intense process of renewal in the Army in all spheres, from the most urgent aspects of military activity right up to the general concept of the organization of national defense. I have to emphasize that within the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, Romania was the only country not to adopt the bloc doctrine imposed by the leader of the alliance; it formulated its own national military doctrine in keeping with the necessity of ensuring the independence and territorial integrity of the Romanian state. Consequently, there was not very much to change in this area. Valuable ideas, which are valid both now and in the future, have been carried over into the new general concept of our country's defense. However, the current domestic and foreign situation requires certain political, social, and economic reconsiderations of our national military defense doctrine.

In keeping with the development of the political and military situation in Europe and with the dynamics of the CSCE process, national defense implies the involvement, to a greater extent, of other areas of social activity as well. We formulated the basic concept of Romania's national security with these tendencies in mind. Thus our military doctrine becomes part and parcel of the basic concept on national security, which gives priority to political and diplomatic activity aimed at creating the new framework of European security, strengthening confidence and stability on this continent, and preventing the threat of any hostile action and aggression.

A number of other new aspects are determined by the strategic nature of Eastern Europe. The instability that exists in this area is shown by a certain development in threats that may affect Romania, risks which are currently characterized by greater diversity and by the change of priorities in the sense of shifting the emphasis from external to internal threats, from "conventional" threats to "nonconventional" ones, and from direct to indirect ones. Therefore, according to the new doctrine, the main objective of Romania's defense is one of guaranteeing the state's unity, territorial integrity, the country's independence and sovereignty, constitutional order, and the conditions for the Romanian people's development in freedom, democracy, and peace.

At the same time, in organizing our national defense we have departed from the theory according to which being prepared for a worst-case scenario—a defensive war against a superior aggressor—we mean we would be able to cope with any other situation appropriately. What we have in mind in the present conditions and for the future is to take the necessary measures to be able to appropriately and effectively respond to any forms of aggression that might be directed against Romania.

In seeking to ensure the best possible defense capability for the country, we must also bear in mind the necessity of eliminating shortfalls of equipment accrued during the years of dictatorship and of modernizing the training process of troops. Consequently, we will give priority to qualitative aspects in all areas of our national defense: organization—on modern bases—of the Army and the other elements of the national defense system; securing combat equipment comparable to the military equipment of the other developed European countries; and improving the professional standard of conscripts and so forth.

Important changes will be generated by Romania's transition to the market economy; this will imply the reorganization of logistic activity and the military equipment production process.

In connection with the second part of your question regarding military alliances, I am of the opinion that all the states on our continent, particularly those in the East, must focus their efforts on building the new structure of all-European security. As to the emergence of possible military alliances in Eastern Europe, a situation that cannot be ruled out altogether, I believe that this would be undesirable, because it would intensify the tension that exists in this area at the moment and it would complicate or even hamper the completion of the process of all-European collective security. Romania does not propose to participate in military alliances. We advocate

ensuring national security not by adhering to new military alliances, but by expanding bilateral many-sided cooperation, also in the military sphere, in order to offer enough mutual guarantees for the promotion of the national interests of each state.

[Dranga] What are Romania's guarantees for security at this point?

[Spiroiu] From a geopolitical viewpoint, Romania is located at the crossroads of major strategic interests. We have realized this; consequently, the measures that have been adopted in order to ensure security by guaranteeing independence and territorial integrity were primarily pursued to promote national interests.

As is known, the military and political structures of the Warsaw Pact have now been dismantled. This, and the recent development of events in Europe have brought about essential changes in the whole concept of national, regional, and international security, and have considerably decreased the number of major military confrontations between states. Whereas threats against security came mainly from the outside in the past, as I said before, today experts increasingly maintain that such threats may come mainly from inside in the shape of unexpected repercussions of the reform process in Eastern European countries, or they may be of an economic, social, or national nature; to these we could also add certain kinds of "nonconventional" risks such as terrorism, drug trafficking, ecological problems, and so on.

In this context, the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Arms Reduction in Europe—although negotiated between the two military blocs—is a positive fact that contributes to establishing a balance of forces in this area, even if certain "general ceilings" put Romania at a disadvantage compared with some of its neighbors.

The development of the CSCE process and the signing of the Paris Charter for a new Europe constitute, for Romania too, fundamental elements in building new security structures.

Within this framework, major guarantees are offered to Romania by the measures taken to develop cooperation with neighboring states, with those in the Balkan area, and with other states—be they NATO members or nonaligned states; our country has taken important steps in this area. In this context, I should also mention the contacts the Ministry of National Defense has had with its counterparts in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, England, and France. On those occasions, we agreed on framework programs, accords, administrative deals, and cooperation plans in various areas. We have taken steps to adopt mechanisms to avoid distorted views in the military field. This should permit an effective solution to problems caused by military activities that might generate feelings of insecurity and concern in neighboring states. Thus, not long ago Romania and Hungary were the first to perform a control test flight within the framework of the "open skies" accord; this is a conclusive example of ensuring the transparency of military activities as a guarantee for mutual security in conformity with the provisions of the Paris Charter.

Within the context of guarantees for security offered by the positive development in relations and cooperation in Europe, I believe, however, that the main guarantee of Romania's security is the firm and accelerated continuation of the reform process, the achievement of a viable market economy, and the consolidation of democracy and a state of law. At the same time, at the domestic level, a guarantee for national security is ensured by perfecting the necessary potential for the country's defense. I want to mention that Romania has the necessary potential to discourage possible attacks on its integrity and independence at the moment. As a basic state institution, the Army—which is going through an intensive modernization process—is able to fulfill its mission of defending the country and of guaranteeing the values of democracy, basic human rights and freedoms, and the state of law and constitutional order.

FSN Approach to Privatization Law Criticized

AU2407180391 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 20-21 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with National Liberal Party, PNL, President Radu Campeanu by Mircea Florin Sandru; place and date not given: "Today: Mr. Radu Campeanu"]

[Text] [Sandru] Mr. Campeanu, please tell us if your position on the privatization law has changed after the last meeting with the president at Cotroceni Palace and after the discussions on this subject within your party and the parliamentary group of the National Liberal Party.

[Campeanu] We will not attend any debate on the privatization law until a special commission on this matter is set up. This commission should include representatives of parties with different viewpoints from those of the government, as well as experts who can make an objective analysis of all viewpoints. Only after this commission has met and the draft law has been revised and rewritten will we participate in the plenary discussion on the privatization law.

[Sandru] In the 18 July Senate session, after you left the hall, the leader of the majority group complained that you, the Liberal group, failed to submit a complete and correct bill and presented instead only a rather shallow Chapter II. Will you submit, as they demand, your own bill, properly worked out as stipulated by the rules?

[Campeanu] There are no rules in this respect. We submitted our proposal for Chapter II, because we requested the replacement of this part of the law. Consequently, we presented our version of this chapter. The fact that Mr. Vacaru or others like him keep coming back to this subject is rather naive, to say the least. It is known that all kinds of drafts were presented in Parliament, only to be ignored. We ourselves have presented a lot of

amendments—over 20—but they were not taken into consideration either by the Deputies' Assembly or the Senate. Consequently, Mr. Vacaru's arguments are not valid. At most, they can be of interest to children. On the other hand, it is obvious that any political group and any parliamentarian has the right to contribute to the drafting of this law. They are entitled to it, even if some minor procedural aspects have not been complied with. This thing should be understood by Mr. Vacaru and everybody else. This law—which in our opinion is as important as the Constitution—will lay the foundation of Romanian society in the economic and social spheres for many decades hereafter. Therefore, the mentality shown by some FSN [National Salvation Front] parliamentarians—according to whom the law should be voted rapidly, in 2-3 days—has no place in parliamentary life and should not be invoked when a law such as that on the privatization of trade companies is at stake.

Brucan Examines Political Spectrum

AU2407144291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1316 GMT 24 Jul 91

["Agora: Left, Centre, Right in 1992"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 24/7/991—Under the above headline and its "independent tablet" section, the newspaper "LIBERTATEA" runs an extensive article signed by well-known politologist Silviu Brucan who analysed the sociopolitical situation in Romania with the elections due in 1992 in the offing.

Silviu Brucan opines that for the first time "the budding middle class will be a significant political factor" in the future elections. On the other hand, "the decisive battle will be fought to win the vote of workers who are numerically prevalent in urban centers so that all parties will struggle for a significant vote from workers."

In the countryside, the Front [National Salvation Front] has chances to keep most of the votes as the peasants were the only class to benefit from the revolution acquiring land even if many of them are discontented, as was but natural, Professor Brucan says.

It is Silviu Brucan's opinion that at present the Romanian political spectrum is structured as follows: The National Salvation Front and its allies are centre-left; the Civic Alliance and the Christian and Democratic National Peasant Party—centre; the National Liberal Party—centre-right; and the National Unity Party, the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union and "Romania Mare"—right; as for the Socialist Party of Labour Mr. Brucan highlights that "the ideological confusion that followed the collapse of communism makes it tip either to the extreme left or to the right, where Ceausescu's chauvinist and anti-Semitic friends are to be found."

Placed on a centre-left position is the Roman cabinet, which, as the initiator of the price liberalization drive, has assumed a nasty task whose effect could be the alienation of the vote of workers and of those with fixed incomes, Mr. Brucan points out and further shows: On the centre, the Civic Alliance, which seems to get on well with the Peasant Party as far as the intransigent attitude towards communism is concerned, will have to offer an alternative to the present power, that is to say, to win the confidence of the electorate and to put forward political leaders of national interest. Referring to the representatives of the National Unity Party and the "Vatra Romaneasca" Union, whom he considers as rightists, the author of the article shows that one of their salient features is "their bias to the prewar period" as they reiterate pro-Transylvania and pro-Bessarabia slogans without realising that the strategy of Hungarian irredency has grown "far more sophisticated than the revision of borders, which is without a chance." Moreover, Bessarabia can no longer be seen as a mere province of Bucharest as a new reality has emerged—the Republic of Moldova.

In conclusion, Silviu Brucan shows that if in 1992 none of the political forces wins an absolute majority a coalition government will have to be created which, in his opinion, "would be the best solution to surmount the climate of implacable adversity and hatred that prevails in Romania's political life." In this case, he says, political logic will necessarily lead to the coalition of the centre-left with the centre, as imposed by the external factor—Europe—to diminish the nefarious effect of the nationalist-chauvinist right.

PACR President Manolescu Interviewed

AU2407151291 Bucharest LIBERTATEA in Romanian 18-19 Jul 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Civic Alliance Party President Nicolae Manolescu by Gabriela Stanciu; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want To Turn Each and Every Romanian Into a Member of the Alliance"—first two paragraphs are LIBERTATEA introduction]

[Text] As is known, the First Congress of the Civic Alliance adopted the decision to create a new political formation: The Civic Alliance Party of Romania [PACR]. Literary critic Nicolae Manolescu, director of the ROMANIA LITERARA weekly and founding member of the Civic Alliance, was elected to the position of PACR president. Politically inactive for a long time (for 22 years he was stopped from climbing the ladder of the university hierarchy for the simple reason that he refused to become a Communist Party member), he began to get directly involved in politics when he realized that we no longer have a "political class" and that "it is unethical to continue to criticize those in power without participating in the game." I began my dialogue with him by referring to one of the much commented on statements: Hesitations linked to turning the Civic Alliance into a party.

There is a right time for everything!—Mr. Manolescu said. Had it depended only on myself, the creation of the

Civic Alliance Party would have taken place a few months ago. However, this idea had to make its way into the minds and convictions of those who were leading the Civic Alliance and into the minds of its members. This explains the fact that two months elapsed between the Sibiu meeting—when the initiative to create this party was made public—and the congress at which it was established.

[Stanciu] In your opinion, what are the reasons that led to the emergence of this new party in the political arena?

[Manolescu] The first reason was to create a modern and dynamic party as such parties exist in all countries of the former communist world. Historic parties have great merits, but they have also encountered numerous difficulties, which may be explained through the lack of political culture of an electorate that just emerged from four decades of communist "history." They must be supported. The opposition must be strengthened in general. Second, a great number of intellectuals, workers, and even farmers wanted to have their own political organization. They hoped that the Alliance would be able to offer a solution. Third, the Civic Alliance itself had overcome its initial stage, the one of street demonstrations and of arbitrarily taking a stance. The maturation process of the Civic Alliance equals the emergence within itself of a formation capable of joining the electoral struggle and replacing the means of protest employed so far with political means, as is the case in any civilized country.

[Stanciu] What are the priority objectives of this new formation?

[Manolescu] First of all, the Civic Alliance Party must get organized. Then it must seek ways and means to come close to and understand the electorate. Third, it must try to persuade people that its tactics and strategy match the needs of a large part of the population. Fourth, it must impose a political style based on cooperation with democratic forces, on precision in political thinking, on a decent way of expression, and on clear aims and methods.

[Stanciu] You have mainly referred to questions regarding the organization and orientation of the party and—I have the impression—have avoided talking about its political objectives.

[Manolescu] Naturally, the most important objective is to achieve favorable results in the electoral competition. We want a Parliament that will endorse democratic laws and a government that will apply them rapidly and effectively.

[Stanciu] Confusion persists in the minds of many people about the role the Alliance—as a movement and party proper—will continue to play and about relations between them.

[Manolescu] The emergence of the party will enable the Civic Alliance to calmly pursue its main and far-reaching objectives. The need to take a stance on all kinds of everyday events have hampered the Alliance so far in implementing its program of civic and political education. Taking over the political tasks, the party enables the Civic Alliance to try to set the foundation—by means of the Civic Academy and the other institutions it supports—for Romania's democracy, so that it is not a democracy of words, but so that it corresponds to certain convictions and attitudes of the citizens.

We believe that in this way we are better distributing our tasks and supporting each other, and that in this way we will reach our aim sooner, namely to build a state of law in Romania.

[Stanciu] What part of the electorate are you counting on?

[Manolescu] At this point, it is not clear who makes up the specific electorate of political formations in Romania; an exception in this respect are extremist formations, which I should say—without being ironical—have their natural supporters. They are not necessarily great in number, but they exist. The rest of the parties are suffering from the homogenization effects during bad times and misery under the communist regime. The traditional electorate of the Liberals and Peasant Party has disappeared. The National Salvation Front constitutes a platform for all opportunists, regardless of their political color, but not regardless of direct, and sometimes very personal, interests. The Civic Alliance Party is trying to win back all people of good faith who really want to eliminate the communist past and believe in a future of democracy. These people belong to all social and professional groups. What is at stake for us is to diminish, if not completely wipe out, the false opposition—between intellectuals and workers, between city people and farmers, and between Romanians and minorities—which was kept up by the communist regime as a way to divide society so that it is easier to rule. Our ideal is not to address a divided or polarized society any more, but a restructured one in which none of the differences generated by communist oppression and its tendentious and irresponsible propaganda exist between the intellectuals and workers, city people and farmers, and between the majority populations and minorities.

[Stanciu] Do you know what supporters you may count on at this point?

[Manolescu] We do not know what the exact situation of our supporters is. It is too early. However, I can say that the success of the idea of setting up a party is considerable. We are overwhelmed with inquiries and membership applications. But we do not want to turn each and every Romanian into a member of the Civic Alliance. We want each and every Romanian to vote for the party program. We are interested in honest involvement, not necessarily an institutional one.

[Stanciu] What is the position of this new formation in the political arena?

[Manolescu] What is usually understood by the notion of political arena in Western democracies is something that does not correspond to the situation or spirit of post-totalitarian regimes. Right and left almost have no meaning in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Our model, of course, can only be the one offered by the newly emerged parties in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, such as the Czechoslovak Civic Forum, the Hungarian Liberal Democrats, and Mazowiecki's party in Poland. We try to compare ourselves with them. A parallel with parties like those in Italy, Germany, France, or other Western countries is not possible. It would only cause confusion.

[Stanciu] May the withdrawal of Marian Munteanu and of other student leaders be interpreted as the distancing of the student world from this new political formation?

[Manolescu] I am not sure that such an interpretation is correct. We want young people to be at our side and we promise to be at their side. One of the greatest losses the [National Salvation] Front suffered was youth. We want to prevent such an error at all costs.

[Stanciu] What relationships will you maintain with the other opposition parties?

[Manolescu] We will probably participate in the Anti-totalitarian Forum, which the Civic Alliance Movement has already joined. The democratic opposition parties have shown understanding and we hope that this will be the case in the future as well. There are no fundamental differences between us regarding our main aims; there are certainly differences in the way we deal with certain problems, as well as tactical and strategic differences, but they must be subordinated to general interests. As for tangible forms of cooperation, especially electoral ones, I cannot say anything yet. We shall see. What I can say, however, is that we will try to abide by the slogan that was mounted above the Opera Hall in Bucharest during the congress: "Only together will we succeed."

[Stanciu] Do you consider yourself as a potential candidate for Romania's presidency?

[Manolescu] Here is something that does not depend on me. It depends on the capability of the Civic Alliance Party to make such a candidate out of me or another person. The elections are no joke; they must be prepared. As far as we are concerned, I may run for any position provided that the Civic Alliance Party has the potential and prestige to turn its candidate into the one who is elected.

Federal

Draft Accord on Moratorium Released

LD2407161191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1017 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Journalists who are today reporting from a session of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly received a draft agreement on the functioning of the country during the period of moratorium, which was drawn up by the Federal Executive Council. The text of the draft agreement says:

"Participants of the agreement:

—being profoundly concerned about the very difficult situation the country is now experiencing,

—being aware of huge and unforseeable dangers being created in such circumstances for the future of all citizens of the country and all nations and nationalities,

—endeavoring to provide conditions for the operation of the vital functions of the system, macroeconomic policies, and functioning of the institutions of the system,

—taking responsibility for the implementation of the joint Brioni declaration of 7 July 1991,

—wishing to create the necessary conditions to reach an agreement on the future of the country,

have reached the following agreement on the functioning of the country in the period of moratorium.

The agreement defines the rights and the undertaking of mutual obligations in the domestic and international spheres, which should be realized in the period of the moratorium, i.e. in the forthcoming period in accordance with the nature of the obligations undertaken.

Obligations arising from this agreement do not prejudice solutions regarding future relations in the country. I. Moratorium:

Within this agreement, moratorium means:

1. Complete cessation of all armed conflicts and all hostilities and restoration of peace in the whole country.

2. Freezing the implementation of all regulations and other general legal documents, regardless of whether they refer to secession, dissociation, changing internal borders between republics and borders within them, including the formation of new autonomies, changing external borders, border regulations, use of force, armed conflicts, formation of illegal armed formations, including the withdrawal of weapons and demobilization of all additionally mobilized armed formations. That means a return to the status quo ante wherever the implementation of such regulations has been initiated. II. Principles:

1. Observance of the international and legal status and the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.

2. Inviolability of external and internal borders.

3. Exclusion of the use of force when settling conflicts, i.e. the application of peaceful means of settling all contested issues.

4. Consistent observance of the right of a nation to self-determination including secession, in accordance with jointly established procedures.

5. Full respect and protection for human rights and liberties throughout Yugoslavia.

6. Respect and protection for the rights of nationalities.

III. Functions:

1. Market

To secure free flow of goods and services and capital, workforce, and knowledge on the Yugoslav market, all regulations limiting such flow should be frozen. This includes:

—freezing measures that mean discrimination and closing markets,

—full respect for property and ownership laws throughout the entire territory of the country, and in accordance with that the return of or compensation for confiscated or destroyed property of citizens and enterprises.

2. Monetary system

The dinar as the sole currency

Functions of the sole currency are secured through the system of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and national banks of republics, single monetary system and single monetary policy, which means:

—creation of primary money, primarily through open market operations, through financing the federal budget and monetization of foreign economic relations,

—freezing of selective credits granted to banks,

—keeping the same level of compulsory bank reserves,

—permanent control of the implementation of the established monetary and foreign currency policies by the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the Federal Executive Council [FEC] including the possibility of suspending the application of some legal documents that are adopted by republican bodies and bodies of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and the suspension of all measures violating the established policy,

—equal position of republics in using the new money issue.

3. Foreign currency system and foreign credit relations

The National Bank of Yugoslavia will intervene in the single foreign currency market only for servicing foreign debts the guarantor of which is the federation or the playing agent of which is the National Bank of Yugoslavia, provided that appointed banks provide in proper time the dinar counter-value for paying these obligations.

Incentive measures will be established so that citizens' foreign currency savings that are deposited with the National Bank of Yugoslavia are used for the purchase and construction of housing, for the stimulation of development of the private sector, changes in the ownership structure, development of the capital market, etc.

The FEC will continue its intensive contacts with all international financial institutions and the European Community to obtain the necessary financial support.

4. System of payment and payment operations

All functions of the system of payment will be established to normalize payments circulation in internal and external markets.

The Social Accountancy Service and the National Bank of Yugoslavia will be in charge of consistent control and supervision.

5. The system of customs and other taxes

Single customs system will be restored to the situation existing before 25 June, which means that the Federal Customs Administration should function at all border crossings and that customs duties, import taxes, and duties should be paid into the federal budget. Payment into the federal account will be controlled by appropriate federal and republican bodies. In case of failure to observe this provision, the payment of customs duties will be done according to a decision of the FEC on the method of paying customs duties.

6. Prices, standards and goods reserves

The regime that was in force before the beginning of the moratorium remains in force during the moratorium.

The blockade of federal goods reserves that was imposed in some parts of the country, i.e. the seizure of a right to use them autonomously, is to be suspended.

7. Federal budget

Financing the common functions of the federation during the moratorium will be done in accordance with a proposal on the minimum necessary funds which should be provided in the budget of the federation in this period (supplement: document on the federal budg et).

8. Defense [as received]

9. Security

a). Measures will be taken to put a stop to and prevent all intranational and other conflicts.

b). Measures will be intensified to eradicate terrorism, drug trafficking, and other serious crime.

c). Providing personal and ownership security will also be the main task of the bodies of internal affairs during the period of the moratorium.

10. Foreign policy.

a). The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the sole subject in international relations, with all properties and rights belonging to a sovereign state. Its bodies and representatives should act in the name of that status, which is integral.

b). Cooperation of republics will be continued with representative bodies, governments, and other political organs of foreign countries, with a view to broadening and strengthening mutual relations.

c). Diplomatic and consular missions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia equally represent the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia abroad, all its interests, the interests of all republics, and all citizens and legal subjects.

11. Human rights and liberties and legal system

Uniform application of the current laws will be enforced regarding the protection of human rights and liberties, and also the application of assumed international obligations in this field, which implies court proceedings and other measures, including international mechanisms of control.

Most energetic measures will be taken to lift a blockade of the Yugoslav information space and to provide a free flow of information throughout the country.

Appropriate bodies of the republics and the federation will take energetic measures to protect the freedom of citizens, primarily personal integrity, dignity, and inviolabilty of persons who are threatened by activities of extremists who are acting out of the control of legal government bodies. This implies protection from threats being issued by public information media, which give untrue details, i.e. abuse of information relating to the privacy of the person.

IV. Institutions of the System

During the moratorium period it is essential to insure the functioning of the system.

1. The SFRY Assembly

The SFRY Assembly, in its full complement, will determine the method of working and decision-making during the moratorium period.

2. The SFRY Presidency

The SFRY Presidency, in its full complement, will perform its functions during the moratorium period.

3. The Federal Executive Council

Conditions will be provided for the FEC to perform its functions effectively and completely, i.e. to take all measures within its competence for the implementation of this agreement. That implies that the FEC should work in its full complement.

The functioning of federal administration bodies will be insured so that they will implement the tasks stemming from this agreement, and the FEC will have the supervisory function over their implementation. Proposals for the adequate organization of the federal administration will be prepared, which implies its reduction.

V. Agreement on the Future of the Country

1. Talks on future relations will start on 1 August at the latest, provided that basic solutions are established and publicly presented by the end of the moratorium period.

2. Participants and the procedure

Participants in the agreement on the future of the country are the signatories of this agreement.

3. Balance of property

In the period of the moratorium the FEC will draw up a balance of property of the federation, federal bodies and organisations.

VI. Final Provisions

1. The moratorium comes into force on the day of signing this agreement.

2. The moratorium lasts three months and the participants agree that the moratorium can be extended in the way and according to the procedure originally established.

3. Certain provisions of the agreement can be changed during the moratorium period, if all participants agree.

4. Participants of the agreement are aware of their full responsibility for its implementation. They will, to this end, take or propose adequate measures. Presidents of the Republics or Presidencies: Presidents of the Republican Assembly: President of the SFRY Presidency: President of the Federal Executive Council: Bosnia-Hercegovina Macedonia Slovenia Serbia Croatia Montenegro

Foreign Affairs Secretary on EC Peace Moves

LD2507015091 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—"Yugoslavia is today the only, acute, dangerous focus of crisis in Europe; in other words, it represents at the moment the greatest danger for peace and political stability in Europe," Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar assessed in his staetement to the delegates of the Federal Council of the SFRY Assembly.

According to him, the number of international factors who consider that the final escalation of the Yugoslav crisis can possibly be contained within the local frameworks is very small. The conflict in Yugoslavia simply cannot be only a local issue as far as Europe and the world are concerned, primarily because Yugosalvia is an illustration of a very dangerous process which can start in any other post-real socialist or multinational country. Secondly, our crisis is the first serious test for Europe, and especially the European Community, in the post cold-war period, and the first challenge for the CSCE mechanism for preventing conflicts. In the context of our crisis, the dilemma for international law, of how—regardless of the regulations of international behavior and the conventional understanding of sovereignty so far—to react in cases of flagrant violation of human and minority rights, has once again, after the war in the Gulf and the case of the Kurds, become topical. Besides this, Loncar added, Yugoslavia has become a precedent for an essential reconsideration of the relation between a principle of self-determination and territorial integrity.

"It is a well-known fact that we have moved, thanks to our own efforts, from the head of the line of countries which have been offered the advantages of associate membership of the European Community, to the bottom," Loncar said, and recalled that the protocols on financial cooperation have been suspended, an embargo on the import of arms and high technology has been introduced, and relations with the IMF, the World Bank, and the stock exhange have been blocked." Regardless of the result of the negotiations on the future of the country, these economic and financial sanctions are causing enormous material damage to the country and all its parts, and even citizens, and it is increasing with every new day of our conflicts." "No matter how paradoxical it sounds, there is still readiness to offer Yugosalvia economic aid. Recently, the European Seven [as received] expressed this at their summit in London. However, the conditions are well known—the situation must be normalized."

According to Loncar, the stand of the European Community is clear. The issue which they consider most important is that absolutely all sides should observe the Brioni Declaration. The EC, as well as the whole of the international community, is prepared to accept any agreement on the future of Yugoslavia that is reached with a democratic and peaceful political dialogue, and with negotiations with the consent of all the Yugoslav nations and factors. The Community will not accept unilateral acts that will make political dialogue impossible, but neither will it accept an attempt at preserving the unity of Yugoslavia by force.

The Community, continued Loncar, is at this moment giving an absolute priority to prevention of any further conflicts and bloodshed, the use of force by any side, and especially by the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] and the urgent continuation of the political dialogue in order to reach an agreement on restructuring Yugoslavia, which should express a new Yugoslav reality. Therefore, he concluded, it has been insisted that a new democratic

basis for Yugoslav coexistence that would satisfy national aspirations of all the Yugoslav nations and the needs of coexistence, must be found.

"If we proceed from the viewpoint that we cannot resolve the crisis without support or aid, then the role of the EC cannot be interpreted as a kind of arbitration or guardianship," Loncar said, and pointed to the evolution of the notion of national sovereignties, especially after the cold war ended and the process of European integration began. "Europe is bound today by very concrete mutual interests. By helping Yugoslavia, it helps itself. A different behavior from us would bring us international sanctions which, as we can see, are already in force—an isolation which is in sight, an arbitration which would be inevitable, and even the involvement of the widest international forums in order to pacify the Yugoslav fires. Instead of adopting conclusions, it is obvious that our complex community must restructure itself and bring itself into accord with the current trends in the world. We would have had to do that even if the conflicts and the catastrophic divisions had not occurred. The Yugoslav community, such as it was, has simply been taken over in time and in the space it occupies in Europe."

"We must not have the illusion," Loncar concluded, "that someone else will solve our problems for us. Our inner denouement and our place within the international community are most closely mutually conditioned. We will regain international support and aid and our place in this European and world peace process to the extent to which we observe the principle of a peaceful and democratic resolution of our conflicts, while refraining from the use of force."

Roundup of Press Comments on Ohrid Declaration

LD2407152691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1055 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, July 24 (TANJUG)—Monday's meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency in Ohrid (Macedonia) devoted to the fate of peace in Yugoslavia "ended without any results," the Zagreb daily VJESNIK writes today. The daily, published in the Croatian capital, describes the Ohrid statement, which was not signed by Yugoslav Presidency President Stjepan Mesic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, as an empty phrase. It is high time that the Yugoslav Presidency (also in an enlarged composition) draft a concrete peace plan which would eliminate the fundamental causes of the war psychosis. Peace must become the objective of both Serbia's and Croatia's leaders, as well as those of all the other republics," VJESNIK writes.

The Ljubljana daily SLOVENEC assesses the Ohrid statement today as "ambiguous, because it does not specify exactly who will negotiate and on what." "Without an exact specification of what will be the subject of bargaining and negotiations conducted in the name of peoples the representatives of Yugoslavia's republics will chat at the green baize table ad nauseam, while the independent and sovereign peoples, who decide on their own fate freely, will be shooting at each other," says SLOVENES, which is published in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana.

The Sarajevo daily OSLOBODJENJE wonders if Yugoslavia is now waiting for an all-out civil war or for peace.

The daily, published in the capital of Bosnia-Hercegovina, recalls that Tudjman has made the disarming of paramilitary units conditional on a withdrawal of the army to its barracks. "It is highly unlikely that the army, the guarantor of peace, will withdraw, given that the Ohrid statement was signed by all the presidents of Yugoslavia's republics except Tudjman and Yugoslav Presidency President Mesic," OSLOBODJENJE says.

The meeting of the protagonists of the Yugoslav drama has once again shown that the Yugoslav leaders contribute much more to peace by not meeting at all, writes the Sarajevo daily VECERNJE NOVINE. Warning that a new wave of violence is forthcoming in Yugoslavia, the daily points to the "discord in the Ohrid statement, which was not signed by Tudjman and Mesic."

The Novi Sad Hungarian language daily MAGYAR SZO equates the Ohrid statement with the Brioni declaration, describing them as "proof that the Yugoslav leaders are thinking about war rather than peace." The daily, published in the capital of the province of Vojvodina, says "Slovenia has already been written off, with the next candidate being Croatia, where the military is now defending Yugoslavia's territorial integrity."

Federal Chamber's Appeal for Peace Detailed

LD2407182491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Bearing in mind the situation in the country and the measures and activities for bringing the country out of the crisis, the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly today adopted an appeal for peace. The Federal Chamber strongly urges all decision-making subjects in the republics and provinces and the federal organs to ensure an immediate and unconditional cessation of all armed conflicts in the country, the full protection of human lives and property, and a guarantee of the observance of human rights and freedoms throughout Yugoslav territory.

The Chamber insists on its previous stand that the Yugoslav crisis should be resolved exclusively by peaceful means, in a democratic and civilized manner, in negotiations in which the equality of all participants will be respected.

The Federal Chamber assessed that in the current circumstances the consistent fulfillment of obligations and

realization of the decisions set out in the joint declaration adopted on 7 July 1991 on Brioni are the prerequisite for the creation of conditions for the normal work of the federal organs for the duration of the moratorium and for the start of negotiations on all aspects of the future of Yugoslavia, without any preconditions, to realize the individual and joint interests of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities, in accordance with the UN Charter and on the basis of the principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter on a new Europe.

Therefore, the Chamber calls on the organs of the republics and provinces and the federal organs to fulfill consistently the commitments they undertook before the Yugoslav and world public with the adoption of the joint declaration.

The Chamber cails on all citizens of Yugoslavia, their organizations and associations, political parties and peace movements to exercise their civil and human rights and strongly demand and pressure the organs of government at all levels and the holders of the highest state offices, particularly in the republics and provinces, to invest maximum efforts in adopting decisions and undertaking actions to halt the bloodshed and all conflicts, achieve the return of all refugees to their homes, and secure the peaceful existence, economic development, and higher quality of life for all, as well as to act in accordance with their public statements and publicly undertake commitments, states the appeal adopted today by a show of hands by delegates of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly. The session was not attended by delegates from Slovenia and Croatia.

Army Issues Statement on Erdut Incident

LD2507082591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0731 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Novi Sad, 25 Jul (TANJUG)—The Novi Sad Corps information office has been authorized to issue the following statement:

At about 0150 [2350 GMT] this morning, a unit of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] stationed in the area east of the village of Erdut that was guarding a bridge on the Danube near Bogojevo [on the Vojvodina side] was fired on with infantry weapons and then with grenade launchers by members of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] and the Croatian National Guard. The YPA unit responded with fierce firing.

The exchange lasted for about 20 minutes. There were no casualties on the YPA side. No information is available about casualties among the guardists and MUP forces.

Statement on Vinkovci Incident

LD2507091191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0821 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 25 Jul (TANJUG)—The command of the First Military District today announced that in an attack by members the (Croatian) National Guard Corps on two Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] officers in Vinkovci yesterday two of the attackers were killed and several injured while a YPA sergeant was killed and another seriously injured.

The following is a statement from the First Military District command:

"On the evening of 24 July while returning from an inspection of military personnel apartments—made necessary by an increase in the number of incidents in which apartments have been broken into—two YPA officers were attacked near the Cafe Irena in the vicinity of the barracks in Vinkovci.

The officers put up strong resistance and succeeded in liquidating two of the atackers from the National Guard Corps including the notorious Sebauer, who was in charge of the nearby barricade and who provoked the attack on the officers.

This was following by another treacherous attack from the barricade in which the officers succeeded in wounding several other guards. Sergeant Goran Mijajlovic was killed and Sergeant Boban Kalimancevic seriously wounded in brave self-defense.

This is yet another in a series of crimes committed by the forces of the Croatian Internal Affairs Ministry and the National Guard Corps in this area. An investigation is underway."

Federal Chamber Refrains From Discussing Crisis

LD2407171991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1408 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues and a cease-fire are among the main points of "an appeal for peace" adopted today by the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly.

The Federal Chamber decided not to discuss the situation in the country and measures for overcoming the crisis. In doing so the chamber heeded calls not to adopt a major decision before the final attempt is made to complete the composition of this chamber.

The same topic will be discussed in the continuation of this session, scheduled for 1 August. Until then, the Federal Government and the SFRY Presidency will draft a report which should clarify whether the moratorium applies to unilateral decisions of the Slovene and Croatian Assemblies to withdraw their delegates from the Federal Chamber. [Passage omitted]

EC Drops Proposal To Invite Presidents to Talks

LD2407192891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1759 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Brussels, July 24 (TANJUG)—A proposal to invite the presidents of the Yugoslav republics to attend

a meeting of the E.C. foreign ministers on July 29 has been removed from the agenda, as diplomatic sources in Brussels confirmed today.

German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher today sent a written message to his Dutch counterpart Van Den Broek, who currently holds the rotating E.C. Presidency, calling for urgent action for the situation in Yugoslavia to be relaxed. Genscher proposed that the meeting of the E.C. Council of Ministers be attended not only by Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar but the republican presidents too.

At the consultations of the E.C. ministries, Genscher's proposal was supported by Italian diplomats, while France and Greece opposed. After some written and telephone contacts, Genscher's proposal was removed from the agenda.'

The Hague is currently hosting a meeting of E.C. ranking officials who are preparing the July 29 meeting. The E.C. observer mission in Yugoslavia is in the focus of [words indistinct] possibility of extending the mission to cover the 'ethnic conflicts' in the Republic of Croatia is also being discussed, as a Dutch Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

The decision on this will, however, be taken by the E.C. foreign ministers on July 29, as the current meeting discusses 'technical details.'

International

Kucan, Rupel Meet Netherlands Envoy on EC Role

LD2407222191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1544 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Ljubljana, July 24 (TANJUG)—A special envoy of the Netherlands, the chair-country of the European Community, Ambassador Henry Wijnaendts today met with officials of the Yugoslav republic of Slovenia—Presidency President Milan Kucan and Foreign Minister Dimitrije Rupel.

They discussed the stands of the Slovenian leadership towards future events in Yugoslavia as well as the role of the E.C. in the negotiations on Yugoslavia, said a statement issued by the Slovenian Foreign Ministry information service.

The statement added that Wijnaendts will have similar consultations with the leaderships of the other Yugoslav republics in the next few days.

Loncar, Romania's Nastase View Regional Issues

LD2407212391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2043 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar and Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase exchanged views this evening on bilateral relations, the situation in the region, and other issues of common interest.

It was assessed that the friendly relations of the two countries are developing well in the interests of both sides, and the need was stressed for them to be deepened and expanded.

Ministers Loncar and Nastase, who is on a one-day working visit to Yugoslavia, devoted particular attention to the events and the situation in the region. Securing stability and cooperation in the Balkans was stressed along with creating a new system of security. Stability in the Balkans, it was said, is not only in the interests of the region, but goes far beyond its borders and is an essential part of the wider CSCE process.

The Romanian minister presented certain ideas of his government for strengthening cooperation in the region, which were assessed positively. Federal Secretary Loncar informed the Romanian minister about the forthcoming meeting of heads of governments and foreign ministers of the Pentagonale in Dubrovnik on 26 and 27 July. The Romanian minister confirmed the interest of his country in cooperating in the realization of certain projects in the framework of the Pentagonale.

The two ministers also examined the cooperation of the Black Sea and Danube basin countries. It was noted that certain forms of this regional cooperation touch upon each other and are correlated with the trends on the continent, but that they also have certain specific features arising out of the differences in the countries.

Minister Loncar briefed Nastase on the current situation in Yugoslavia and the efforts to find a peaceful and democratic way out of the crisis. The Romanian foreign minister repeated the Romanian stand on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the need for a peaceful and democratic solution to all the problems. It was agreed that contacts between Yugoslavia and Romania should be intensified in various directions and at various levels with the aim of promoting cooperation. It was concluded that these meetings should be used for an exchange of information on the different issues and that a regular dialogue should be insured.

Romanian Minister Nastase will end his working visit to Yugoslavia in the morning.

Markovic Meets Nastase

LD2407200891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Federal Executive Council [FEC] President Ante Markovic has received Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Adrian Nastase.

In lengthy talks, in response to the Romanian minister, the FEC president spoke about the current situation in Yugoslavia and the efforts being made by the FEC to halt the armed conflicts in the country, and about the platform which the government is proposing for the normal

functioning of the system until a final agreement is reached on future relations in Yugoslavia.

Foreign Minister Nastase Stressed the interest of his country in a democratic resolution of the crisis in our country and emphasized support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. He stressed that it is up to the nations and republics of Yugoslavia to decide on their mutual relations and the form of the community they will build.

Milosevic Holds Talks

LD2407201191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1905 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, today received Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase and his aides.

During the meeting the two sides discussed relations between Serbia and Romania. They drew attention to the joint interest in the further development of friendly relations and comprehensive cooperation, especially economic. To this end, both sides agreed on the need for more intensive contacts between the state organs of Serbia and Romania.

Apart from the members of the Romanian delegation the meeting was attended by Branko Maksimovic, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Serbia; Aleksandar Prlja, chairman of the Committee for International Relations of the Serbian People's Assembly; as well as by Konstantin Girda, charge d'affaires of the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade.

Slovenia

Defense Secretariat Promises To Reopen Airports

LD2407202191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Slovenian Defense Minister Janez Jansa today told the SLOVENIAN PRESS AGENCY that fuel stores at Cerklje military airfield "were offered to the Yugoslav Army." He added that "all this could be taken over in two or three days." His statement says that "the Federal Defense Secretariat was also informed about this, and it was promised that the Secretariat would arrange the opening of the Slovenian airports."

In his statement, Jansa also emphasized that "most units of the territorial defense in the republic have been demobilized." He then declared that during the height of engagements only about 50 percent of the original potential—that is, only a few thousand members of the territorial defense—were activated to protect various projects and to carry out normal training. After the Yugoslav Army withdrawal, the territorial defense will take over certain functions which used to be performed in Slovenia by the Army.

Views Airport, Border Issues

AU2407194791 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] In connection with the alleged demand of the Yugoslav Army concerning the opening of the Slovene airports, Slovene Defense Minister Janez Jansa has told the SLOVENE PRESS AGENCY that the gasoline depot and pump at the Cerklje military airfield have been offered to the Yugoslav Army. It has been established that the Army is willing to take over these facilities in two or three days.

The Federal Secretariat for National Defense was informed about this and it was at least promised that it will take care of the opening of the Slovene airports.

Replying to the question of what units of the Territorial Defense have already been demobilized, whether some will remain mobilized until the final withdrawal of the Army and what will happen after the withdrawal, Janez Jansa said that most units have already been demobilized. He also said that at the height of commitment, only 50 percent of maximum Territorial Defense manpower was called to active service. Only a few thousand of the Territorial Defense members are still engaged in guarding facilities or undergoing regular training.

After the Yugoslav Army withdraws, the Territorial Defense will take over some functions that the Army performed in Slovenia until the aggression.

Replying to the question of who will take control over the border zone, Jansa said that the European standard concerning the borders does not require the replacement of the Army by the police, but establishes a situation in which there is no permanent control over the border. Therefore, the border posts vacated by the Yugoslav Army will mostly stay empty or be used for defense or other purposes.

With regard to the prepared barricades, Janez Jansa said that they will be removed when the situation is settled to such an extent that the barricades will not be needed any longer.

Drnovsek, Kadijevic Discuss Release of Soldiers

AU2407145891 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] It has been announced by the office of Janez Drnovsek, member of the Yugoslavia's Presidency from Slovenia, that regarding the implementation of the Yugoslavia's Presidency decisions relating to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Slovenia, and especially relating to the release of Slovene soldiers from the Yugoslav Army, Drnovsek has been in constant touch with the highest representatives of some federal organs and the Army.

On the basis of today's talk with General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for people's defense, Janez

Drnovsek announced an administrative order was issued today on the release of Slovene soldiers from the Yugoslav Army. According to this order Slovene soldiers will leave Army units in three stages, by 15 August at the latest.

Drnovsek also had prolonged talks with General Veljko Kadijevic on the opening of Slovene airspace and airports. General Kadijevic said that a high Air Force officer had been sent to Slovenia to ensure the opening of Slovene airspace and airports as soon as the Slovene Territorial Defense turns over the fuel depot at the Cerklje Military Airfield.

Slovene Leaders in Talks With EC Envoy

LD2407202591 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1634 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—The talks between ambassador Henry Wijnaendts, a high representative of the European Community and envoy of Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek, Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, and Slovene Foreign Minister Dmitrije Rupel ended at about 1700.

The talks were due to start at 1500 but there was a half-hour delay due to problems at the Ljubljana airport "Brnik".

During the talks, the Slovene side outlined its view about the intervention by the European Twelve. Attention was also given to the stands of Slovenia's leadership concerning the negotiations in Yugoslavia and the role of the European Community in these negotiations.

It is unofficially reported that after the talks, Henry Wijnaendts, accompanied by a four-member delegation, left Ljubljana for Zagreb. No statement has been issued by the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia or the republican foreign ministry about the contents of the talks.

Hopes for Increased Trade With West

AU2507064491 Paris AFP in English 0627 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Katinka Mezei report]

[Text] Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, July 25 (AFP)—Slovenia, Yugoslavia's most industrialized republic, is confident it can double its trade with the West once it has shaken loose of Belgrade and emerged as an independent state.

The republic, which produces 18 percent of Yugoslavia's gross national product while accounting for only 10 percent of its population, is hoping after independence to maintain its actual level of trade with the other republics.

Josip Skoberne, vice-president of the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, said the republic planned to step up its metal-working, electrical and chemical industry exports to the West.

Slovene industry, considered competitive abroad, has been around for over 100 years, whereas economic life in the rest of Yugoslavia remains primarily based on agriculture

The republic's biggest gripe with Belgrade has been its disproportionate contribution to the federal budget—amounting to 25 to 30 percent—in what has been viewed here as forced subsidies to Yugoslavia's less-developed regions.

The poorer republics of Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia- Hercegovina account respectively for 2.0, 5.7 and 12.5 percent of Yugoslavia's GNP, and have been the direct beneficiaries of Slovenia's prosperity.

When Slovenia achieves independence, a goal whose likelihood was dramatically increased with the decision last week to remove all federal troops from the republic, it wants first to put its own currency into circulation.

With its own convertible currency, Slovenia hopes to earn more from its exports.

"Until now, for Slovene products exported aboard, we were paid in non-convertible Yugoslav dinars, while Belgrade received hard currency from our sales," explained Mr. Skoberne.

"In this way Belgrade filled the federal coffers, using an artificial rate for the dinar which was extremely unfavorable for us," he said.

Slovenia has remained relatively unscathed by the current Yugoslav economic crisis, which has seen a weak central economy hit hard by a collapse in tourism following an upsurge of ethnic fighting.

The crisis has affected the other republics "twice as much" as Slovenia, primarily because of the republic's stronger base, Mr. Skoberne said.

Yugoslav unemployment ran about 10 percent overall before the crisis and has now risen to 17 percent. Meanwhile, Slovenia has a jobless rate of 6.6 percent, up from a mere 2.5 percent before the crisis.

Mr. Skoberne attributes Slovenia's economic stability to its tradition of industry and its high level of education, a "precondition to satisfactory productivity."

The repubic's school system is copied after that in neighboring Austria, with whom Slovenia shares common cultural ground. Long a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the republic feels a gulf between itself and the southern republics who had been part of the Ottoman empire.

Fifth Military District Statement on Talks

LD2407113891 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0728 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—The information office of the Fifth Military District Command stated today that a meeting has been held—in the presence of the EC mission representatives—between commissions of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] and the Republic of Slovenia, which are responsible for monitoring the implementation of the SFRY Presidency's conclusions concerning the withdrawal of the YPA units and institutions from the territory of Slovenia. The following is the text of the statement:

"Before the discussion began in keeping with a previously agreed-upon agenda, the representatives of the Republic of Slovenia made any further discussion contingent on the release from the YPA units and institutions of servicemen of Slovene and other nationalities sent by competent bodies of the Republic of Slovenia to do their military service in other parts of Yugoslavia. This demand was considered unfeasable at the present juncture by the YPA representatives who stressed that the issue should be resolved over the next three months.

Following several hours of talks between the two commissions on the withdrawal of the YPA from Slovenia it was agreed that the YPA will seek no compensation for damage caused so far to its facilities and equipment. This issue will be resolved in line with point three of the SFRY Presidency's decision of 18 July 1991. With reference to damage sustained by the Slovene side, the republic's commission informed the YPA commission that by the end of the current week a document will be submitted containing initial estimates of war damage and a list of the material-technical equipment belonging to the Territorial Defense and Civil Protection of the Republic of Slovenia but at present in YPA hands.

The Slovene commission also put forward a proposal that calls for the withdrawal of all units and institutions of the Maribor, Ljubljana, and Rijeka Corps as well as of the forces under the direct command of the Fifth Military District and of the Cerklje Air Base, which is under the command of the Fifth Air Force and Air Defense Corps.

The republic's commission also presented a proposal under which the air reconnaissance units will remain on Slovene territory in view of the fact that the SFRY airspace is a common one. It is also proposed that military-medical institutions should also remain in order to continue to provide service to a large number of retired army officers and their families expected to remain in the Republic of Slovenia. In response, the YPA commission stressed that the concept of withdrawal covers all YPA forces and that the above proposals will have to be considered at the level of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

In reference to the regulations relating to intergarrison traffic, the commissions agreed that in future it will not be necessary to announce movements of one or of a column of up to five army vehicles. It was also agreed that flights by individual aircraft should be reported to the Republican Intelligence Center 60 to 120 minutes before the flight commences. Group flights will be announced in a manner applicable to transporters", the Fifth Military Command says in conclusion.

Slovene Soldiers To Leave Army Soon

LD2407213891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2008 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Ljubljana, July 24 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Presidency member from Slovenia Janez Drnovsek, as his office announced on Wednesday, reached accord with Federal Defense Minister Gen. Veljko Kadijevic for soldiers-Slovenes to leave the Yugoslav army by August 15, (?this) year at the latest.

The announcement said the accord was reached on Wednesday.

Under the decision, as set out, soldiers-Slovenes would leave their units 'in three intervals.'

However, the command of the Fifth Army District, which encompasses the territories of Slovenia and part of Croatia, announced on Wednesday that the demand for the soldiers-Slovenes to leave immediately was impossible to comply with.

This issue, as the military announcement said would be solved over the next three months, during which time the federal army is to withdraw from slovenia.

Slovenia's Defense Minister Janez Jansa on Wednesday said that the fuel depot at the airfield in Cerklje "has been offered to the Yugoslav army" and that it [words indistinct] 2-3 days.'

In a statement to the SLOVENSKA TISKOVNA AGENCIJA (Slovene press agency), Jansa said also that the Federal Defense Ministry was informed of this. The ministry is expected to secure the opening of Slovenia's airports.

Jansa said that a "larger number of territorial defense units of the republic have been demobilized."

Croatia

Tudjman Blamed for Isolating Croatia

LD2407154691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1040 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, July 24 (TANJUG)—A leading weekly in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia has accused the ruling Croatian Democratic Union of "having managed to fall out with all Serbs, isolate Croatia and bring it to within the Serbian Army pincers—all in one year of its rule."

The weekly DANAS notes that the charisma of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman "is suffering serious blows" and that it is "hard to believe that it will be saved by Kohl or Vranitzky, because Croatia alone holds the keys to its destiny."

"In contrast with the polit-marketing of Slovenia, which succeeded in buying its way out of Yugoslavia by casualties in a brief war, a large number of casualties, long lines of refugees and burned villages in Croatia are all but in vain, due above all to a wrong policy," says the weekly in a story headlined, "how the guardsmen die."

DANAS also publishes the attitudes of three prominent Croatian opposition leaders—Miko Tripalo, Bozo Kovacevic and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak.

"On the whole, the leading party is shutting itself within its own ranks, which may prove fatal to Croatia and its defence," points out Tripalo.

Cicak accuses Tudjman of "having proclaimed himself the only criterion of Croatia's past, present and future, while manifesting only arrogance, scorn and hatred for all others."

"The confusing and absurd moves of the authorities have left Croatia without allies both in and outside Yugoslavia, and its citizens in a state of quandary such as should not appear in a war situation," says Kovacevic in an article headlined, "Tudjman's Hostages."

VJESNIK Urges 'Historic Accord'

LD2407153391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1128 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, July 24 (TANJUG)—The expansion from Serbia should be neutralized by a new historic accord with the Serbs in Croatia, while opposing all extreme, outdated and vulgar theses such as that they all are a "fifth column of greater Serbian imperialism," the Zagreb daily VJESNIK writes today. The paper carries a second installment of an article written by Darko Bekic, until recently close adviser to Croatian President Tudjman, who dwells on the need for a new strategy on the "Serbian question" in Croatia.

Bekic holds that Croatian policy, instead of talking about "terrorists imported from Serbia and limited rebellion by a manipulated minority," must as soon as possible face the fact that involved here is a large-scale uprising, provoked by the feeling of peril among many Serbs in Croatia. The most important thing is to talk with domestic Serbs, says Bekic, placing before its former employers and the Croatian public a choice between "a democratic and an ethnically pure state."

The author suggests a cease-fire as the first, truce as the second, and historic accord as the third stage which may resolve the increasingly dangerous situation in Croatia.

Belgrade Papers View Options for Tudjman

LD2407124891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1159 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, July 24 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily BORBA writes today that what the 'Slovenes succeeded in gaining through a benign and short-term media war the Croats will find very difficult to win by way of a real war.'

The daily says 'the president of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman was from the very beginning of Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in a considerably more delicate position than the Slovenes.'

Tudjman still faces negotiaitons with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as his principal partner, but also with premier of the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina Milan Babic, BORBA says.

Krajina, unilaterally proclaimed by Serbs living in areas in Croatia where they are in the majority, is not recognized by the Croatian authorities.

The daily says in its commentary that in case Tudjman were to opt for war in order to realize Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia he could have a much harder task than Slovenia's Milan Kucan, 'which is why Tudjman is keeping the war option aside.'

'Kucan took on a Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) which was not a military force but more of a group of leisure travelers, while Tudjman would be faced with both the JNA and the Serbs living in Croatia,' BORBA argues.

The Belgrade daily POLITIKA writes today about a 'universal political inability to reach a solution to the Yugoslav crisis in a peaceful and civilized manner.'

POLITIKA illustrates its view by the conduct of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, 'who did not sign the statement on the elimination from Yugoslavia of the use of force' after the Yugoslav Presidency meeting in Ohrid (Macedonia), and 'called Croatia's citizens to war.'

'Tudjman remains alone in his efforts to win a withdrawal of the JNA to its barracks and to elegantly explain the hostilies in Croatia by the existence and activities of Chetniks infiltrated from Serbia,' he paper concludes.

The Chetniks were armed Serbian collaborators during World War Two who were linked with the royalist government in exile.

Weekly Assesses Army Moves on Slovenia

LD2407192191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1359 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, July 24 (TANJUG)—The weekly VJESNIK U SRIJEDU today comments on the "modality of maintaining Yugoslavia without the Republic of

Slovenia, and with terrorism exercised against the Croats by Serbian extremists in and outside the Yugoslav Army."

The weekly, published in the capital of the Yugoslav republic of Croatia, illustrates the claim by saying that the "Yugoslav Army carried out a fictitious intervention in Slovenia on June 27."

The paper says that the intervention was intended to "prepare the European political public for a de facto independence of Slovenia from Yugoslavia," in the anticipation of a "concession from Europe implying that Croatia should be prompted to 'see reason' and agree that a kind of Yugoslavia is in its own interest."

"European monitors say that they 'are not in charge' of Croatia, while American Ambassador in Belgrade Warren Zimmermann has even exerted a sort of overt pressure on Croatia by a notoriously untrue and provocative statement that 'Serbs in Croatia are unprotected,'" argues VJESNIK U SRIJEDU.

It goes on to stress that Croatia has no choice but to turn its defensive tactics into an offensive one and to initiate fighting against the Serbian extremists, even though this change of tactics may imply open clashes with the Army (where local military commanders clearly side with the extremists).

The term "extremists" is used by Croatian authorities for Serbs in Croatia who engage in armed clashes with Croatian police and national guard units.

The weekly sees it as "Croatia"s advantage in this war" that the "Croatian people is protecting its homeland against the aggressors."

The Yugoslav People's Army was also denounced as an "aggressor" by the Slovenian leadership on June 27, when the Army was ordered to protect Yugoslavia's western borders on the territory of Slovenia.

Tudjman Condemns Army Support for Serbia

LD2407153691 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] The situation in Croatia today is extremely tense. Over the last 12 months we witnessed a war of limited proportions imposed by Chetnik outlaws. However, now we are facing not just the escalation of Chetnik-inspired terrorism but also the active involvement of the Yugoslav Army in the battle against sovereign Croatian authorities and against the defense and police forces of Croatia.

This was said in Zagreb today by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in an interview with the U.S. television station WTN. He stressed that until recently the attitude of the Yugoslav Army was a passive one. It allegedly wanted to separate the confronting sides but was in fact used as a shield for Serbian outlaws and terrorists on Croatian territory.

In some localities individual army units sided with the outlaws and used tanks and aircraft, Tudjman said, adding that he had left the Ohrid meeting because the demand for the army to return to barracks was rejected and because clashes with army units were underway at the time in Croatia.

The Croatian president stressed that the latest developments have led us to insist on the unconditional withdrawal of the army to barracks. We are therefore appealing to the EC to enlarge its observer groups in Croatia and even to have the blue beret peace forces ready in case it becomes necessary not just to prevent a war against Croatia but also to halt the escalation of war in this part of Europe, President Tudjman said.

Assembly Delegates Protest 'Illegitimate' Acts

LD2407203391 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Excerpt] We demand that the issue of illegitimate activity by the Yugoslav Assembly, monopolized by Serbian policy, be resolved at top state level. We oppose terror waged by the Serbian police and authorities and demand that Kosovo's problems be resolved peacefully and through political agreement. These are the key points made at today's news conference organized by the Croatian Information Ministry.

Djuro Vidmarovic, head of the Croatian delegation in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, said today's Federal Chamber session was unconstitutional and represented a fresh political attack by the Serbian delegation and government on the Yugoslav legislative system. The Constitution prescribes a special quorum for the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, which cannot function normally since Slovenia has withdrawn its delegation. The work of the Federal Chamber without the Slovenian and Croatian delegations would mean that these two republics are being put under tutelage of four Serbian delegations, because the Montenegrin delegation also does not act independently. [passage omitted]

Zagreb Daily Says Croatia Has Lost Allies

LD2407104591 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0847 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, July 24 (TANJUG)—The Zagreb daily VECERNJI LIST suggests today that Croatia should negotiate with the Serbs, scrap all cliches, and form a new strategy.

The decision on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) from Slovenia means that the Croatian political leadership has 'lost a powerful ally in the battle for Yugoslavia's transformation.'

The daily extrapolates by describing the events at the last two meetings of the Yugoslav Presidency in Belgrade and Ohrid, where Croatia was the odd man out in its positions.

'According to what we have learned, a "historic" Izetbegovic-Milosevic agreement is in sight. It seems that the Moslems are closer to a Serbian option of a Yugoslav community,' VECERNJI LIST writes, adding that it fears that Macedonia's politicians will side with this agreement.

All Croats who regarded the Moslems, Macedonians and ethnic Albanians as their 'natural allies' are politically naive, the daily says, adding that in the current situation even Slovenia is only a formal friend to Croatia.

Cease-Fire Agreement in Plaski Municipality

LD2407161791 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Representatives of the [Croatian] Ministry for Internal Affairs and the Plaski local municipality are putting themselves under unconditional obligation to end hostilities, and both sides will resolve a possible breach of this agreement together. This is the first article of an agreement signed in front of the Ministry for Internal Affairs building by (Ivan Stajduhar), head of the Karlovac police station, and Ante Ujovic, head of the Ogulin police station, and by Nikola Medakovic and Milan Bota in front of the Plaski local municipality. Let us hope that this is the first step toward permanent peace in this area, because ordinary people are sick and tired of conflicts and fears.

The agreement specifies that units of the Plaski Territorial Defense will be demobilized and return to their regular peacetime tasks. Both sides are pledging not to carry out terrorist and other activities. Only forces of the Ministry for Internal Affairs will regulate traffic in the Ogulin municipality. Signatories agreed to jointly secure the free flow of people and goods in the Ogulin municipality and in particular on the Ogulin-Josipdol-(Plaski Saborsko) road. An appeal is being made to all citizens of the Ogulin municipality who left their homes to return.

The following Army representatives attended the meeting at which the agreement was forged: Major General Trajcek Krstovski and Colonel Milos Krnjeta. The Plitvice army headquarters will oversee the implementation of the agreement.

Hungarian Weapons Reach Croatia Via Bulgaria

LD2407123391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1015 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Sofia, July 24 (TANJUG)—Director of the Yugoslav Customs Authority Radoslav Sekulic has told the Belgrade correspondent of the Sofia daily DUMA that Hungarian weaponry reached Yugoslavia via the Bulgarian port of Varna in late January of this year.

In a statement frontpaged by the daily today, the federal customs official claims that eight large containers full of Hungarian automatic rifles were loaded on the Yugoslav vessel Lipa, owned by the shipping company of Mali Losinj in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia on January 29. The shipment was allegedly declared for Abu Dhabi, but was instead unloaded in the large Croatian Adriatic port of Rijeka in the night between February 2 and 3.

The report of Bulgaria's possible involvement in arms running to individual Yugoslav republics has caused a considerable disturbance in Sofia and has been denied by the Bulgarian Government and Defence Ministry and by some export firms.

The Bulgarian Government has imposed an embargo on the sale, re-export and transport of arms to neighbouring Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian media have put Sekulic's statement into the context of an 'anti-Bulgarian campaign waged constantly in Yugoslavia.'

Councils Expect 'Decisive Attack' by Serbs

AU2407202391 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Stanko Pevac, of Novi Sad Television, report from Borovo Selo]

[Text] After a sleepless night, the residents of Borovo Selo have spent yet another tense day. Even though shooting has not stopped for weeks between Borovo Naselje, which is held by members of Croatia's Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Guard troops and Borovo Selo, which is defended by armed inhabitants who also include Croatian neighbors, tension has considerably increased in the last 24 hours.

There are several reasons for this. It is thought here that the Ohrid declaration on establishing a cease-fire will suffer the same fate as the Brioni Declaration, that is to say, it will not be respected. Guardists are setting up ground-to-ground missile launchers in Borovo Naselje, although it is not yet known where they are aimed.

There has also been a breakdown in post office and telecommunications service and road and rail transport that has lasted for several weeks, and electricity is often cut off.

Guardists also hit (?Crepulje), the border area between Borovo Selo and Borovo Naselje, with mortar fire today. Members of the Yugoslav People's Army were also shot at.

Because of the aggravated [word indistinct] political situation, the Executive Committee of the National Council for Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem met in Borovo Selo last night. In a statement for Novi Sad Radio and Television, [name indistinct] Hadzic, president of the government, stressed that armed Serbs are still on the defensive, but they will soon launch a decisive attack. Their aim is to liberate themselves from the revived Ustasha authorities, as they say, and full accession to Serbia on the basis of the generally expressed will of the Serbian people who live in this area. This will be much sooner and will last for a much shorter time than even the greatest optimists expect, Hadzic thinks.

At the session of the government of the National Council, it was decided that apart from the old ministries of internal affairs and territorial defense, new

organs of authority would be set up. These are ministries for a (?market economy), information, foreign affairs, education and religion, and health and social welfare.

The session was not attended by all the government members because fighting continues in their towns and more is expected.

Sibenik Situation 'Far from Stable'

LD2407202791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1845 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Split, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Following this morning's armed clash between the Krajina units and policemen of the [Croatian] Ministry for Internal Affairs north of Sibenik, near Bratiskovci—which started with an attack of [Milan] Martic's men on a police patrol—the situation was under control of the special units of the Ministry for Internal Affairs by around 1900. No shooting was recorded at that time.

All news bulletins of Croatian Radio and TV today opened with reports from this—as they assess—new flashpoint of crisis in Croatia.

Four seriously wounded Croatian policemen, one of whom is in a critical state, are in the Sibenik medical center. It appears that they are the only victims of this morning's clashes.

The situation is far from stable. The Croatian special policemen cannot get through to the village of Plastovo and several other points held by "Chetniks", as members of the Krajina police units and their reservists are called here. There are two Croatian policemen in villages near Plastovo—Svlavci and Rupe, with Croatian population. The special units canot reach them and the villagers.

Almost all Croats have been evacuated from this part of the Sibenik municipality during the day. The Army helped them by providing coaches. The commander of the Sibenik garrison promised that he will assist in efforts to persuade Martic's men to release the villagers and two policemen.

The night is full of anxiety and uncertainty. The question is whether four wounded Croatian policemen will be the only victims of one more irrational armed conflict at this unlucky soil or whether a new flashpoint of crisis has been opened in Croatia. Tomorrow may provide answers.

Attacks in Knin Area Described

AU2407203191 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Danko Peric report from Knin]

[Text] There was an armed struggle in Plastovo near the hamlet of (?Sladici) this morning between the Serbian village guards and the Knin militia on the one side and members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and armed members of the Croatian Democratic Community on the other. There has been a cease-fire in nearby Bratiskovci since noon. This is sometimes disturbed by shots, and the cease-fires meant to last for one hour are also being violated. In such an hour-long cease-fire, officers and soldiers from the Knin and Sibenik garrisons of the Yugoslav People's Army managed to evacuate a number of people, mainly elderly women, from the hamlet of (?Sladici).

The ethnic Croatian inhabitants there have, with substantial misgivings, joined this organized temporary exodus masterminded by members of the Yugoslav People's Army. Military transport vehicles are situated in the center of Bratiskovci. Numerous Knin militia men can be observed, but also many hunting rifles and M-48 rifles.

It is almost certain that four members of the Ministry for Internal Affairs forces were wounded this morning, one seriously. An exceptionally disruptive night is expected in this village, from which the Serbian elderly and children have moved to Kistanje while the Croatian elderly and children have gone to Sibenik.

Twice this morning at 0430 [0230 GMT] and twenty minutes later, members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces attacked (?Srackovo Selo) near Udbina. The attack was carried out from the nearby Croatian village of Podlapaca, that is to say, it was carried out by members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces stationed on the Ljubovo pass.

We have learned that no one was killed or wounded, but that bullets and probably mortars hit the house of the local village postman Rado Ljubovic. According to reports that have been arriving this afternoon, members of the Ministry for Internal Affairs forces intended to repeat this action and include the villages of Barlete and Vrebac.

Six Guardsmen Killed East of Osijek

LD2507075891 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Excerpts] Six members of the National Guard Corps were killed and at least 15 injured during an attack by the Yugoslav Army on National Guard positions within the territorial defense center in Erdut [east of Osijek] and on the Vodovod [water supply enterprise] holiday camp near Dalj. At 0150, heavy machinegun and tankfire was opened from neighboring Vojvodina and from the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo bridge. The holiday accommodation was completely demolished and several privately owned houses, the Territorial Defense medical center, and a wine-cellar in Erdut were hit.

When it became obvious that a large number of guardsmen were injured, an attempt was made to contact the Osijek garrison command to ask them to allow an ambulance to pass through Bijelo Brdo. However, Colonel Stojancev refused the plea which meant that between 0230 to 0500 the injured did not receive any medical aid. Eventually they were all admitted to hospital to Osijek. [passage omitted]

At about 0100 this morning mortar shells were fired at the village of Sarvas from the direction of Bijelo Brdo. According to latest reports from the police authorities fire was opened on Sarvas again at 0700 this morning and the village is still under attack. [passage omitted]

Two National Guardsmen Killed in Vinkovci

LD2507074191 Zagreb Radio Croatian Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] In a serious incident in Vinkovci two members of the National Guard Corps reserve force were killed and one injured. Gran Mijajlovic, a Yugoslav Army sergeant and member of KOS [army intelligence], who caused the incident was also killed.

Sergeant Mijajlovic, who was in civilian clothes and in the company of Boban Kalimancevic, a Yugoslav Army reserve officer, provoked an armed clash in a cafe in Vinkovci with the guards. When the news spread about the sergeant's death, the Djuro Salaj barracks in Vinkovci telephoned the local medical center instructing them to have necessary equipment and facilities ready as there were going to be a large number of dead and injured. At about 2330 last night tank engines were started inside the barracks. Radio Vinkovci continued to broadcast warnings to the population. The tank engines were switched off at 0100 after Kalimancevic, who was injured in the incident, told a medical center official that the incident was caused by sergeant Mijajlovic who first provoked and then shot at the National Guardsmen.

Shoot-Out in Vinkovci Leaves Three Dead

AU2507072491 Paris AFP in English 0008 GMT 25 Jul 91

[Text] Vinkovci, Yugoslavia, July 25 (AFP)—Three people died and two were injured when a fight between federal army officers and Croatian national guard members broke out in this tense eastern Croatian town late on Wednesday, a local doctor said.

Dr. Josip Dolanski of the Vinkovci hospital said the dead were two Croatian guardsmen and a federal soldier. One of the injured was a civilian.

Vinkovci, located in a part of Croatia which is home to a large Serbian minority, was one of the flash-points in violence which left at least 20 people dead in eastern Croatia on Monday.

Wednesday's clash occurred in a cafe not far from the city's army barracks, when a brawl between patrons turned into a shoot-out. Dr. Dolanski said that none of the victims had been in uniform at the time.

He said he had been able to identify the dead soldier by his military identification papers, found on his body.

The inhabitants of Vinkovci are living in fear of intervention by the federal army, which Croats widely perceive as being dominated by the Serbs, their sworn enemies.

Serbia

Government Statement Condemns Mesic

LD2407165391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1309 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—"We consider it necessary to tell the public that SFRY Presidency President Stipe Mesic should in future behave in keeping with the minimum dignity befitting the position which he holds, since he himself does not possess personal dignity nor personal elements of human honor. By the very fact that he made unfounded allegations against Serbia with a fresh series of lies, Mesic intended to jeopardize the Ohrid statement for peace at the same moment, on the same day when it was adopted by almost all the participants of the session over which Mesic was presiding." This is stressed in a statement from the government of the Republic of Serbia which was sent to TANJUG today.

The statement goes on to say that Mesic, in his capacity as president of the SFRY Presidency, yesterday proclaimed "official Serbia" as primarily responsible for the current situation in Yugoslavia. He said, inter alia, that Serbia "is paying Martic's [Krajina Internal Affairs secretary] policemen and sending armed Chetniks into Croatia." He accused Serbia of wanting "to seize Croatia," of being "to blame for the destruction of the Croatian economy," and of directly inflicting on Croatia damages amounting to $2 billion. In this connection, Mesic states: "The problem lies in the fact that this war psychosis serves the interests of someone who wants to achieve their political aims, but will, under great pressure from the domestic and world public, agree to dialogue in the search for a peaceful solution of the crisis." These and similar totally unfounded allegations by Mesic against Serbia are now new and come at a time when the situation in the country has reached boiling point and when matters have come to bloodshed on the territory of Croatia itself, stresses the statement by the government of the Republic of Serbia.

The man who became candidate for the post of president of the Presidency, by announcing the certain disintegration of Yugoslavia, once again disqualified himself as a serious participant in the process of consideration and resolution of the political situation in the country, so his accusation of Serbia cannot be accepted by the foreign

and domestic public as serious and rational, the statement of the Serbian government stressed.

Djodan's statements in Zagreb, Tudjman's in Osijek, and Mesic's in Ohrid are all the result of the same policy of the Croatian leadership, which finds its main purpose in the prosecution of the Serbs from Croatia and in the war against Yugoslavia and Serbia and against truth.

The basis for the development of the so-called "democracy in Croatia" are the armed party units of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], which are being systematically trained for...alleged dialogue. The Serbian government is convinced that the Serbian people naturally cannot accept such a dialogue which is recommended to them by Mesic, the government statement says. Already several hundreds of human lives, tens of thousands of refugees, and numerous destroyed buildings on Croatian territory are proof that the policy of the HDZ is not a policy of a peaceful, democratic, and political dialogue.

By arbitrarily accusing Serbia and the Serbian people in front of the domestic and international public, Mesic is nervously trying to protest his own already shaken position and the positions of other Croatian leaders, whose hawks are increasingly running out of control throughout Croatia.

The Serbian government stressed in its statement that the fear of imaginary Chetniks is the fear of people who are seeking freedom, and of the equality of the Serbian people in Serbia and Croatia, andthat it is a consequence of the genocide inherited from the time of the Ustashas.

It is the height of cynicism when the persecuted Serbs, who are defending their homes, are called terrorists and Chetniks. Croatian reality is increasingly burdened by bloody consequences whose roots lie in fascist ideology. It is necessary that the Croatian leadership recognize that Serbs in Krajina, Banija, and Slavonija live on their own territory. That is why the Serbian population in those regions is forced to defend in a dignified manner its homes and freedom using all available means. The Croatian leadership will be able to implement European calls for peace only if it recognizes the natural rights of a nation to the Serbs, in the same way that the Serbian people recognize the rights of all other nations in Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the world. The Croatian people had their referendum in which they voted in favor of an independent and autonomous Croatia, and the Serbian people in Krajina and Slavonia in their referendum voted to remain within Yugoslavia, the Serbian government statement stresses. Because the Yugoslav People's Army is trying to safeguard the results of these referenda and the right of the people to self-determination and peaceful life, Mesic wants to make the armed forces retreat to barracks, where they become an everyday target for the HDZ so-called "political means"—from the barrels of Kalashnikov rifles bearing Ustashi insignia.

Contrary to what Mesic believes, the Republic of Serbia has always advocated freedom and equality of people; it has always advocated the existence of Yugoslavia and equal cooperation in Europe. The Republic of Serbia is convinced that this is in the interest of both the Serbian and Croatian peoples, and of the other nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia. As the president of the Presidency of the Yugoslav state, Mesic should respect this basic interest of the people, the Government statement says.

The government of the Republic of Serbia requries the SFRY presidency and the Federal Executive Council to do all within its power to stop the mass exodus of the Serbian people from Croatia. The SFRY Presidency, the Federal Executive Council, and other federal organs are requested to prevent entry into the country and ensure expulsion from the country of all foreign nationals who are involved as mercenaries in para-military formations in Croatia, the statememt by the Government of the Republic of Serbia concludes.

Serb-Romanian Relations Discussed

LD2407201191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1905 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase and his aides.

During the meeting the two sides discussed relations between Serbia and Romania. They drew attention to the joint interest in the further development of friendly relations and comprehensive cooperation, especially economic. To this end, both sides agreed on the need for more intensive contacts between the state organs of Serbia and Romania.

Apart from the members of the Romanian delegation the meeting was attended by Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister Branko Maksimovic; Aleksandar Prlja, chairman of the Committee for International Relations of the Serbian People's Assembly; as well as by Konstantin Girda, charge d'affaires of the Romanian Embassy in Belgrade.

Official Claims Serbians 'Preparing for War'

LD2407214191 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Report by VECERNJI LIST correspondent Sefki Luka, from Pristina]

[Excerpt] Kosta Bulatovic, vice chairman of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, announced in an interview with Radio Pristina's Serbian desk that Kosovo Serbs are preparing for war. He explicitly announced that tens-of-thousands of Serbian volunteers will take an oath to defend everything Serbian at Gracanica Monastery, near Pristina, on 28 July. Some units will be urgently dispatched to crisis areas in Croatia. These volunteer, Chetnik formations will be uniformed and armed.

Bulatovic said that the leading military experts are training these units for special tasks. [passage omitted]

Vojvodina's Bozovic on Hungarian Minority

AU2407134791 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 22 Jul 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Vojvodina Prime Minister Radovan Bozovic by Gyorgy Andras Lengyel; place and date not given: "Vojvodina Inalienably Belongs to Serbia"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the Vojvodina Executive Council, told our correspondent: According to responsible Serbian political officials, the Hungarian Government has rectified Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's statement according to which the Paris peace treaty made Vojvodina a part of Yugoslavia, not Serbia. Bozovic is a 38-year-old economist and head of government, and he is one of Yugoslavia's most publicized politicians.

[Lengyel] Mr. Bozovic, you recently criticized Prime Minister Jozsef Antall extremely sharply for his comment on Vojvodina. Could you give a more detailed explanation to your point of view?

[Bozovic] It is extremely important for the peoples of Hungary and Yugoslavia/Serbia to show patience and respect toward each other. We have the right to expect our western neighbor to show understanding in connection with Yugoslavia's current crisis. I am pleased to say that there is not a single unresolved issue in Hungarian-Serbian relations. I am convinced that the Hungarian state and Hungarian Government want to maintain good-neighborly relations with Serbia. So I consider Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's statement to be "invalid," because the Hungarian Government later rectified it, and the redrawing of borders is not in Hungary's interest or intention. I think that the reaction of Hungary's democratic public opinion to certain parts of Antall's statement was acceptable. I hope that government officials in Budapest are fully aware that the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Serbia is so good that it is almost unique in the world. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same about the Serbian national minority living in Hungary. I am confident that Hungary's new government is doing everything in its power to improve this situation.

[Lengyel] Why are you dissatisfied with the situation of Serbs in Hungary?

[Bozovic] Certain facts prove that over the past few decades, the Serbian national minority has not benefited from the advantages of mother-tongue education and a fostered culture. As the consequence of an inadequate nationalities' policy, only a few thousand people in Hungary call themselves Serbs nowadays, yet this figure was incomparably higher in the past. Moreover, the schooling of Serbian children is inadequate: They are only taught their mother-tongue and their literature in Serbian, they have to learn the rest in Hungarian. The participation of Serbs in information is also symbolic. Serbian churches and monasteries are neglected. I very much hope that these are merely manifestations of the past and that Hungary's democratic public opinion will vociferously demand that these issues be resolved at long last, in the spirit of European norms.

[Lengyel] You are unquestionably right from several points of view. Nevertheless, I think that the parliamentary debates in Belgrade on the language use bill or the education bill (for example) show far more dangerous tendencies. What is your opinion on that?

[Bozovic] Before answering that question, I would like to add some more personal comments on Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's statement concerning Vojvodina. The prime minister should really have known that the 1920 Trianon Treaty and the 1946-1947 Paris Treaty only determined the external borders of sovereign states, not the internal borders. That is why I was surprised by Jozsef Antall's attitude when he "alienated" Vojvodina from Serbia. The Hungarian community here belongs to Serbia both historically and ethnically, and in 1918, Hungarians in Vojvodina declared this to the whole world when they joined the Kingdom of Serbia-Slovenia-Croatia. Whatever the outcome of the SFRY crisis—naturally, Serbia would like to achieve a peaceful solution that guarantees the right to self-determination of our peoples—Vojvodina has to belong to Serbia for the aforementioned reasons.

[Lengyel] Excuse me, but to what extent do you think that it is a modern attitude to refer to historical rights and traditions at the end of the 20th century?

[Bozovic] I agree with you in the sense that this can only be one of the criteria—not the sole criterion—when we evaluate the present circumstances. However, please remember that the Yugoslav federation of states, which was put together with such great difficulty, is starting to fall apart. Internal borders—which were drawn up administratively after World war II—do not correspond to national and national minority relations. Slovenia's and Croatia's secession efforts shattered our illusions of a peaceful solution to the crisis and a simple redrawing of realistic internal borders.

[Lengyel] Thank-you for your argumentation. Let us now return to the legislative debates on the language use bill and the education bill.

[Bozovic] I understand the Hungarian state's and Hungarian Government's natural wish to find out about the fate of Hungarians living outside Hungary. I do not see this as interference in the SFRY's domestic affairs. Naturally, it is understood that the Hungarian Government respects the principles laid down in interstate agreements.... As far as your concrete question is concerned, I have to tell you that the Serbian Constitution is one of the few European constitutions to declare that all

Serbian citizens are equal; consequently, the Serbian Constitution enables non-ethnic Serbs to enjoy full civic rights.

[Lengyel] However, a constitution is only worth something if it is implemented. I have often noticed that schools and cultural centers are closed down in Vojvodina—Hungarian institutions, of course. Churches are run down and the Hungarian-language press is struggling with incredible financial difficulties. Would you not agree?

[Bozovic] I agree that it is easier to formulate a constitution than to implement its regulations. However, I have to state that in the spirit of the new law on language use (which will hopefully be passed soon), all national minorities will be able to use their mother tongue officially in those communities where they form the majority; naturally, in Serbia, the official language will be Serbian, and the Cyrillic alphabet will be used. The same principle will apply to education and general culture. I would be incredibly pleased if any of our neighboring countries instituted similar constitutional guarantees for the rights of the Serbian national minority. I agree that there are some practical difficulties in general and secondary education, and there are some problems with university-level scientific degrees, but we are trying to solve these problems "en route." I would like to point out that the same problems apply to the Serbian education network.... particularly in communities that are predominantly Hungarian.... However, it is an undeniable fact that in Vojvodina, the people who work for Hungarian education and culture, and those who work for the Hungarian-language press, radio, and television, have enjoyed exactly the same rights as Serbs for decades.

[Lengyel] What is your opinion on the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK]? What do you think about the statements according to which the VMDK is a vehicle for irredentist and chauvinistic propaganda?

[Bozovic] The VMDK is a legitimate political organization, and it participates in Serbian public life perfectly legitimately. Just like any other similar organization, it should show greater respect for the codes of behavior and operational rules that bind political parties. The VMDK does not have the right to proclaim itself as the sole champion of Hungarian rights. Firstly, this is destructive for relations between nationalities, and secondly, there are other political parties that also include many Hungarian members. I would like to add that Serbian parties do not have the right, either, to proclaim themselves as the sole defenders of Serbian citizens' rights. Be that as it may, I think that the statements and political moves made by some VMDK leaders will have a negative effect on the relations between the nationalities that live in Vojvodina. For example, I did not see the justification behind a statement made by Andras Agoston, chairman of the VMDK, according to which Hungarians living in Vojvodina are in danger. Maybe that would simply be convenient for Mr. Agoston and his party; by constantly stressing this danger, they could come to play a more important role in the public life of our Republic and our province. Mr. Agoston also stated that Hungarian youths should not have to serve in the Yugoslav People's Army: According to the rules of a constitutional state, Mr. Agoston's statement borders on incitement to desert. Fortunately, there was no reaction to this appeal. Indeed, young ethnic Hungarians see Serbia as their homeland. They have the same rights and obligations as anybody else.

[Lengyel] What would happen if the young Hungarians living in Croatia (for example) heeded Defense Minister Martin Spegelj's appeal and joined the armed forces in Croatia, thereby shooting at their Hungarian brothers who serve in the Yugoslav People's Army?

[Bozovic] The Yugoslav People's Army is fulfilling its duties by defending the country's borders and trying to prevent reemerging conflicts between nationalities. The so-called Croatian Army is nothing but the armed wing of the governing party, the Croatian Democratic Community. In other words, it is an illegal formation. As an intellectual, you probably know that the arming of parties is a fascist phenomenon. Fortunately, the greater part of the population has not been poisoned by fascist Croatian slogans, and they do not listen to Martin Spegelj's and the Croatian Democratic Community's appeal.

[Lengyel] Mr. Bozovic, many people see the Yugoslav People's Army as the armada of a political party, namely the Socialist Party of Serbia. Is that incorrect?

[Bozovic] I see that opinion as malicious and artificially construed speculation. Not only the Army's soldiers, but also its officers belong to different nationalities. I could even mention an example from Vojvodina, the province's Defense Minister Geza Farkas, who is an ethnic Hungarian. So I would like to repeat that calling the Yugoslav People's Army the army of a political party is pure speculation (to put it mildly). By preventing conflicts and pouring oil on troubled waters, this Army is paving the way for a possible negotiated solution to this crisis. Incidentally, soldiers had to be transported from their barracks to various parts of the country primarily because they had to defend endangered Serbian population groups against the attacks of political party armies, commandos, and other units.

[Lengyel] How do you visualize Vojvodina's future? Will this area be part of a federative or perhaps confederative Yugoslavia, will it be part of an independent Serbia, or will it be part of an independent and multinational state (modelled on Switzerland)—the latter being an idea suggested by a recently created party of Serbian intellectuals?

[Bozovic] We will definitely not accept the confederative solution. Our opinion is that those peoples who decide of their own free will to remain within Yugoslavia should do so. We try to respect the right to secede, and we would

like to find a peaceful solution to this crisis. Regardless of the way in which we solve this crisis, Vojvodina will inalienably remain a part of Serbia. It will enjoy the advantages of autonomy within the Serbian Republic. That is what happened in 1918, and in subsequent referendums, the population has made the same decision. The people's will triumphed then, as it will in the future.

Vojvodina Paper Assesses Hungarian Press Analyses

AU2407133691 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 22 Jul 91 p 2

[Unattributed report: "MAGYAR SZO Also Criticizes"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In an article entitled "More Fairy Tales Than Truth," the Vojvodina newspaper "UJVIDEKI MAGYAR SZO" [Vojvodina Hungarian Word] writes: "Our impression is that Hungarian newspapers are tainted by intrigues. They follow our mass media very closely, thereby nestling into the general chaos that rules in Yugoslavia.

"Our neighbors, it seems, hope for Yugoslavia's quick disintegration and division. As we know, Austria has an eye on part of Slovenia, Ramiz Alia has been hoping for a Republic of Kosovo in Serbia for a long time, and in the Hungarian press and television we can read and hear about the establishment of refugee camps for Yugoslavs. In fact, at the beginning of this month, the military units along the SFRY-Hungarian border were in a state of alert because they thought they would have to defend themselves against frightened Yugoslavs."

Magyar Villages Threatened by Serbs

LD2407172691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Jozsef Kroner report from Osijek]

[Text] The villages of (Szent Laszlo), Korog, and Osijek inhabited by Magyars are still in the center of attention of Hungarian and foreign public opinion.

Korog, a settlement of 800 people consisting almost entirely of Magyars, was fired on again last night from neighboring villages inhabited by Serbs. According to information, four shells struck the territory of the village, fired from a mine-thrower. Unfortunately, we do not know about the consequences, for telephone links were cut off with the people of Korog a week ago. According to our information, evacuation of the village has started.

In (Szent Laszlo), following the fierce clashes yesterday, which were again ended by the army by establishing a buffer zone, last night and today were apparently calm. Despite this, the people of (Szent Laszlo) feel threatened and they have decided that together with the villages of Korog, Haraszti and (Svet) they will send a delegation to the Hungarian parliament. For it is to be feared that the army which marched into Palacsa yesterday—where they were received with great enthusiasm—delivered new ammunition and weapons to the terrorists.

40,000 Apply To Join Serbian Guard

AU2407203591 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Srdjan Savic report]

[Text] Forty thousand volunteers have applied to join the Serbian Guard under the auspices of the Serbian Renaissance Movement. After the selection process and training, they will be organized in a guard of 5,000 people whose units will be sent to all territories where Serbs are threatened. This was stressed at a news conference at the Faculty of Education in Belgrade by Zoran Kojic, vice president of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Renaissance Movement. Srdjan Savic has the details:

[Savic] The Serbian Guard is not a party army but a Serbian army, its organizers claim. The idea to set it up arose because of the position of the Serbian people outside Serbia and because the Croats have already organized this kind of armed formation.

Leaders of the Serbian Renaissance Movement do not hold any posts whatsoever in the guard, which should be only a part of a future Serbian army. So far, 40,000 volunteers have applied to join, of which 60 percent do not belong to any party.

Answering the question on who is bothered by the Serbian Guard and why, Djordje Bozovic, commander of the Serbian Guard, stressed above all Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, and representatives of the ruling party, accuses them of having a monopoly on the defense of Serbianism.

Serbia Turns Back Albanian Recruits for Croatia

LD2407224191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1812 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Krusevac, July 24 TANJUG—The police in Krusevac (Yugoslav Republic of Serbia) today announced that it cut off the channel by which ethnic Albanians from the Province of Kosovo were transferred to the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, where they were recruited into Croatian armed units.

The Krusevac police said it intercepted a bus of a Slovenian private bus operator passing through the city and which was carrying over 50 ethnic Albanians and sent them back to their homes in Kosovo.

Ethnic Albanians said they were headed 'to visit cousins in Croatia' and that the private bus operator maintained a Ljubljana- Zagreb-Janjevo line and back.

The police indicate that it is characteristic that in the bus, apart from young ethnic Albanians, there were no elder persons or passengers of other nationalities.

Kosovo Officials Present Demands to Mesic

LD2407173691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1253 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Zagreb, 24 Jul (TANJUG)—Today's guests at the regular news conference held in the Croatian Ministry for Internal Affairs were Ilias Ramajli and Professor Skender Skenderi, who introduced themselves as vice president and member of the "Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo" and briefed the journalists on four categories of demands which they presented to SFRY Presidency President Stipe Mesic today.

"At our request we were today received by the president of the [SFRY] Presidency and asked him to demand that the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia publish its decision on the constitutionality of the Serbian Assembly's legal documents on the suspension of the assembly, the executive council and state organs [of Kosovo], as well as on the dismissal of Riza Sapundziju," Ramajli said.

The second category of demands refers to an annulment concerning the soldiers who left the Yugoslav People's Army units, "insistence on the disarmament of Chetnik formations at present in Kosovo," and to the demand that recruits "of the Albanian people" should do their military service exclusively on the territory of Kosovo, possibly in Macedonia.

Ramajli pointed out that "Albanians, as the third largest nation in Yugoslavia, have so far had no opportunity of taking part in talks on the country's future" and that a demand was presented that "from now on they should attend and take part in these talks regardless of whether they are conducted between subjects in Yugoslavia or whether the international community is present."

"Considering that the Brioni declaration does not directly mention Kosovo, we asked the president to do what he can so the responsibilities of the observer mission should expand so as to include the region of Kosovo and so the legitimate Albanian representatives could take part in the talks which start on 1 August in the presence of the EC representatives," Ramajli said.

Asked by a journalist what was Mesic's response to these demands, Ramajli said that "these decisions are within the jurisdiction of the Presidency." Ramajli failed to give a direct answer to the question of a foreign correspondent on whether "representatives of the Republic of Kosovo contacted Tirana in connection with any possible future solutions."

BORBA Views Ethnic Albanian Moves in Serbia

LD2407191491 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1349 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Belgrade, July 24 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily BORBA which is close to the Yugoslav Government, writes today that the leader of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova has taken over the leadership of the five most influential parties rallying ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo.

"This was to be expected after his stay of several days in Albania, and after the information that in all Kosovo communities, Albanians have started organizing themselves into paramilitary units and arming themselves," underscores BORBA.

BORBA recalls that the five most influential political parties of Albanians in Kosovo have formed a coordinating board, regardless of differences in programmes, because "they all have a common goal."

"Until recently, while secession had not acutely affected certain parts of Yugoslavia, the ethnic Albanian parties had publically proclaimed that they were struggling for Kosovo to become a republic, within the federation or a confederation. Now that Yugoslavia has been reduced to 'what is left of it,' they are urging for a 'sovereign state of Kosovo' and 'a sovereign Albanian people in Yugoslavia," writes BORBA.

BORBA assesses that once they have become "sovereign" their final goal "is the right to decide on secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia."

BORBA writes that after the forming of the coordinating board, it can be expected that the national front of all Albanians will be formed, to be followed by a new government and war council.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Democratic Action Demands Army Units Demobilize

LD2407223191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1808 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Sarajevo, July 24 (TANJUG)—Vice President of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) Salim Sabic today demanded the demobilization of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) corps which are to be transferred from the Yugoslav republic of Slovenia to Bosnia- Hercegovina and Serbia.

At a news conference today, Sabic said the demand by the SDA would be sent to the Yugoslav state Presidency, the government and the general staff.

The Yugoslav state Presidency last Thursday decided that two JNA corps should be withdrawn from Slovenia and moved to Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia.

Sabic said the SDA would demand that the respective units be completely demobilized and military equipment stored.

The SDA proposes that the funds earmarked for these purposes be redirected to social and medical security and education, Sabic added.

The Moslem-dominated SDA is the largest national party in multi-ethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina. The ruling three-party coalition includes also the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

SDA leader Alija Izetbegovic is president of the republican Presidency.

The HDZ of Bosnia-Hercegovina yesterday opposed the transfer of a JNA corps from Slovenia to Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Macedonia

Gligorov Meets Dumas, Urges Compromise

LD2507045691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2230 GMT 24 Jul 91

[Text] Paris, July 24 (TANJUG)—After meeting with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, president of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov on Wednesday night stated that a compromise was necessary in Yugoslavia because "not one republic can attain its maximal goals." Gligorov told a press conference in Paris that "conditions existed for reaching such a compromise." He informed newsmen that experts of the European Community were considering proposals of such a compromise.

The Macedonian president stated that an agreement would be hard to reach in Yugoslavia without the aid of independent experts, such as representatives of the E.C. He specified that he "primarily meant aid, not pressures."

Gligorov also noted that the session of the Yugoslav Presidency together with the presidents of the Yugoslav republics in Ohrid "opened very well, that accord was reached quickly on the first item of the agenda", but that the "disagreement emerged after reports came in about heavy clashes in Croatia."

A statement on peace was adopted at the Ohrid meeting, but it was not accepted by Croatia's representatives - Stipe Mesic and Franjo Tudjman.

Croatian President Tudjman left the presidency session.

On that day, July 22, two aircraft of the Yugoslav Air Force destroyed a testing ground of Croatian National Guard at Novi Kovci, after - according to Belgrade television - they were shot at from there. According to unconfirmed reports, a total [words indistinct] were killed.

Gligorov indicated that in [word indistinct] days a new meeting of the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics is to take place.

VMRO Urges Macedonian Independence

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[Text] The Information Service of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] has issued a statement. The statement says, among other things: The proclamation of the independence and autonomy of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia and the decision of the SFRY Presidency on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army from the territory of Slovenia have changed the constitutional and legal status of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia no longer exists. It is the view of the Republic of Macedonia that it cannot remain in a curtailed federation.

(?In this respect) there is no longer any conflict in our call to the Macedonian people for national unity and to be prepared for a historical moment. All of us together, regardless of political, party, and religious affiliation, (?should carry out) with dignity the proclamations of independence and autonomy.

Those who oppose the Macedonian people and the sovereign state are those who claim that Macedonians cannot independently rule themselves and survive. It is demanded that the Macedonian assembly ask the United Nations to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Macedonia. The withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army should begin from the territory of Macedonia and the defense of the Republic of Macedonia should be entrusted to the Territorial Defense of Macedonia.

The VMRO-DPMNE pursues the peaceful and democratic resolution of all contentious questions among the states, as well as the continuation of dialogue for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. This was included in the statement issued by the Information Service of the VMRO-DPMNE.

Montenegro

Bulatovic Fears Slovenia Will Hinder Withdrawal

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[Text] Titograd, July 24 (TANJUG)—President of Presidency of Montenegro Momir Bulatovic on Wednesday expressed fear that Slovenia "would not let the Army leave honorably" this republic and that "the Yugoslav Army would have to, defending its honor, forget considerations as regards large number of casualties."

At a political gathering on Wednesday, Bulatovic stated the view that the "operation of Army's withdrawal from

Slovenia would be hindered" and that Slovenian Defense Minister Janez Jansa "would not permit the military technical means to leave."

In case the Army was hindered, human losses would, as Bulatovic said, be the "price the Slovenian leadership would have to pay because of its inexplicably unreasonable attitude and conduct, which lacks all sense of morality and other positive human features."

The Yugoslav Presidency on July 18 ordered that the Yugoslav Army withdraw from Slovenia.

Bulatovic also said that Croatia has put forth at the presidency session in Ohrid two days ago a war ultimatum. At this session an appeal for peace was made which Presidency President Stipe Mesic, from Croatia, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman refused to sign. Croatia, as Bulatovic said, posed at the Ohrid presidency session a condition that "unless they signed the decision that the Army stationed in Croatia would withdraw to barracks" it (Croatia) would take it as if "war was declared on it." In other words, Bulatovic [word indistinct] declared war on all others."

Bulatovic assessed that a withdrawal of Yugoslav Army units to barracks "would be tantamount to a disaster."

Parts of Croatia, with mixed or predominantly Serbian population, were experiencing armed clashes between Croatian police and National Guard, on the one side, and armed Serbs, on the other.

The Army plays the role of a "buffer" zone and its task is to separate the conflicting sides